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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the economic and political aspects of the 
Soviet distant water fleet. The Soviet Union is the number two 
fishing nation, responsible for 12% of the world catch. The USSR is 
planning to further expand its efforts by implementing a multi­
faceted strategy to increase the quantity and quality of fish and fish 
products. However, future expansion is unlikely.
The 1990's will be a challenging decade for the Soviet fishing 
industry. Fish will remain a source of much sought after hard 
currency and food, but the prospects for the optimistic growth 
forecasted by the Soviet government are not realistic. Despite the 
current profitability of this industry, several factors limit future 
growth of this sector, including restricted Soviet access to coastal 
fisheries, depleted stocks worldwide, as well as the high cost of open 
ocean fishing operations. In addition, there is pressure for global 
conservation for many of the stocks targeted by the Soviet distant 
water fleet. This has led to the increase of regional management 
schemes in the South Pacific, East Caribbean, and the Antarctic which 
effectively close off most new areas of expansion to the USSR. As a 
result, the Soviet fishing industry has increasingly turned to 
developing its coastal fisheries and mariculture capabilities to 
increase its annual harvest.
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PREFACE
"Now, thank God, the period of stagnation is over." Perestroika1 
has brought renewed vigor to the Soviet Union not seen since Lenin's 
New Economic Policy (NEP) program was introduced in the 1920's. 
The goal of this reform is to raise the standard of living in the USSR 
through a major restructuring of the economy.
The main aim is to change the economic 
management of our country from the administrative 
(diktat or command) system developed over the last 
50 years to a radically new one, based on economic 
levers such as market forces, financial credits and 
other stronger economic stimuli. The whole process 
must be carried out alongside a general 
democratization of our society and a transition to 
self-administration in our enterprises.2
Economic growth will be accelerated through the intensification of 
production and the extensive democratization of management. 
Enterprises will transition from dependence on the government to 
self-financing and self-accounting.3
1Peres troika  was inaugurated in the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the
Central Committee. The June 1987 Plenary Meeting of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee adopted the "Fundamentals of 
Radical Restructuring of Economic Management."
2Abel Aganbegyan, Inside Peres troika . Harper & Row, Publishers, NY, 
1989, p. 1.
3Nikolai Ryzhkov, Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development 
of the USSR for 1986-1990 and for the Period Ending in 2000. Novosti  Press
Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1986, p. 19.
The main task of the five-year plan (12th five-year 
plan period)...consists in enhancing the growth 
rates and efficiency of economic development 
through accelerated scientific and technological 
progress, the retooling and technical 
reconstruction of industry, the intensive utilization 
of the existing production potential, an 
improvement of the economic management system, 
of the economic mechanism, and the attainment, on 
this basis, of a further rise in the Soviet people's 
living standard.
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Though the Soviet Union has the population and resources to 
make this country an economic superpower,4 the current reality of 
Perestroika is dismal. Officially, the national income grew by 3.6% 
from 1981-85. Unofficially, Soviet economists have said the 
economy has stopped growing. The net material product (NMP), the 
basic Soviet index analogous to the gross national product (GNP), was 
3.1% in 1985 and 3.6% in 1987 whereas Western analysts calculated 
real growth as closer to 0.8% for both years. Inflation is unofficially 
estimated to be 6-8%, fuelled by a budget deficit of 11% as opposed 
to 3% of GNP as in the United States.
The benefits of Perestroika  are not obvious to the average 
citizen. Soviet housewives spend at least the equivalent of one day’s 
work each week standing in line to do the shopping. Basic goods such 
as meat, sugar and detergent are often unavailable or rationed. 
Americans are nine times as likely to have a telephone and 12 times 
as likely to own a car.
In addition to economic problems, the USSR is facing political 
turmoil in its empire: 1989 was a tumultuous year for Eastern 
Europe. An avalanche occurred starting with the Solidarity sweep in 
the Polish elections last June. By August, General Wojciech Jaruzelski 
announced the first non-Communist government since the World 
War 11, and Tadeusz Mazowiecki was nominated as Prime Minister. 
In October, Hungary went even further and disbanded the 
Communist Party, renaming itself the Hungarian Socialist Party. 
Long-time Party Chief Erich Honecker resigned as head of East 
Germany and several weeks later the Berlin Wall, the symbol of the 
Cold War, the East-West schism, was turned into a mass of asbestos- 
ridden rubble. The East German Parliament rewrote its Constitution 
and scheduled free elections in 1990. In November, Party Chief
4The USSR has one sixth of the world's land area, over 22,400,000 square 
kilometers, abundant natural resources, more than 286 million educated 
people, including 1.5 million scientist (which is 25% of the world's total). The 
Soviet Union is a multinational state comprising of 15 Union Republics with 
over 100 nationalities. In 1920, the USSR had approximately 8% of the world's 
population, but only 1% of the total industrial output. By the late 1980’s, the 
USSR produced 20% of the total industrial output, surpassing the combined 
product of West Germany, Britain and France and second only to the United 
States. In other words, the Soviet output has grown 590 times since the 1920's.
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Todor Zhivkov was ousted in Bulgaria as were Milos Jakes and the 
Politburo in Czechoslovakia. The last holdout, Nicolae Ceausescu was 
overthrown December 22, after a week-long protest in which 
hundreds of protestors were killed by his security forces. He and his 
wife subsequently were tried and executed.
The break-up of the Soviet empire was part of Gorbachev's 
overall economic strategy which was to place bankrupt Eastern 
Europe into the hands of the West, relieving Gorbachev of this heavy 
financial burden. Gorbachev can now address the domestic economy. 
It is interesting to note that while Eastern Europe has been allowed 
to explode, Gorbachev has kept a tight reign on the political and 
racial unrest in the Baltic and southern territories.
Gorbachev is facing unbelievable challenges in this decade. No 
one knows what will happen next. Last year, few would have 
anticipated the demolition of the Berlin Wall and thousands 
demonstrating in Red Square. Dramatic changes in the Soviet Union 
are happening on a daily basis.
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GLOSSARY
Aeroflot
ATA
AtlantNIRO
AzcherNIRO
Azcherryba
BMRT
CCAMLR
CEAO
CECAF
CMEA
COMECON
CPSU
Dalryba
Soviet State Airline
American Tuna Boat Association
Atlantic Scientific Research 
Institute for Fisheries and 
Oceanography (USSR)
Azov-Black Sea Scientific 
Research Institute for Fisheries 
and Oceanography (USSR)
Azov-Black Sea Fisheries 
Administration (USSR)
Large Stern Factory Trawler
Commission for the Conservation 
of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources
West African Economic 
Community
Fishery Committee for the 
Eastern Central Atlantic
Council for Mutual Economic 
A ssistance
Council of Mutual Economic 
A ssistance
Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union
Far Eastern Fisheries 
Administration (USSR)
DWFN Distant Water Fishing Nation
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DWT Deadweight Tons
E2 European Community
HEa Exclusive Economic Zone
EPSEP Empresa Publica de Servicios
PesqueroslStzte Company for 
Fisheries Service (Peru)
FAO Food and Agriculture
Organization (United Nations)
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
FID Foreign Trade Organization
(USSR)
FYP Five Year Plan
GDR German Democratic Republic
Glasnost Openness-referring to the Soviet
policy of increased freedom of 
speech under Gorbachev
Main Administration of the 
Soviet Fishing Industry
Gross National Product
State Planning Committee of the 
Council of Ministers of the USSR
Gross Registered Ton
International Baltic Sea Fishery 
Commission
ICCAT International Convention for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tuna
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Glavryba
GNP
Gosplan
GRT
IBFSC
ICCLRSEA
ICCNPFS
ICES
ICNAF
IOC
IWC
KaspNIRO
Kaspryba
Kolkhoz
KPC
LOS
LSI
MFS
MRC
MRCI
International Convention on the 
Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the Southeast 
A tlantic
Interim Convention on the 
Conservation of North Pacific Fur 
Seals
International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea
International Convention for the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Inter-governmental Oceanic 
Commission
International Whaling 
Commission
Caspian Scientific Research 
Institute for Fisheries and 
Oceanography (USSR)
Caspian Sea Fisheries 
Administration (USSR)
Soviet Collective Farm
Kamchatka Pacific Company
Law of the Sea
Law of the Sea Institute
Motorized Fishing Station
Marine Resources Company
Marine Resources Company 
In ternational
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MRT
MRTR
MSY
NEAFC
NEP
NMFS
NMP
NOAA
CKD
Perestroika
PICES
PINRO
PRC
RCK
RTC
Sevryba
Small Trawler
Small Freezer Trawler
Maximum Sustainable Yield
North-East Atlantic Fisheries 
Convention
New Economic Policy
National Marine Fisheries Service 
(USA)
Net Material Product
National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration 
(USA)
Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development
Restructuring-referring to the 
current economic program in the 
USSR
Pacific International Commission 
for the Exploration of the Sea
Polar Scientific Research 
Institute for Fisheries and 
Oceanography (USSR)
People’s Republic of China
Republic of Korea
Resource Trading Company
Northern Regional Fisheries 
Administration (USSR)
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SFC
Sovkhoz
Sovrybflot
SRT
SRTM
SRTR
TAC
TINRO
UNCLOS
VNIRO
Zapryba
Sierra Fishing Company
Soviet State Farm
Soviet State Fisheries Company
Medium Size Fishing Vessel
Medium Size Trawler
Medium Size Freezer Trawler
Total Allowable Catch
Pacific Scientific Research 
Institute for Fisheries and 
Oceanography (USSR)
United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea
All Union Scientific Research 
Institute for Fisheries and 
Oceanography (USSR)
Western Fisheries 
Administration (USSR)
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INTRODUCTION
Soviet sea power has evolved since the 1930’s to become 
one of the primary maritime powers in the world. The basis for this 
incredible growth is the apparent integration of all aspects of its sea- 
use, including central management of the Navy, Merchant Marine, 
and research expeditions into a central policy.5
Soviet sea power evolved under the leadership of Stalin 
who promoted an offensive naval program by commissioning the 
construction of two 35,000 ton warships, a 12,000 ton aircraft 
carrier, as well as 19 destroyers, 18 submarines, and seven cruisers.6 
Khrushchev broadened the scope of Soviet sea power to include the 
Merchant Marine, fishing industry, and oceanographic research.
More recently, sea power has become an important part of 
Perestroika. Under this program more attention is focused on 
improving the domestic economic situation rather than increasing the 
country's military presence. During the new decade, Gorbachev's 
biggest challenge will be feeding the people. He inherited a 
disastrous agricultural sector which has been unable to feed the 
country since Stalin introduced collectivization in 1929. As a result, 
the USSR has had to turn to its fishing industry to provide the 
country with animal protein.
Soviet calculations show that currently it is more 
economical to fish than farm. For example, according to one Soviet 
economist, Dr. A.A. Aksenov, it takes 2,000-2,500 rubles of
5S.G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State. Naval Institute Press, 
Annapolis, MD, 1979, p. 42.
The fishing fleet (in its widest sense) is a 
constituent part of the civil fleet and an important 
component of the sea power of the state. The role of 
this fleet has sharply grown as a result of progress 
in the mastery by mankind of the World Ocean and 
increase in the scale of use of various marine 
products of animal and plant origin for food and 
industrial purposes. Its most important task consists 
in ensuring the solution of the acute food problem 
facing mankind.
6Donald C. Watt, "Stalin’s First Bid for Sea Power, 1933-1941," U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings. V. 90, N. 6, 1964, p. 90.
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investment to produce 100 kilograms of beef whereas it takes only 
1,500-1,700 rubles to produce an equivalent amount of fish. In 
addition, to produce one head of beef requires 20 man-days whereas 
to produce the equivalent amount of fish takes five days.7 As a 
result of the reduced labor costs, fish is less expensive. One gram of 
protein contained in cod can be purchased by Soviet consumers at 
1/6 the price for chicken, and 1/3 the price of mutton or beef.8 Over 
20% of animal protein in today's Soviet diet is from fish and sea 
products.
Unlike the agriculture sector,9 the fishing industry is 
p ro fitab le .10 The fishing industry produces 15 billion rubles gross 
income, including 12 billion rubles for commercial marketable 
products, which amounts to 2.5 billion rubles of profit each year.10 
The industry currently produces about 5,000 types of edible fish 
products and tins. In the period 1981-83 alone, 295 new fish 
eatables were introduced.11
This growth is not likely to continue. Until the mid-1970's, the 
fishing industry assumed that access to marine resources was limited 
only by the available technology and fleet capacity. However, 
worldwide depletions of commercial stocks from overfishing and the 
introduction of coastal jurisdiction over the most valuable grounds 
invalidated this assumption. Consequently, the Soviet fishing 
industry has been forced to explore new fisheries in the high seas 
and through the development of its domestic mariculture program.
7United States Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS), Office of International Fisheries, Fisheries of the U.S.S.R.. 1976.
Foreign Fisheries Leaflet N. 77-2, Government Printing Office, Washington 
D.C. , February 1977, p. 453.
8N.P. Sysoev, Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry, translated by the 
Israel Program for Scientific Translations for NOAA, NMFS, US Department of 
Commerce, and the National Science Foundation, Government Printing Office, 
Washington D.C., p. 5.
9Please refer to Appendix A on the Soviet agricultural sector.
10Press Release May 1989, my translation. Copy from Captain 
Konstantin P. Tkachenko, First Secretary of Fisheries Affairs, Embassy of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Washington D.C.
l^ Inrybprom  85 USSR, International Specialized Exhibition of Soviet 
Exhibits, Marketing Materials, Inrybprom,  Leningrad, 1985, p. 6.
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Emphasis in the 1990’s will be on improving the quality of the 
harvests, rather than only increasing the quantity of the catch. 
Perestroika  has greatly affected the fishing industry by stream­
lining the bureaucracy in the Ministry of Fisheries and making the 
industry accountable for its financial operations. Measures have 
been taken to modernize the fleet as well as improve the 
infrastructure of the fishing ports and onshore processing 
enterprises. Spoilage has been reduced due to the improvement in 
the transportation system and in more efficient distribution 
channels. In addition, the training and education programs have been 
improved making the fishing industry a highly skilled and desirable 
profession.
Despite these improvements, the future for fishing industry in 
the new decade is dim. Increased investment and focus on the 
agriculture industry will continue to take funds away from the Soviet 
fishing industry. In addition, the industry has less upward potential 
than the agriculture sector. The cream of the ocean resources has 
been depleted through pollution and overfishing. The extension of 
coastal jurisdiction in the 1970's has excluded the Soviet fleet from 
many of its traditional fishing grounds. No longer can the Soviet 
flotillas ’’annihilate” fishing grounds through overfishing as in the 
1960's and early 1970's. Instead the Soviet Union has had to 
negotiate for restricted access to coastal fisheries through bilateral 
agreements and by participating in joint ventures.
18
Soviet A dm in istra tion  and M anagem ent S tru c tu re
A study of the Soviet political organization as it relates to the 
bureaucracy of ocean and inland water policy making.
According to Soviet organizational chart, the Soviet Union has 
an integrated ocean policy. Fishery, merchant marine, naval, and 
research issues are closely coordinated into an overall centralized 
plan with military concerns traditionally taking precedence. Each 
maritime activity supports the Navy, thus, merchant marine, 
research and fishing vessels can be transformed into warships. In
addition, Soviet fishing vessels reportedly have been used for 
intelligence gathering. In one instance, up to 35 Soviet "fishing 
vessels" were used to monitor American military communications 
and radar installations, aided by the oceanographic vessel, the 
Cosmonaut Komarov.12 Under Gorbachev, the emphasis on ocean 
policy has shifted gradually away from the military to focus on
domestic issues such as feeding the population. As a result, fisheries
have been given increasing importance in the Politburo d ec ision ­
making process.
Theoretically, ocean policy is formulated through the Soviet 
system of democratic centralism. The Communist Party decides 
policy which is legislated by the Government and then administered 
by the Ministries. However, in practice, the Soviet Union is not much 
different from the United States in its bureaucratic decision-making 
process. In both countries, special interest groups lobby for 
favorable legislation to their sphere of influence.
On paper, the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) is the highest form of government, followed in 
descending order of importance by the Central Committee Plenum, 
Central Committee Politburo , and the Central Committee Secretariat. 
In reality, the order of importance is practically reversed with the 
Politburo making the most important decisions, followed by the
Secretariat, the Plenum, and lastly the CPSU.
The Politburo decides the direction of the Soviet economy. 
These plans are then implemented by the Government. The agenda
^ R o b e r t  A. Kilmarx, Soviet Sea Power. Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Special Report Series No. 10, Georgetown University, 
Washington, D.C., 1969, p. 98.
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of Politburo  meetings is secret. What probably happens is that the 
Politburo  becomes involved in fishery issues when they arise as part 
of larger domestic and foreign policy matters. The role of the 
Politburo  has changed over the years. In the 1930’s, Stalin alone 
decided most policy on both major and minor issues whereas 
Brezhnev depended on the consensus of the Politburo for decision­
making. Gorbachev appears to go one step further and seems to 
encourage open policy discussions in the current meetings.13
The Secretariat of the Central Committee is the administrative 
head of the Party with control over personnel appointments. This
includes the responsibility for filling positions in the Party and State
Trade Unions. It has been speculated that the Secretariat implements 
some of the every day business of the Politburo .
The Central Committee is responsible for directing all Party 
activity.
The CPSU guides the society's development primarily 
by elaborating and implementing a scientific 
strategy and tactic. It proceeds from a deep Marxist-
Leninist analysis of the laws of social development,
the sum totals of society's interests, its social
sections and groups, a comprehensive study of the 
peculiarities of one or another stage of the 
country's development and changes in the 
international situation .14
While the Party decides policy and direction for the USSR, the 
Soviet Government has the legal responsibility for implementing 
these plans. The Government is made up of the following branches: 
the Supreme Soviet,15 the President of the Supreme Soviet, the
13The current Politburo  appears to be losing some power. It used to 
meet every Thursday, now it meets only twice a month. Gorbachev has been 
able to hold his power base. On September 20, 1989, he removed two additional 
Conservatives from the Pol itburo,  including Mr. V. Nokonov for failing in his 
agriculture position.
14Leonid Abalkin, The Strategy of Economic Development in the USSR. 
Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1987, pp. 10-11.
15 Previously, the Supreme Soviet was the only body with the right to
legislate. It was made up of two chambers, the Soviet of the Union and the 
Soviet of the Nationalities and meets twice a year for three to five days. The
Presidium was the highest level of the Supreme Soviet and operated on a
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Council of Ministers and its Presidium, Ministries and State 
Committees, and lower level organs of the the state.
The structure of the government recently went through a 
major overhaul. On March 26, 1989, 1,500 were up for election to 
the Congress of People's Deputies,16 joined by 750 selected by public 
organizations ranging from the Communist Party to the Society of 
Stamp Collecting. Approximately 89% or 173 million registered 
voters took part in the election of the People's Deputies of the USSR 
elected in March, April and May 1989.
Under today’s system the Congress of People's Deputies will be 
the "highest organ" of the government. Members are directly elected 
by the people as well as appointed. This body in turn elects 542 
members to form the working parliament of the Supreme Soviet.17
The Supreme Soviet will set up a number of commissions to 
discuss all projects, add amendments to legislation, and draft new 
law s.18 In theory, the Supreme Soviet could pass a law over the 
objections of the Party. This is an unlikely occurrence since 90% of 
the members are Communists. In addition, if a bill were to pass the 
Supreme Soviet, the People's Deputies still could veto the bill.
continual basis with legislative powers when the Supreme Soviet was not in 
session. The body consisted of a Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and its
membership overlapped with the Politburo. Most of the fishery related work
in the Supreme Soviet was probably done in the Permanent and Ad Hoc 
Commissions. This body was responsible for examining and preparing draft 
legislation as well as ensuring that the drafts complied with Soviet law. They 
set up policy discussions and requested additional documentation from the 
Ministries. Subcommissions and Permanent Commissions were also created in
the regional levels of government.
16Please refer to Appendix B for an outline of the past and present 
structure of the Soviet government.
17Members of the government and other high officials cannot be 
elected to the Supreme Soviet. The intention is that members of the Supreme 
Soviet will treat that membership as their main occupation so as to devote their 
full attention to the workings of the government. The new Supreme Soviet 
will meet for 8 months a year compared with the approximately six days a year 
previously and will supposedly hold open debates on proposed legislation.
18There are now 14 parliamentary committees with approximately 40 
members each to create bills from the proposed drafts. Previously, the first 
drafts of new laws were drawn up in the Ministries, revised by the 
appara tch iks , and then rubber-stamped by the former Supreme Soviet.
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Gorbachev is President of the new legislature which competes 
for authority with the Communist Party of which Gorbachev is 
General Secretary. Gorbachev is using the new body to maneuver 
around the Brezhnev Old Guard still strong in the Party hierarchy, 
while at the same time, using the Politburo to keep the radical 
element in the new Supreme Soviet under control. Now that the 
USSR has a Parliament, the Central Committee is losing control over 
decisions as the Parliament has become the primary decision-making 
body.19
The Council of Ministers20 is elected by the Supreme Soviet and 
is wholly responsible to its electors. The same system has been 
adopted by all republics. More than half the members of the present 
Council of Ministers will be removed from their positions largely 
through retirement and attrition.21
The Ministries and State Committees coordinate and carry out 
policy decisions. According to Soviet sources, the overall number of 
Ministries dealing with basic branches of industry, construction, 
transportation, the agro-industrial and defense sectors will be 
reduced by almost 40%-from 52 to 32 Ministries.
Though the Ministries operate under the Party's directive and 
the laws of the Government, they are powerful because of their 
technical knowledge. This is especially true in fisheries where
19Since it is dominated by Conservatives, the Central Committee is 
failing to reflect or keep pace with the sweeping changes in the USSR. One 
year ago, Gorbachev emasculated its Secretariat, causing Politburo members to
worry that the Party was losing authority.
20Previously, the Council of Ministers was composed of Ministries, State 
Committees, Government Agencies and Councils, as well as the Chairman of the 
Republic Level Council of Ministers, and was responsible for direction and 
coordination of state organs. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers served 
as coordinator and also had overlapping membership with the Politburo.  Some
Western analysts thought that the Presidium would rely on subordinate 
Government agencies for specialists in fishery legislation.
2 N ikolai Ryzhkov, "Report to the First Session of the USSR Supreme 
Soviet," Pravda, June 11, 1989 in Reprints from the Soviet Press , V. 49, N. 4, 
August 31, 1989, pp. 31-33. The USSR Council of Ministers will comprise 57 
Ministries and committees; 25 existing ones will be disbanded. A State 
Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers for Economic Reform will be 
formed as a standing government body to oversee the day-to-day systems 
an alysis .
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technical knowledge is necessary in the decision-making process. As 
a result, the politicians are increasingly dependent on personnel— 
fishery economists and scientists—who sometimes are from outside 
the Communist Party structure for help in resolving issues and 
recommending policy.
Two categories of Ministries exist under the current system.
The first is the All Union Ministry which directly manages all 
administrative concerns in its field regardless of geographic location. 
The second is the Union Republic Ministry which works through 
counterpart Ministries in each Republic.
Previously, Ministers were appointed by the Central 
Committee, and now they are appointed by the Congress of People's 
Deputy. Each Ministry has a Minister with several deputies reporting 
to him as well as a specially appointed Collegium to act in an 
advisory capacity. If there is a difference of opinion between the 
Minister and the Collegium, the Minister implements his decision, but 
must inform the Govemment-basically one-man management in 
conjunction with collegium decision-making. Under Glasnost more 
information on the ocean policy-making process is available, and it 
appears that the Ministries today are more powerful than at first 
thought by Western analysts.
The first Ministry of Fisheries was created in 1918 in response 
to the food crisis after the Revolution. State management of the 
fisheries was introduced under the auspices of the Glavryba , the 
Main Administration of the Fishing Industry, in October of that year. 
Associations were established in the Volga-Caspian, Caucasian, White 
Sea, Aral and Northern Lake Regions. These bought fish from the 
local fishermen in exchange for materials and credits towards future 
food and gear purchases.22 The People's Commissariat of the Fishing 
Industry had been a division of the Food Industry, but became a 
separate organization in 1939. In May 1946, two Ministries of 
Fisheries were established, one for the Western and one for the 
Eastern regions. These were combined into the Union Republic 
Ministry of the Fishing Industry in December two years later.
22Sysoev, Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry, pp. 22-23.
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Fisheries affairs were moved into the Ministry of Light and Food 
Industries in 1953, and then shifted into the Ministry of Foodstuffs. 
The Union Republic Ministry of the Fishing Industry was established 
in April of the following year.
Khrushchev abolished the ministry format in 1957.23 In its 
stead, the Main Administration of Fisheries was formed under 
Gosplan , the State Planning Committee of the Council of Ministers of 
the USSR, in June 1960, and two years later, the State Committee for 
Fisheries was established with subordinate administrations in some 
regions. This was placed under the Council of the National Economy 
in January 1963, later to be reorganized back into the State 
Production Committee of Fisheries. The present form of the Ministry 
of Fisheries was established in October 1965.24
The current Ministry of Fisheries is responsible for the 
planning, administration and operations involving the fishing 
industry. The Ministry also runs fishery schools, manages repair and 
shipbuilding facilities, is involved in foreign relations, and 
determines the organization of labor and delivery of materials to its 
institutions. In the 1970’s, the Ministry fought for the right to sell
fish directly. Now the Ministry controls the export of fish which had
been under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.25
Moscow dictates the production plan which the Ministry in turn 
allocates to each fleet in a ratio corresponding to the number of 
vessels-units in each fleet. The allocation is made primarily in
monetary terms, but is also divided into categories such as types of
fish. For example, to calculate a plan for a factory refrigeration 
trawler ship with a capacity of 30 tons per 24 hours, the amount of 
fish frozen per hour is multiplied by the designated number of 
working days. With 200 working days the plan for vessel A would
23The system of ministries was re-established after Khrushchev's fall 
from power in 1964.
24Terese Sulikowski, "Soviet Management of Ocean Affairs: The Case of 
the Fishing Industry," Ph.D. Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1978, p. 
186.
25Press Release May 1989. The Ministry of Foreign Trade has lost its 
monopoly. A permanent authority, the State Commission for Foreign Economic 
Relations, was created under the Council of Ministers.
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be 6000 tons. If vessel A is affected by weather or breakdowns, the 
other vessels are responsible for completing the plan. So it is 
possible that a vessel's production target on a given voyage can 
exceed its actual capacity by 50% if other vessels in the flotilla are
unable to meet their targets. Production targets are calculated on the
basis of ungutted, untreated fish. Thus, 100 tons of raw fish are 
needed to produce 50 tons of salted fish.26
As a result of centralization, planning is often far removed 
from the management responsibility for fulfilling these targets. The 
setting of annual production targets at the regional and fishing fleet
level is divorced from management responsibility for fulfilling those
targets. It is important to note there is little motivation to improve 
the quality of the catch and reduce spoilage because the fleet 
management is not responsible for the marketing of the fish.
Another consequence of the centralized supply system is that it 
places a wall between the producer and consumer. Under such a 
system, the consumer cannot influence production to satisfy his 
needs. In addition, the centralized supply system has led to 
stockpiling of goods and parts for repairs. At least 460 billion rubles 
worth of goods are hoarded by factories and enterprises. This 
hoarding slows down the economy and becomes production for 
production’s sake, a problem the Government is trying to rectify 
under Perestroika .27 Now under USSR Law on Public Enterprise, the 
planning process is more regional and less dependent on Moscow for 
direction.
As part of Perestroika , a major reorganization of the Ministry 
of Fisheries is scheduled to begin in 1990. Currently, The Ministry is 
divided into approximately 40 working administrations, including six 
main administrations, with 20 divisions located in Moscow. The lines 
of authority run from Moscow to the republic branch Ministries and 
to the regional main basin administrations and enterprises.
26The different sources used for this dissertation state catch in terms of 
"tons" and/or "metric tons," sometimes interchangeably. I have used 
whichever wording was mentioned in that source. However, some of the 
sources state "tons" assuming the reader will think in metric.
27Aganbegyan, Inside Perestroika . pp. 32-37.
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The Ministry of Fisheries is headed by N.I. Kotlyar.28 He is 
assisted by the Deputy Minister, V.K. Zilanov, as well as five Deputy 
Ministers and the Collegium. Underneath the Minister are the five 
basin Chiefs and their staff: I.F. Denisenko in the Azov and Black Seas 
Region; A.A. Shaposhnikov in the Caspian Sea Region; N.T. Nosov in 
the Far Eastern Basin; S.V. Kireyev in the Northern Basin; and B.G. 
Sokolov in the Western Basin. The responsibility for Fish Breeding 
and the Inland Waters Main Administration is currently under Y.I. 
Stepanchikov. In addition to the basin administrations, the Minister 
is responsible for a number of departments including Protection and 
Reproduction of Fish Reserves and Regulations of Fishing; Stocking 
and Fishing in Interior Reservoirs; Design and Capital Construction 
Administration; Economic Planning Administration; Finance 
Administration; Fishing Kolkhozes Affairs Administration. The 
Ministry has its own finance and legal departments, communications 
and safety divisions, fish processing and sales divisions, foreign 
relations and protocol department, as well as a division entitled 
"Work with Sailors Traveling Abroad," and even a housekeeping 
adm inistration.
The existing departments of the Ministry of Fisheries were 
reduced to 12 in September 1989. The First Deputy and the Council 
for Science and Techniques report directly to the Minister. Five 
Deputies report to the First Deputy. The new departments include 
divisions focusing on living resources—Department for Fish Stocks 
Reproduction, Environmental and Enforcement, the Department of 
Science and Technology and the Department of Economics; the fleet— 
Department of Fleet Operations, Department for Safety, Navigation, 
and Labor Standards Control; production-Department of production, 
Department of Marketing, Department of Industrial Supply, and 
Department of Industrial and Social Construction; as well as one for 
training and education—Department for Personnel, Education, and 
Social Development; and the Foreign Relations Department which
28Please refer to Appendix C for three versions of the organizational 
chart of the Ministry of Fisheries.
27
oversees joint ventures through Sovrybflot , the foreign trading 
branch of the Ministry of Fisheries.
Five main basin administrations called glavki  were established 
in 1962 to provide regional direction for the local fishing efforts as 
well as to serve as links with the central administration. The basin 
administrations are responsible for fulfilling their regional plans and 
are responsible for the economic development of all the 
organizations, enterprises, and fishery kolkhozes  in their region. 
These bodies also have technical councils which act as advisory 
boards, consisting of senior staff members of the Ministry and 
functional administrations, scientists, experts, and inventors.
The five main administration basins are Dalryba, Sevryba, 
Zapryba, Azcherryba, and Kaspryba.  The names are a combination of 
the name for the region, i.e. Caspian, and the Russian word for fish, 
ryba , which when combined form the name Kaspryba.  Operations 
administered by these centers account for 90% of country's total 
catch and processing of fish food. Dalryba is responsible for the Far 
Eastern Basin, covering the Sea of Okhotsk, Bering Sea and the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans. It comprises the Maritime, Sakhalin, and 
Kamchatka administrations of the fishing industry as well as the 
Magadan, Okhotsk, Nizhne-Amur fishing industry trusts, the 
administration of the whaling flotillas, and the refrigeration fleet 
administration. The Vladivostok and Nakhodka fishing ports report 
to this administration.
Sevryba , the Northern Basin Administration, is responsible for 
the White, Barents and Norwegian Seas, and the North and Central 
Atlantic. It includes the Arkhangel and Karelian Administrations of 
the fishing industry, and operates in the Murmansk region. Zapryba , 
the Western Basin includes the Baltic, North Sea, Central and South 
Atlantic regions. This administration is also responsible for the 
Kalingrad, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian regions and the ocean 
fishing fleet based in Leningrad.
Azcherryba, the Azov-Black Sea Administration, operates in the 
Black, Azov, Mediterranean and Red Seas and Indian Ocean. It 
includes the Krasnodar, Rostov, Georgian, Crimean and Black Sea 
Administrations of the fishing industry. Kaspryba , the Caspian Sea
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Administration, operates in the Caspian Sea and includes 
responsibility for the Gurev, Turkmenian, Azerbaidzhan and 
Daghestan Administrations of the fishing industry.
All inland fisheries are handled by the Main Administration for 
Fishery Conservation and Fish Breeding and the Regulation of 
Fisheries. Regional questions related to the internal water bodies are 
handled by the Republican Ministries of the Fisheries, the Republican 
Main Administrations and administrations for the management of 
the fishing industry in internal water bodies and pond fishery.29
For scientific support, the Ministry has an impressive 135 
laboratories serving the All-Union Research Institute of Marine 
Fisheries and Oceanography in Moscow, Murmansk, Kalingrad and 
Vladivostok. VNIRO, the All Union Scientific Research Institute of 
Fisheries and Oceanography, is located in Moscow. Other institutes 
include: AtlantNIRO, the Atlantic Scientific Research Institute in 
Kalingrad and the Baltic Institute of Fisheries in Riga, with 
responsibility for the Central and South Atlantic regions and the 
Baltic; PINRO, the Polar Scientific Research Institute, located in 
Arkhangel working in the North Atlantic and Polar regions and the 
Norwegian Sea; TINRO, the Pacific Scientific Research Institute, on the 
Pacific Ocean with branches in Kamchatka, Sakhalin, Amur and 
Magadan; AzcherNIRO, the Azov-Black Sea Scientific Research 
Institute, located in Kerch and conducting work in the Southern Seas 
and the Indian Ocean; KaspNIRO, the Caspian Scientific Research 
Institute, in Astrakhan with a branch in Daghestan for work on the 
Caspian Sea. In addition, there are eight scientific research and 
development institutes in the Ministry of Fisheries working on 
fishery equipment and instrumentation. These institutes conduct 
research on fisheries that may directly benefit industrial operations 
and be of scientific interest.
The Ministry also sponsors exhibitions. The first was 
Inrybprom  68 held in Leningrad in 1968 in an attempt to exhibit 
Soviet achievements in the industry as well as encourage foreign 
companies to display their technological advances in this area. The
29Sysoev, Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry, p. 49.
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exhibit lasted two weeks and 75 million rubles in contracts were 
signed. The second exhibition held in 1975 was much larger and 
included participation from 400 organizations and 40 Ministries and 
departments as well as 284 foreign companies. During this one 
approximately twice the amount of contracts were signed worth over 
150 million rubles.30
In 1985, Inrybprom  85 was held, a specialized international 
exhibition with the full title of "Modern Means of Reproduction and 
Exploitation of Water Biological Resources" whose objective was to 
expand relations and technical cooperation among Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries and expand business ties with 
other countries for the cause of "peace and social progress.31 
Contributors included a number of Soviet All-Union foreign trade 
associations such as Sudoimport , Techmashexport , and Prodintorg.
The next exhibition, Inrybprom  90, is scheduled for August 1990 in 
Leningrad.32
In addition to the Ministry of Fisheries, ocean policy issues 
have input from related ministries including the Ministries of the 
Maritime Fleet, Shipbuilding, Finance, Foreign Trade, Land 
Reclamation and Water Resources, as well as direct input from the 
Ministries of Defense and Agriculture.
Ocean science research is accomplished through the Ministry of 
Defense, Ministry of Fisheries, Ministry of Maritime Fleet, Ministry of 
Higher and Specialized Education and the Ministry of Geology. The 
USSR Academy of Sciences which is subordinate to the Council of 
Ministers conducts and coordinates science research. The P.P.
Shirshov Institute of Oceanology at the USSR Academy of Sciences is 
a major center of oceanographic research. The Oceanographic 
Commission of the Academy of Sciences began work in 1951 and 
publishes the journal Okeanologiia. The State Committee for Science
30United States Department of Commerce, Fisheries of the U.S.S.R.. 1976. 
p. 387. Only one US company participated-the Xodar Corporation of Rhode 
Is land .
31Inrybprom  Marketing Materials, p. 3.
32 Deputy Minister of Fisheries V.K. Zilanov Speech, August 11, 1989, 
Tape 1, translated by the Department of International Affairs under the 
Department of Commerce, Washington D.C.
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and Technology uses a system of science councils to coordinate 
research across institutional lines.
Gosplan  is in charge of long-term and current planning on a 
national scale. Gosplan is the instrument used to translate decisions 
into productivity and has the capability to monitor, plan, and 
coordinate the five year plans (FYP). Ministries develop and submit 
plans for Gosplan  review. There is some personnel overlap between 
the Ministries and Gosplan which may indicate significant ministerial 
control over economic planning since the same bureaucrats who 
develop plans may be the same ones who approve them.33
Gosplan  has a fisheries industry division and the Ministry 
retains a Gosplan  liaison department. In addition, Gosplan  
coordinates all research and is in charge of the introduction of the 
achievements of science and technology into production.
Under Perestroika , the trend has been away from centralized 
decision-making to giving the regional administrations more 
autonomy and control over their industries. According to recent 
correspondence, the idea of centralized decision-making is 
"unreasonable.” In addition, the USSR has begun the process of 
reorganizing and streamlining the administration area by deleting 
branches and reducing the central and republican apparatus by 30 to 
50%. Under the new system, local Soviet enterprises can adopt their 
own plans that do not have to be approved by a higher authority. As 
a result, the centralized plan has lost a great deal of its importance as 
witnessed in the 1989 plan which has 52,000 fewer organizational 
headings.34
Sum m ary
Although the Soviet Union in theory has an integrated 
ocean policy, the cumbersome bureaucratic system makes the 
organizational system unwieldy. Currently, there are 32 
ministries in all sectors to carry out policy decisions. In addition
33It is interesting to note that Sysoev who is considered the authority in 
the USSR on the economics of Soviet fisheries is now the head of the Gosplan.
34Aganbegyan, Inside Perestro ika . p. 99.
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to the Ministry of Fisheries, other ministries are involved with 
ocean policy issues.
The first Ministry to deal directly with fisheries was 
created in 1918 as a response to the food crisis after the 
Revolution. The present Ministry was formed in 1965 and is 
currently responsible for the planning, adm inistration and 
operations of the fishing industry and must meet certain budget 
and production objectives set by Moscow. The current 
organizational structure has been simplified to five divisions 
dealing with living resources, the fleet, production, training and 
education, and foreign relations. There are also five regional 
administrative basins which account for 90% of the country's 
total catch and processing.
With the introduction of P e r e s t r o i k a , the trend has been 
away from  cen tra lized  d ec is io n -m ak in g  to reg io n a l 
administration to help streamline the decision-making process.
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S truc tu re  of the Soviet Fishing Industry
A study of the four phases of the "complex" fishing industry.
Despite the unwieldy bureaucracy, the Soviet fishing industry 
is currently producing over five million tons of food, the equivalent 
of 20% of the total animal protein consumed in the USSR. Per capita 
consumption of fish and fish products has grown from 7 kg in 1950 
to over 18 kg currently and is expected to increase to 20 kilograms 
during the 1995-2000 plan. The Food Program has called for an 
increased development rate of 4.3-4.5 million tons of fish edibles by 
1990, including 3.2 billion conventional cans of canned fish. In 
addition, the production of commercial fish in fish-breeding farms is 
expected to increase three fold by the early 1990's.35 The USSR has 
estimated that the development of aquaculture in the Soviet shelf 
zone alone will yield more than 1 million tons of food products. As a 
result, mariculture is becoming one of the main reserves for the 
further development of fisheries and will greatly increase the chance 
for a successful implementation of the Soviet Food Program.36
In the 1970's, the fishing industry employed over 800,000 
workers, 2,500 of whom were located in Moscow, and an additional
7,000 in fishery and related-scientific institutes. By 1988, the 
workforce was reduced by 38% with an additional 50% cut-back 
expected in 1990 to increase efficiency by streamlining the labor 
force.37
The fishing industry is ',complex,,38 and can be divided into 
four phases: harvesting, processing, distributing, and consuming. The
35Inrybprom  Marketing Materials, pp. 3-6. The USSR intends to double 
its 1970's harvest by the 1990's as well as create 750,000 hectares of ponds and
lakes for fish farming.
36/hid., p. 44.
37Conversation with Milan Kravanja, Branch Chief, NMFS Branch of 
Foreign Fisheries Analysis, Washington D.C. in July 1989. This has reduced the 
Moscow staff to less than 600 employees.
38Correspondence with Dr. V.A. Teplitsky, Chief Economist, AtlantNIRO, 
Kalingrad, dated August 23, 1989. The fishing industry includes fishing, 
transport, processing and auxiliary ships; sea fishing harbors and shore-based 
fish processing factories; ship repair facilities, shipyards, engineering works
and container factories; and collective farms. Related industries include ship
building, technical equipment, container making, net making, fleet service 
enterprises, scientific research and design institutes, and a system of schools.
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catch is harvested by the Soviet fleet or produced through fish 
farming. Harvesting is complemented by the ship building, ship 
repair and net making industries, various port facilities, and the fleet 
of refrigeration vessels.
The extractive branch of the fishing industry is made up of 
state and cooperative enterprises. The state finances the state- 
owned enterprises, appoints the industry managers, as well as sets 
production and target wages. Renumeration is guaranteed and does 
not depend on results. Supposedly, Soviet fishermen receive only 
40% of their pay in cash, the balance paid in issue by the Foreign 
Trade Bank.
A fishery kolkhoz  is a voluntary producer cooperative of 
fishermen. Members themselves decide on their wages and make 
management decisions at general meetings. In 1923, the First All- 
Russian Constituent Fishermen's Congress in Moscow founded the 
All-Russian Cooperative Fishermen's Union. By 1928, over 63% of 
the individual fishermen in the USSR had joined a cooperative. 
Voluntary producer associations were set up in which vessels and 
gear became communal property. This allowed for the introduction 
of advanced technology, motorization of the fleet, and the 
introduction of highly productive gear. In 1931, the All-Union 
Association of Fishery Kolkhozes and Cooperative Organizations was 
set up with the primary objective of taking charge of the 
organization, operation and economic management of all fishery 
cooperatives.39
The government purchases raw and processed fish from the 
kolkhoz  and pays a price set according to species, size, quality, season 
and region. In addition, the kolkhoz may receive additional 
payments for live fish and expeditionary expenses. Also, the state 
sometimes leases fishing vessels to the cooperatives.40 The total
39Sysoev, Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry, pp. 71-74. In 1968, 
these accounted for 72.4% of the total catch.
40The cooperatives concentrate on the organization and technical 
improvement of fishing, while the state is responsible for the processing and 
marketing of the harvest.
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number of vessels operated by the cooperative increased from 7,500 
in 1968 to 9,000 by 1985.
Management of the kolkhozes  was further centralized in the 
mid-1980's when the Politburo agreed to create one unified 
collective system, headed by an All Union Association. The All Union 
Association now directs all aspects of the collectives including the 
organization and distribution of capital investment, the provision of 
capital equipment and technology and the training of personnel. By 
the mid-1980's there were over 400 fishing collectives which 
accounted for 25% of the total Soviet catch. At that same time, the 
collectives owned 9,000 vessels and had a large production base 
which included docking facilities, shipyards and two design 
institu tes.4 1
Kolkhozes  earn a gross income of over 270 million rubles, of 
which the catching of raw fish, marine animals and marine products 
accounts for more than 65% of the total income.42 To earn additional 
income, kolkhozes have begun processing operations. These process 
over 145,000 tons of raw fish and produce over 42,000 tons of fish 
products, and almost 15,000 million standard cans of fish 
p reserves.43
The second aspect of harvesting is through mariculture. The 
artificial reproduction sector has been called the most important and 
most promising activity in the Ministry.44 Even the cooperatives 
have begun to develop pond fisheries. Over 3,500 tons of pond fish 
are raised by more than 50 kolkhozes  annually.45
Marine aquaculture or mariculture is a relatively new activity 
in the coastal zones of seas and oceans. Its purpose is to enhance
4 ^ 'Russians Set Target," Fishing News International. August 1986, p. 4.
42The percentage of total catch by cooperative varies by region. For 
example, cooperatives account for most of the fish caught in the Caspian, 
Azov-Black Sea, Aral-Balkhash and Leningrad regions. State fisheries have 
been dominant in the Murmansk, and Far Eastern regions.
43Sysoev, Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry, p. 77.
44Correspondence with Dr. Natalia Mirovitskaya, Institute of World 
Economy and International Relations, Moscow, dated July 14, 1989.
45The development of pond Fisheries is one of the main objectives of 
cooperatives in the Azov-Black Sea and Caspian Basins, and in the inland water 
bodies of the Ukraine.
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biological productivity, commercial stock and catches, cultivate 
valuable fish, invertebrates, and algae. Pasture fish breeding is the 
principle direction of development in this area.46 Since the early 
1970's, research institutions in the USSR have studied organisms 
suitable for mariculture. In the Far East, these include salmon, 
Okhotsk Sea herring, scallops, mussels, oysters, and sea cucumbers.
In the Azov-Black Sea Basin, grey mullet, flounder, sturgeon, 
mussels, oysters as well as the introduction of striped bass, 
steelhead, rainbow trout and Far East mullet have been studied by 
scientists to improve the productivity of fish farming. Salmon, sea 
trout, and rainbow trout have been studied in the Baltic Sea and 
salmon, wolf fish, halibut, White Sea herring, and mussels in the 
Northern basin.47
Fish farming is necessary to supplement the natural fish supply 
adversely affected by water pollution and man-made construction.48
4^This is the cultivation of diadromous and semimigratory fish mainly 
salmonids and sturgeons. The fry are released from hatcheries into the sea to 
reach maturity.
47Inrybprom  Marketing Materials, pp. 41-42.
48Dick Thompson, "The Greening of the U.S.S.R.," Time Magazine.
January 2, 1989, pp. 68-69.
The Soviet Union is an environmentalist's 
nightmare....The riverbed of the Neva, which
meanders beside the magnificent Hermitage in 
Leningrad is covered with a thick layer of oil. Ill 
advised dam construction and inappropriate 
irrigation projects have caused the level of the Aral 
Sea to drop 40 feet. It is possible that this body of 
water, the world's sixth largest sea, will not exist in
20 years....Worrisome numbers of dead sturgeon are
floating atop the polluted Volga River, threatening 
the Soviets' prestigious caviar supply. Resorts along 
the Black Sea have banned swimming after the 
government's warning that the waters are 
contaminated with dysentery and typhoid germs.
Interest in the environment is relatively new to .the Soviet Union. Under 
Stalin, rivers and forests were destroyed in the rush to industrialize to 
transform raw materials into material wealth. There was no premium on 
efficiency or no environmental concerns. In 1968, as many as 26,489 
enterprises were found to discharge untreated waste into the water bodies of 
the USSR.
Siberia's Lake Baikal basin has suffered greatly. The lake holds 80% of 
the country's fresh water. Over 75% of the lake's 2,500 fish and plant species 
including the Baikal nerpa, a fresh water seal, are unknown anywhere else in
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Spawning grounds are often destroyed by the building of dams 
which cut off spawning areas from feeding areas. The Ministry has 
taken measures to preserve Caspian sturgeon, white salmon, Far 
Eastern salmon, Kamchatka cod, and Kamchatka crab in major 
waterways of the Northwest.49
Fish farming began in Russia in 1854 with experiments on 
fertilization of the spawn of trout by V.P. Vraskii. He built the first 
salmon and whitefish hatchery in 1857 on the Pestovka River in 
Novgorod Province. Similar hatcheries were subsequently built in 
other areas for Atlantic and Baltic salmon and sturgeon. Until the 
Soviets came into power in 1917, fish culture was carried out by 
volunteer societies and individuals. Since 1934, fish culture and 
regulation has been carried out by the Central Board for the 
Conservation and Replenishment of Fish Stocks and by the Regulation 
of Fishing of the Ministry of Fisheries of the USSR.
Such reclamation projects as water purification, control of 
silting and vegetation overgrowth, construction of fish passes and 
fish lifts in dams of hydraulic engineering installations, and the 
equipping of intake structures with fish protection devices, have 
restored and improved natural conditions for the breeding and 
feeding of the fish and have created a constant water system in the 
spawning grounds. Passage of fish to spawning grounds is ensured 
by cleaning and deepening the channels and by eliminating 
obstructions on rivers. If natural spawning grounds are scarce, 
artificial ones, both permanent and floating, are built.
Currently, there are 183 active fish farms including 97 in the 
system of the Ministry of Fisheries. Fifty percent of the fish farms
the world. The Baikalsh Pulp Plant was erected here 30 years ago and 
currently produces 200,000 tons of cellulose fibers a year and directly 
discharges its waste into the lake creating a polluted zone 23 miles wide.
Gorbachev has shown special concern for the environment. He 
recently reorganized a number of departments into G osko m p r iro d a , the State 
Committee for the Protection of the Environment. Gorbachev dedicated US$ 24 
billion toward cleaning up the environment in 1989. The amount is expected 
to increase to over US$ 46 billion annually during the 1990's.
4 9 A 1 so  measures have been taken to protect the Omul salmon in Baikal. 
The catches of these salmon have stabilized at six million tons and are expected 
to increase as the stock continues to recover.
38
operate in the open sea. These farms breed over 40 varieties of 
commercially valuable fish and over 8.5 billion fry are released into
natural waterways each year. This figure includes 120-125 million
sturgeon, 800 million salmon, over 100 million white fish and up to 
seven billion thick net and vegetation eating fry.50
Fish farms are now equipped with modern appliances, 
refrigerators and compressors, pumping houses, feed processing 
houses, tanks and cages, and large pond areas. The Caspian receives 
90 million sturgeon young and the Azov basin over 44 million.
Despite reduced spawning areas, the hatchery reproduction in these 
two areas yield up to 50% of the total catch of beluga sturgeon, 20% 
of sturgeon and 7% of stellate sturgeon. The fisheries in the Northern 
Caspian are provided with airlifting and fish pumping plants for 
pumping fish to transportation tanks and water channels for 
transportation from the hatcheries to the nurseries. In 1984, a 
productive hatching apparatus, "Osetr," came into use. New 
production methods increased an additional 10 million sturgeon.51
The artificial reproduction of salmonids is carried out on a large 
scale in the Far East, Caspian, Barents, White, Baltic, and Black Seas. 
The young salmon, pink salmon, coho salmon, sockeye salmon,
Atlantic and Caspian salmon are bred in these waters.
Acclimization, the process of planting fish into new water 
bodies, produces over 30,000 tons of fish annually. The first 
acclimization plan in the world was drawn up in the USSR 1980. This
included the successful acclimization of Far Eastern pink salmon in
the basin of the Barents Sea. Since then, the Siberian whitefish has 
been introduced to additional bodies of water in the USSR. In 
addition, pike perch has been introduced in the water bodies of 
Karelia, the Urals, Siberia, and Kazakhstan. Bream has been 
successfully planted in the lakes of the Urals and Siberia. Silver carp 
and grass carp are now common inhabitants of Central Asia and the 
European part of the USSR. Presently, there are acclimization 
stations in the Far North, the Baltic Sea region, Siberia, Central Asia,
50Press Release May 19, 1989.
S^Inrybprom  Marketing Materials, p. 11.
39
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Soviet Georgia. Each year these 
stations carry out over 300 plantings of 40 varieties of fish and 13 
varieties of live food organisms into more than 200 bodies of water 
across the USSR.52
On the inland waterways, the government has focused a good 
deal of attention on the development of pond fisheries. Pond fish 
culture involves the breeding and raising of fish in specially 
constructed ponds. Man controls the entire process—from breeding 
to obtaining a marketable product. Pond fishing is economical as the 
ponds are usually located near population centers which reduces 
transportation costs.53 In addition, the use of live tanks makes it 
possible to supply pond fish more regularly thus reducing the 
seasonality of the fish supply.
Fish are raised in ponds and in integrated-use bodies of water, 
peat open-cut mines filled with water, and the warm water from 
cooling reservoirs of state regional power plants. The fish most often 
raised in these ponds include carp54 and trout. Pike, catfish, mullet, 
and eels also can be raised in ponds. Pond fish culture was primarily 
established in the Ukraine,55 and later introduced in the RSFSR and 
Belorussia. Currently, the USSR has 9,000 kolkhoz and sovkhoz , state 
farm, pond fisheries and 230 specialized state farms attached to the 
Ministry of Fisheries. These ponds occupy an area of about 124,000 
hectares.
To improve efficiency in all inland water fish farming, the USSR 
established a commercial pedigreed fish stock breeding and genetic 
center. In addition, the use of mineral fertilizers and the 
introduction of chemical stimulants helped increase the fish yield 
increase 1.3 times in ten years.56 Scientific organizations have 
worked out formulation of effective feeds for fish of various age
52Ibid„ p. 12.
53The average transport distance does not exceed 200 km.
54A.T. Bolotov was the first to build special ponds for rearing carp.
55Fish ponds existed in Russia in the 12th and 13th centuries in 
m on asteries .
S^Inrybprom  Marketing Materials, p. 17.
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groups in mariculture. Formula feed plants have been built within 
the Ministry of Fisheries.
New directions in fish culture are being developed such as lake 
and industrial methods of breeding in cribs and basins by applying 
warm water. Using this method, the production of marketable fish 
from industrial hatcheries increased 2.6 times during the 1980's. In 
addition, scientists are working on perfecting a new way of breeding 
marketable fish and planting stock under conditions of circulating 
water systems. Methods are also being worked on to further 
mechanize fish breeding processes including water vegetation 
control, conveying, storing and distributing feed and catching fish 
bred in hatcheries. Hatcheries are provided with feed dispensers, 
reed cutters, mechanized hopper-type storehouses, and container 
installations for conveying live fish.
In the future, the USSR will begin focusing on the development 
of commercial cage fish farms and industrial shore tank farms based 
on the intensive feeding of fish with artificial fodder and the high- 
level mechanization of fish-breeding processes. This method of 
breeding is demonstrated by the Banga and Saarekalur collective 
farm s.57
Once harvested by the fishing fleet or through mariculture 
operations, the catch is processed either aboard ship or in land-based 
fish processing complexes. Processing enterprises include a diverse 
number of operations such as refrigeration, canning, salting, smoking, 
and drying. Before the Revolution, there was no equipment to 
process in bulk except for salting which was done by an army of 
seasonal workers. By 1913, only six cold storage plants and several 
small canneries existed which produced a total of 9.6 million 
standard tins of fish products. By the late 1960's, the number of cans 
produced increased 1,000 times.58 Currently, the fishing industry 
also produces 767,000 tons of fish meal, 119,000 tons of fish fat and
768,000 tons of general feed production for animal husbandry.59
57Ibid., p. 43.
58Sysoev, Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry, p. 142.
59Press Release May 1989.
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Over 70% of the total harvest is processed at sea. Since raw 
fish cannot remain unprocessed for any great length of time without 
spoiling, the optimum solution is for the processing industry to be 
brought as close as possible to where the fish is caught. Onboard 
ship this is done two ways. First, catch is combined with processing 
on the same vessel. The downside of this technique is that at its 
peak season the crews are not always able to process the fish fast 
enough and so have to lose valuable fishing time which reduces the 
size of the catch. A more efficient method is to process the harvest 
on specially designed factory ships. This is the more efficient 
method, since the fleet can now harvest and process simultaneously.
The development of the fish processing fleet is closely linked 
with the herring fishery in the North Atlantic. Several month long 
herring expeditions needed motherships to accept fish products from 
the catcher vessels and provide technical and medical assistance 
supplies to the other vessels. As a result, dry cargo ships were 
refitted in the late 1950’s to act as herring motherships.
The Soviet fleet now includes fish processing motherships and 
refrigerated factory ships. Factory ships including vessels of the 
Andrei Zakharov and NataVya Kovshova classes, as well as large stem 
factory trawlers (BMRTs), currently account for over 40% of the 
canning capacity in the USSR.
The catch is processed by a fish dressing machine which 
mechanically dismembers the fish. Gutting, sectioning and filleting 
are carried out by fixed or rotating blades. The machines are divided 
into conveyor, rotary and drum type designs. Different machines are 
made to process different fish. For instance, the IRM-3 fish dressing 
machine was designed to process fresh Baltic herring and can process 
as many as 200 fish a minute. A promising direction in the 
development of fish dressing equipment is the production of 
universal multiple-operation machines with interchangeable 
assem blies.
Refrigeration is used to keep fish fresh in route to port and 
eventually to the consumer. The introduction of modern 
refrigeration technology is one way the Soviets hope to reduce loss of 
catch and make the processing of edible food more efficient.
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Refrigeration capacity grew 10 times during the last 30 years on 
Soviet fishing vessels.
Fishing ports are an important part of the distribution process. 
The effective use of the fleet is determined by the adequate 
development of these facilities. The unit-load delivery of fish 
products largely contributes to a more efficient and shorter port 
visit, for it ensures higher volume of loading and uses fewer workers, 
reducing ship unloading time and expediting the harvest to market. 
The bindless method of unit-load shipment involves the use of side 
fork lifts in handling unit loads of frozen fish products. The electric 
fork lifts are used for discharging unit-load products and for loading 
railroad cars.
The catch is packaged onboard ship or at onshore processing 
facilities for transportation to the consumer. There may be up to 10 
transfers of a single shipment during this process. Thus shipping and 
packing materials are also vital segment of the distribution process. 
The fishing industry is the principle user of shipping cartons in the 
national economy. Production of packing materials include barrels, 
bags, cases, boxes, metal and other packing materials to prevent 
spoilage.60 The industry uses millions of wooden boxes and barrels 
and hundreds of millions of cans each year. Packing materials are 
made of polyethylene, cellophane, polystyrene, and aluminum foil. 
The Soviets have been trying to improve packaging materials and 
have designed a variety of machines and devices which mechanize 
and automate these processes.
Once the catch is packaged for distribution, the Ministries have 
tried to coordinate operations for the faster transportation of fish to 
the market. However, transportation remains a key problem in this 
stage leading Soviet consumers to complain about the poor quality of 
fish products.61 This is the result of the distribution network where
60The industry has its own cask making factories. In spite of efforts to 
introduce new materials such as polymers, wooden casks will continue to be 
used to pack, convey and store salted fish products aboard ships and at shore 
based facilities for a long time to come because of the availability of wood in 
the USSR.
61 State standards for the output of the fishing industry are approved by 
the Committee of Standards, Measures and Measuring Instruments under the
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unconfirmed reports state that the fish is not kept at a constant -30 
degrees C as necessary. This results in a high percentage of spoilage 
especially for the Far Eastern harvest as over 50% of the catch is 
transported by train to the population centers in Moscow and 
L eningrad .62 As a result, the fleet is forced to catch three to four 
times as much to compensate for the resulting spoilage. The USSR is 
trying to improve the efficiency of the distribution system by adding 
more processing and freezing plants. A short term solution has been 
for motherships to spend months in port as a floating storage plant in 
those ports where storage is a problem.63
To expedite the distribution process, the government is also
trying to improve the rail system. In a recent interview, the 
Minister of Railways, Nikolai Konarev announced he would introduce 
special express schedules for trains carrying foodstuffs. Currently,
7,000 to 9,000 rail cars stand idle and up to 12,000 additional cars 
wait to be unloaded because of mismanagement and the lack of 
communication between Ministries.64
Previously, the the Ministry of Fisheries was responsible only 
for the extraction and processing stages. The finished product was 
marketed by the Ministry of Domestic Trade. Now the Ministry has 
full responsibility including export and import operations.65 Fish and
Council of Ministers of the USSR, which has the sole right of publishing all
standards of the USSR.
62United States Department of Commerce, NOAA, NMFS, Office of 
International Affairs, Foreign Fisheries Analysis Branch, S ov ie t-L a tin  
American Fishery Relations. 1961-1989. Government Printing Office,
Washington D.C., May 5, 1985, p. 12.
63lbid.
64Conversation with Captain Tkachenko in July 1989.
65"USSR Council of Ministers' Resolution on Further Development of 
Foreign-Economic Activities of State, Cooperative and other Publicly-owned 
Enterprises, Amalgamations, and Organizations," Izvestia . December 9, 1988 in 
Reprints from the Soviet Press. V. 48, N. 2, January 30, 1989, p. 5.
To greatly increase foreign-economic contacts, 
actively involve them in enterprises, 
amalgamations, production cooperatives and other 
organizations, and to further streamline the 
practical patterns of foreign-economic relations on 
the basis of actually paying their way in hard 
currency and consistent use of commodity-money 
relations, the USSR Council of Ministers deems it
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fish products earn the USSR hard currency; the export of canned fish 
and luxury items such as salmon, crab-meat and caviar earned 89 
million rubles in 1984.66
A mini-revolution is taking place in Soviet foreign trade.67 
Previously, a few dozen specialist foreign trade organizations (FTOs) 
had a near monopoly of imports and exports. The cautious 
decentralization started in 1987. At that time, trading rights were 
given to 70 large factories and 20 ministries. Since April 1989, all 
Soviet enterprises can apply to register for independent trading 
rights.68 However, the FTOs will still monopolize trade in bulk 
commodities such as fuel and other raw materials which account for 
more than 80% of Soviet exports to the West.
The Ministry of Fisheries has expanded its control for managing 
production and trading fish products, which includes delivery of fish 
to the retail trade system. It has developed a system of large 
specialized shops for distribution of fish and fish products to the 
consumer. More than 250 fish shops are functioning at this time, 
including 130 specialized "Ocean" shops. These establishments are 
used as marketing tools to introduce new species to the consumer 
and try to promote increased consumption of fish in the USSR. The 
shops arrange regular tastings of new types of fish products and so 
are a sort of laboratory for studying consumer taste. These programs 
are necessary because Soviet consumers prefer fresh water fish. The 
Caspian and Azov seas were the traditional grounds and set 
consumer tastes. When new varieties of ocean fish were introduced 
in the 1940’s, consumers labelled these "Ishkov’s Folly" after the
necessary to grant, starting April 1, 1989, the right 
of direct export-import transactions to all 
enterprises, amalgamations, production 
cooperatives (including all cooperatives engaged in 
production, and unions and amalgamations thereof), 
and other organizations whose products, services 
and other activities are competitive at the foreign 
m arke t.
66"Soviet Fishing off the Developing Countries," Background Brief, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, December 1985, p. 3.
67Aganbegyan, Inside Perestroika . pp. 177-178.
68Over 5,000 have already been registered.
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Minister of Fisheries. Even today few Soviets enjoy shell fish.69 In 
addition to the specialized shops, the Government also manages 100 
specialized public catering establishments, including restaurants and 
cafeterias.70 These marketing efforts have helped to increase the 
consumption rate from 17 kg in 1974 to 18 kg currently. The USSR 
expects consumption rates to increase to 19 kg by the 1990's. The 
increased consumption rate has resulted in a concurrent increase in 
the rate of fishmeal production since the industry is producing more 
finished fish products such as fillets and selling fewer whole frozen 
fish. The waste from the processing is used for fishmeal.71
The government forecast for an increased consumption rate 
may be very optimistic. Several factors limit the growth of the 
consumption rate. The first is the availability of fish. Stock 
depletions and increased coastal jurisdiction have changed traditional 
Soviet fishing patterns. The second factor is that the USSR now 
harvests less desirable fish, switching from the popular herring, cod 
and red fish to pollack, hake, and krill. To the Soviet consumer, the 
higher the fat content of the fish, the more desirable it is, so salmon, 
sturgeon, Danube catfish, pike, eel, and cod are considered to be good 
eating fish. In addition, cultural and geographical factors affect 
consum ption.72 Despite these limiting factors, the Soviet government 
hopes that its marketing and educational programs will encourage
69Sulikowski, "Soviet Management of Ocean Affairs: The Case of the 
Fishing Industry," p. 296.
7®Inrybprom Marketing Materials, p. 169.
^Correspondence with Dr. V.A. Teplitsky dated August 23, 1989.
On the whole, the reason is that recently in the 
Soviet fishing industry there is a sharp rise of 
production of frozen dressed fish, fillets, Alaskan 
pollack, shrimp meat, culinary products, etc., the 
production raw material consumption of which is so 
much higher than in the case of whole-frozen fish 
produced formerly. At the same time it is connected 
with increase of fish meal production from fish 
waste. Portion of raw fish used for food production 
has even raised by 18 points for recent 10 years.
72Sysoev, Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry, p. 5. For example, 
Soviet Georgia consumes 75% less fish than in the rest of the Soviet Union on 
an average annual basis.
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consumers to appreciate the protein content of fish and increase 
their consumption of this vitamin rich food.73
Sum m ary
The Soviet fishing industry is overseen by the Ministry of 
Fisheries to supply vital animal protein to the Soviet population. 
Fishing is a "complex" industry divided into four phases- 
harvesting, processing, distributing, consuming.
Due to the pollution of the water, overfishing, and the 
introduction of increased coastal jurisdiction worldwide, new 
avenues of m an-controlled reproduction have become a 
necessity . These include m ariculture, fish farm ing and 
acclim ization programs. Pond fisheries have become an 
important source of harvest in the inland bodies of water.
Once harvested, processing is primarily handled by state- 
owned enterprises which often lack modern technology. Thus, 
much of the harvest is lost due to lack of refrigeration onboard 
ships and/or inadequate port facilities.
The Ministry of Fisheries has also become involved in the 
m arketing o f the harvest to promote increased consum er 
consumption, as fish are a much cheaper commodity in the USSR 
than beef. In addition, the fishing industry is currently 
profitable which translates into much needed hard currency.
73/b id , p. 4. The standard diet is determined by the Institute of Nutrition 
of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR. The diet takes into account 
economic (population size and incomes,quantity and structure of the 
production of consumer goods), social (demographic and professional 
composition of the population), natural (climatic and geographical living 
conditions and the state of the population's health) and historical factors 
(traditions, holidays, habits of the population).
Fish supply animal proteins and essential amino acids to the population. 
Fish proteins are more easily digestible than meat proteins and account for 7% 
of the total animal proteins provided for by the standard. For example, 4.3 
million tons of fish are equivalent to 6.2 million tons of cattle in terms of live 
weight or about 17 million head of cattle. The fat content is also an important 
component for nutritional consideration. The fat content in fish meat ranges 
from 0.3 to 30% and is absorbed faster and more completely than animal fat.
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Soviet F ishing Fleet
A study of the fishing fleet, including its history, equipment, 
flotilla concept, and its present day status.
The modern Soviet fishing fleet evolved from 12 converted 
minesweepers in 192074 to one of over 3,900 vessels with a 
combined gross registered tonnage (GRT) of 3.5 million, the largest in 
the world.75 One flotilla may now include as many as 200 medium 
500-ton trawlers; 40 stern-factory 3,000 deadweight ton (DWT) 
trawlers; and 30 motherships with up to 15,000 DWT, supported by 
auxiliary and research vessels.76 Soviet fishing fleets are located 
throughout the USSR in Murmansk, Arkhangel, Leningrad, Tallin,
Riga, Liepaja, Klaipeda, Kalingrad, Odessa, Nikolaev, Sevastopol, Kerch, 
and Poti with destinations from the Arctic to the Antarctic.77
Before the extensions of coastal jurisdiction in the 1970's, two 
assumptions were made—the marine resources were unlimited, and 
the USSR would have unrestricted access to stocks. These 
assumptions worked through the 1970's when the size of the Soviet 
harvest was limited primarily by the fleet’s technical capabilities.78 
However, the general introduction of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) during this period changed the Soviet strategy from one of
74Sysoev, Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry, pp. 19-20. During 
Czarist times, the "motherships" were sailing boats in the Caspian Sea and the 
Sea of Azov. These supported the elat a fishing vessel with an upper deck, and a 
s h n y a k a , another type of small fishing vessel used primarily in the European 
North. The catch was unloaded by hand, and then transported to the nearby 
market in wheel barrows. Over 80% of the fish were caught by small fisheries 
employing approximately 205,000 fishermen. Every season 50% of the nets 
had to be replaced at a cost of 25% of gross income.
75Please refer to Appendix D for a comparison of world tonnage from 
1980-1987.
76Press Release May 1989. This includes vessels of 100 GRT and above. 
The actual total number of fishing vessels and support ships is over 24,000 
including 2000 ships of 300 GRT or more.
77Please refer to Appendix E for background information on the Soviet 
Merchant Marine and Navy.
78Sysoev, Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry, pp. 177-181. 
Traditionally, the Soviet Union did not necessarily look at its long distance 
fleet in terms of profit, but rather as a way to feed its population, i.e. to 
produce cheaper animal protein than available from its failed agriculture 
system. Large vessels offer many advantages-for example the catch per crew 
member and per 1 hp of the main engine is 50-100% higher on large vessels.
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resource abundance to resource scarcity.79 The scarcity has led to 
the trend of building larger vessels capable of fishing in remote areas 
of the high seas.
The fleet currently is composed of large trawlers including 
those of the Pulkovskii, Meridian, and Gorizont  classes which can be
used within a continental slope and also in remote areas of the high
seas. Fish canning factory ships and processing motherships, such as 
the Rybatskaya Slava, are also part of the fleet and show high 
performance. Special refrigerator transport ships such as the 
Almazny Bereg service the fishing expeditions. From Poland, the 
USSR bought the large trawler, the Ivan Bochkov, and the 
mothership, the Konstitutsiya .
Recently, the USSR has ordered three 179 meters fish factory 
vessels from Rauma-Repola.  A 152 person crew runs each vessel 
while 368 factory employees work two 11 hour shifts. The resulting 
products are then blanched, spiced, sterilized and packed in cartons. 
The vessels are self supporting for 75 days and have a hospital, 
movie theater, disco, barber shop and bank.80
The years of war and political purges devastated the fishing 
fleet. Approximately 5,000 fishing vessels were destroyed during 
World War 11, including the entire Caspian and Black Seas fleets, as
well as the one based in Murmansk. After the War, the industry
concentrated on developing its distant water fishing fleet and by 
1966 the fleet was capable of sailing almost 3,000 miles to a fishing 
ground.81
Two innovations contributed to the increased long distance 
capability of the Soviet fleet. The first was the creation of the stern 
factory ship developed by the British. This type of vessel could 
handle a larger quantity of fish and could spend up to one year at
79Vladimir Kaczynski, "The 200 Mile EEZ and Soviet Fisheries in the 
North Pacific Ocean: An Economic Assessment," Paper prepared for the Law of 
the Sea Institute, Honolulu, HI, August 5, 1987, p. 4.
80"Soviet Ships Close in on the Crab Market," Design News. February 9, 
1987, p. 41.
8 C oastal pollution and overfishing of haddock, cod, ocean perch, and 
salmon in the closer areas of the Barents Sea, Sea of Japan and the Sea of 
Okhotsk were major factors in the development of the distant water fleet.
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sea. Previously, nets had been hauled in over the side so a vessel 
would become unstable if the catch were too large. With the new 
design, the catch can be brought aboard through a stem ramp giving 
the vessel more stability and allowing the use of larger nets. As a 
result, the catch from a stern trawler is about six times as great as 
that of a side trawler. The stem factory vessels also have canning 
and freezing equipment for immediate processing of the fish.
Lacking the technology to copy this design, the USSR ordered 24 
trawlers from West Germany, but has since developed the capability 
to create its own. By the mid-1970's, 15% of all Soviet high seas 
vessels were large stern factory trawlers.82
The second factor was the development of the flotilla fishing 
concept by the Japanese. To remain at sea for extended periods of 
time, fishing vessels need fuel, water, extra gear and parts, medical 
supplies, and even recreational activities. The fishing expeditions 
often last six to nine months so the flotilla was created consisting of 
five basic types of ships: motherships, fish processing and carrier 
vessels, factory trawlers, side trawlers and special function vessels.
A flotilla can have as many as 100 stern trawlers which, in addition 
to harvesting the catch, usually provide their own processing and 
transportation services. Auxiliary ships also service the flotilla and 
include scientific research vessels, salvage tugboats, and tankers to 
supply the mothership with fuel.83
The mothership is the head of the flotilla and can carry 
piggyback six to 14 small catcher boats. These ships can also receive 
and process the catch before transferring it to refrigeration and cargo 
ships for transportation to port. The mothership also provides 
communication facilities, medical and dental services, adequate baths 
and showers, and recreation activities.
The first Soviet mothership was designed in 1958 and was part 
of the Severodvinsk  class built in Gdansk. Other classes of 
motherships were designed for the USSR and built in the mid-1960s
82United States Department of Commerce, Fisheries of the U.S.S.R.. 1976.
p. 414.
83Conversation with Captain Tkachenko.
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in Poland, West Germany and Japan. Tuna motherships like the 
Leninskii Luch and Krasnyi Luch were introduced in 1964.
In 1972, the USSR built the world’s largest mothership, the 
Vostoky which was designed for independent operation in fishing 
grounds 10,000 to 12,000 km away from its base port. The ship has 
a 43,400 ton displacement, and the overall length is 224 meters. The 
power of the main gas turbine is 19 megawatts, and the speed is 18.5 
knots or approximately 34 miles an hour. The ship carries a crew of 
600, in addition to the 14 catching vessels. These catching vessels 
are outfitted for bottom and mid water trawls and for purse seining.
The catching vessels remain on board the carrier ship in route 
to the fishing grounds. Such a piggyback arrangement cuts down the 
time needed to move the flotilla to the fishing grounds and deliver 
catching vessels to distant areas. Once at the fishing grounds, the 
carrier vessel launches the catching vessels, all of which which are 
equipped for independent fishing. If the fishing is poor, the carrier 
vessel can lift the catching boats back on board and move to a new 
ground in a relatively short period of time. This combination of large 
factory trawlers and highly mobile support vessels allows the fishing 
industry to follow the fish which often involves frequent shifting of 
operations and target species.84
The catcher vessels unload the harvest to fish processing 
refrigerator ships which freeze the catch and then deliver it to port 
or to a transport vessel. Handling the catch on the processing vessel 
is done automatically using large derricks to lift the catch from the 
catcher vessel and transfer it to elevators in the hold of the 
processing vessel. Once inside the hold, conveyor belts handle and 
sort the catch. These refrigerator ships may be equipped with 
devices for removing the head and viscera of fish, for filleting, and 
for processing waste products. Some even have a stern slip for 
hauling in trawls containing catch left by the catching vessels. These 
vessels can be over 130 meters with a hold capacity of 5,000 cubic 
meters and a speed of 16 knots. They can freeze up to 100 tons of
84Kaczynski, "The 200 Mile EEZ and Soviet Fisheries in the North Pacific 
Ocean: An Economic Assessment," p. 7.
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fish daily. However, with the appearance of factory ships and large 
trawlers equipped with powerful refrigeration units, the importance 
of the fish processing refrigerator ships has declined.85
During the 1950's and 1960's large freezer trawlers of the 
Pushkin , Mayakovskiiy and Leskov classes were introduced. The 
major advantage of the Pushkin class was its ability to operate in 
distant waters and to withstand wind force of nine, ordinary trawlers 
can withstand six. The average catch per vessel in 1968 was 6,050 
tons amounting to a profit of 543,200 rubles and a recoupment 
period of 4.7 years. The vessel has facilities to process the entire 
harvest.86
The large stern factory trawler of the Caikovskii class has a 
refrigeration capacity of 45 tons a day and a fish meal installation 
processing 35 tons of raw material a day. In addition, the Mintai  
class was developed for the production of fish meal with a 
refrigeration capacity of 30 tons, and can process up to 70 tons of 
raw fish into fish meal each day. As the name suggests, the Tropik  
class was built for operation in the tropics and is equipped with 
trawling and purse seining equipment. In 1967, the Tropik  class 
was replaced by the Atlantik version.
The refrigerated factory ships of the Grumant  and Rembrandt  
class were built to operate in the distant waters and could act as 
catcher vessels as well as accept fish from medium size catcher boats. 
At the height of the season the vessels can be used also to process 
fish. This type of vessel caught 150,000 tons of fish in 1968, earning
1.2 million rubles with a recoupment period of 2.6 years. In 1966, a 
unique canning factory trawler of the Natalya Koshova class was 
introduced. The ship is equipped for bottom and midwater trawling 
and for processing the catch into cans, frozen fish and fish meal. The 
average profit for this type of vessel was 1.5 million rubles in 1968, 
and the recoupment period was approximately 3 years.
85Inrybprom  Marketing Materials, pp. 37-38.
86Conversation with Captain Tkachenko. These vessels are more 
maneuverable than side trawlers since the stem ramps make it possible to 
simplify and quicken the shooting and hauling of trawls as it is not necessary 
to circle while the trawl is shot or hauled in.
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The flotilla is also made up of specially designed transport 
vessels. The greater the distance, the more economical the transport 
vessels are. Transporting one ton of frozen fish from the Atlantic 
Coast of Canada to Murmansk costs one third the price on a 
specialized transport vessel than it does on a large factory stem 
trawler. Refrigerated transport vessels allow the catching and 
processing vessels to stay out longer as the transport ships receive 
fish and deliver the catch to port. On the return trip, they take back 
supplies of fuel, water and provisions to the expeditionary fleet. The 
size of these transport vessels varies. The Kustanai  has a cargo 
capacity of 800 tons and a hold capacity of 1,885 cubic meters while 
the Atlaiskie Gory is 9,550 gross registered tons and a cargo capacity 
of 7,400 tons and a hold capacity of 11,954 cubic meters.87
Trawlers are the backbone of the flotilla. The current stern 
trawlers evolved from small wooden trawlers (MRT) built in the 
1940's with engines of 150-240 hp. These vessels quickly wore out 
and became obsolete and were replaced by a small freezer trawler 
(MRTR) of the Kareliya class. These newer models have a metal hull 
and are used primarily for fishing in the Baltic Sea for herring, sprat, 
and demersal fish and for herring in the North Sea. The medium 
seiner was designed to use of purse seines, drift nets, and Danish 
seines. This type of vessel has been used primarily for fishing grey 
mullets, horse mackerel and Atlantic bonito in the Black Sea and for 
sprat with electric light in the Caspian Sea. Vessels of the Kaspii class 
were constructed for catching, processing and transportation of 
Caspian kilka. These vessels are equipped with 1,000-1,200 hp and 
a cargo capacity of 350 tons and can attain a speed of 11 knots. The 
refrigeration capacity is 25 tons a day.88
Small side trawlers, once the major part of the fleet, have been 
rapidly replaced by more updated trawlers. Some classes have 
refrigeration holds, and facilities to produce semi-processed fishmeal
87Sysoev, Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry, p. 170.
88Other similar vessels have been designed with the capacity of 225-300 
hp seiners suitable for stem trawling as well as additional medium 225 hp 
seiners, small 225 hp seiners with a cargo capacity of 10-12 tons and 50-150 hp 
fishing boats for inland fishing, storage lakes and rivers.
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and fish oil. Other trawler classes include medium stern trawlers 
and side trawlers, again some with refrigeration and some with 
freezer capabilities. Up until 1967, the medium trawlers were side 
trawlers, but this has changed and a medium stern trawler has been 
developed to operate in the temperate and tropical climates of the 
world oceans.89
The SRT-300, SRT-400, and SRTR-540 and SRTR-800 are 
medium sized fishing vessels built between 1947 and 1957. The SRT 
was specifically built for herring fishing in the North Atlantic. In 
1968 these vessels caught almost 16% of the fleet's total catch with 
an average catch per vessel of 1,030 tons. The main shortcoming of 
the SRT is a lack of refrigeration and hold capacity, and their power 
plants are relatively weak. As a result, the SRTR Okean class was 
developed with refrigeration capacity. A further improvement on 
the medium sized trawler was the SRTM of the Mayak  class which 
could fish with drift nets, bottom and midwater trawls in the 
Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans. This class was equipped with 
quick freeze capacity of six tons per day.90
Some ships have been designed to operate in specific 
geographical areas such as the RS-300 seiners built to operate in the 
Sea of Azov, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. These are equipped 
with purse seines, drift nets, trawls and electric light fishing. In 
1968, these landed 610,000 tons of fish or 10% of the total catch with 
an average catch per vessel of 1,840 tons. Small vessels with a 
capacity of up to 300 hp have been used extensively for coastal 
fishing. This category of vessels accounted for over 88% of the total 
number of self-propelled vessels and included small and medium 
trawlers, seiners, and special use vessels.
Specialty ships were also designed for the now-extinct whaling 
operations. The first whaling flotilla, the Aleut  began operation in 
the Far East in 1932. After World War 11, four more flotillas were 
created including the whaling ships, the Slava, Sovetskaya Ukraina,
89United States Department of Commerce, Fisheries of the U.S.S.R.. 1976.
p. 416.
90Sysoev, Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry, pp. 119-122.
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Yurii Dolgorukii, and the Sovetskaya Rossiya. Medium-sized whalers, 
the Vladivostok and the DaVnii Vostok, began operation in the Pacific 
in 1963. These vessels have been retired or refitted when whaling 
operations ceased in the mid-1980's.
Recently, vessels have been designed for harvesting previously 
unsought for species in remote areas such as krill and tuna. The krill 
vessels are designed to use a midwater trawl in the high seas under 
potentially harsh climatic conditions. The USSR also has had to 
specially design and heavily invest in a tuna fleet to operate in the 
tropical and subtropical waters of the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian 
Oceans. In 1976, the USSR ordered US$ 100 million worth of vessels 
from Poland, including 50 tuna long liners, each 52.5 feet long, one 
tuna mothership, 10 tuna super seiners, each 1,800 DWT, and 10 
super seiners.91
The most important shifts in the composition of the fleet in the 
post-EEZ period have affected two types of small fishing vessels, 
those built to fish in Soviet coastal waters and the catcher boats used 
within mothership expeditionary trips. The number and total 
tonnage of these types have been reduced by more than 50% as the 
USSR emphasis has been to increase the number of large ships which 
can operate worldwide in a variety of conditions.92 In terms of GRT, 
the Soviet fleet grew by 2% and the number of factory vessels by 
25% in the post-EEZ period. This included the construction of 11 
super factory trawlers with over 4,000 GRT designed for Antarctic 
fisheries and open ocean operations.
The fleet's extracting capability has grown 53% from 5.5 to 8.4 
million metric tons of fish annually. This is based on the assumption 
that in the late 1970's an average ship of this class could catch 40 
tons of fish per day and would operate 150 days of the year. By the 
1980's the average number of fishing days remained the same, but
91Kaczynski, "Soviet Bloc Tuna Fisheries: Perspectives for 
Development," Paper prepared at the University of Washington, Seattle, WA, 
May, 1978, p. 6.
92Please refer to Appendix F for a comparison of the composition of the 
Soviet fleet before and after the general introduction of worldwide EEZs in the 
1970’s.
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the vessels could catch on average 50 tons per day. This breaks 
down to 48 tons per year per fishermen which is twice the world 
average.93
A typical 3,000 GRT trawler requires a crew of 75 and uses 
four tons of fuel per day and costs approximately US$ 15,000 per 
day to operate. Refrigerated vessels also require a great deal of fuel. 
Fuel does not cost the USSR hard currency as they are a leading oil 
producer, but it does cost them in terms of opportunity as the oil 
could be exported for hard currency.94 Operating cost are even 
higher outside the 200 mile EEZ of Chile and Peru as the USSR 
conducts a mid water trawl for jack mackerel which are found at 
depths of 200 meters or more. The great drag on the nets at this 
depth results in substantial use of fuel. Since this species are 
relatively fast swimmers, the trawlers must cruise at around six 
knots which is two knots faster than a bottom trawler. In addition 
the added expense of harvesting jack mackerel, the USSR pays about 
US$ 30 million to Peru for supplies and support for its vessels.95
The financial statements suggest that the operation of the 
distant water fleets is costly and inefficient.96 Despite the fact that 
the USSR has 50% of the world's fleet tonnage, it catches only 12% of 
the world's catch.97 To put this into perspective, Japan has 8% of the 
world's tonnage and catches 13% of the annual world’s catch. The 
disparity is partially due to the fact that 50% of the Soviet fleet is
93Press Release May 1989. The world average index states that the 
average fisherman catches and processes 23 tons per year.
94Correspondence with Dr. V.A. Teplitsky dated September 26, 1989. As a
result, production costs to harvest one ton of fish are double what they were
before the extension of coastal jurisdiction.
95United States Department of Commerce, Soviet-Latin American 
Fishery Relations. 1961-1989. p. 19. In Argentina, the USSR spent an estimated 
US$ 25 million during May 1987 to April 1988 including a licensing fee, for an 
estimated operation cost of US$ 7 per ton of Fish caught. This is relatively 
inexpensive compared with the US$ 78 per ton cost of catching Pacific hake or 
the US$ 95 per ton of Alaskan pollack which is what the US charged foreign 
fishermen for operating in the US EEZ during 1988.
96Vladil Lysenko, A Crime Against the World, translated by Michael
Glenny, Victor Gollancz, Ltd, London, 1983, p. 17.
97Kaczynski, "Soviet Bloc Tuna Fisheries: Perspectives for 
Development," p. 10.
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made up of support vessels including motherships, fuel tankers, and 
repair ships, while only 15% of the Japanese fleet is comprised of 
support ships. The Japanese are more willing to spend hard currency 
for services and repairs in foreign ports, whereas the USSR brings the 
majority of its fleet support with them on each expedition. The 
advanced age of many of the Soviet vessels also adds to the overall 
inefficiency of its fleet. For example, the majority of the Soviet 
vessels operating in Peruvian waters in the beginning of 1989 were
3,000 tonnage trawlers built in the USSR in the late 1960's. As a 
result of the vessels' age and reportedly poor quality equipment, 
Soviet ships spend 50% of the time idle in ports or shipyards.98
In addition to the high operating costs, the USSR must target 
lower value fish such as Chilean jack mackerel and southern blue 
whiting because of its accessibility.99 As a result of restricted access 
to traditional grounds and depleted stocks in coastal waters, the USSR 
now harvests less desirable fish, switching from the popular herring, 
cod and red fish, 75% of which is useable, to pollack, hake and krill of 
which only 13% is useable. Thus, even though the volume may be 
the same, the protein content is much lower. To secure the same 
amount of protein, the Soviets have to harvest and process more fish 
now. These currently harvested species are not as familiar to 
consumers and so have a lower market value.100
As a result of the increased expense of fishing in the post-EEZ 
period, the amount invested in the fishing industry has had to 
increase .101 Harvesting in the open ocean necessitates the designing
98United States Department of Commerce, Soviet-Latin American 
Fishery Relations. 1961-1989. pp. 17-18.
"C onversation with Dr. Vladimir Kaczynski, Institute of Marine Studies, 
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington in November 1988.
10Conversation with Milan Kravanja. Another example was the catch 
in the Southwest Atlantic where the USSR caught 188,000 metric tons of fish 
under its agreement with Argentina, but since the species such as southern 
blue whiting are not familiar to Soviet consumers and sometimes invested with 
parasites, only 114,000 metric tons were produced for a value of US$ 51 million, 
or approximately US$ 450 per ton.
101 Nlikhail Gorbachev, Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to 
the 27th Party Congress. Novosti  Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow,
1986, p. 33.
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and building of sophisticated fishing vessels equipped with 
expensive generators, navigational and fishing systems. It is 
estimated that this type of vessel would cost US$ 7,500 per GRT to 
build in a western shipyard. This amount will fluctuate depending 
on the the equipment installed, but on average a 3,000 GRT Soviet 
trawler would cost US$ 22.5 million.102
Investment in the fishing fleet exceeded US$ 1 billion in the 
1970 's.103 Ships are expensive, long-term investments as it usually 
takes three to eight years from the time of the concept to the 
completed vessel. Many factors can change during this period of 
time. The design of the ship can become outdated and the supply of 
fish may change. Once constructed, the ships are used for 20 to 25 
years so any problems of design are magnified.
The investment in the fishing industry increased dramatically 
after World War 11. Between 1952 and 1958 alone, over 1,300 
million rubles were invested. Rubles were spent to rebuild vessels, 
port and processing facilities in the Barents, Baltic, Black and Caspian 
Seas which were destroyed during the war. Under Stalin, almost 50% 
of the budget went towards building vessels and the other half to 
shore facilities including ports, storage and processing plants. As the 
Soviet Union became more involved in distant water fishing, the 
amount of the budget spent on the fleet increased to 75%. From 
1956 to 1965, the USSR doubled fishery investments from 144 
million rubles to 290 million rubles a year and negotiated purchases
First of all, changing the structural and investment 
policy. The substance of the changes lies in 
shifting the center of attention from quantitative 
indices to quality and efficiency, from intermediate 
results to end results, from building up production 
assets to renewing them, from expanding fuel and 
raw material resources to making better use of 
them, and also to speeding up the development of 
research-intensive industries and of the production 
and social infrastructures.
As a result, the government has allocated more than 200 billion rubles for 
modernizing and technically re-equipping Soviet industry.
102United States Department of Commerce, Soviet-Latin American 
Fishery Relations. 1961-1989. p. 17.
103United States Department of Commerce, Fisheries of the U.S.S.R.. 1976.
p. 394.
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of new vessels from West European countries.104 These included 
large and medium size stern factory trawlers from the United 
Kingdom in 1954 and from West Germany in 1955 which helped to 
increase the Soviet fleet’s gross tonnage by more than 50%.105 The 
fishing industry operated at a profit by the end of the 1950's, from 
33 million rubles in 1959, to 106 million in 1960 and 541 million in 
1964.106
Almost 1,700 million rubles were spent on the industry during 
the period 1966-68, including over 1,200 million rubles directly on 
the fleet. The USSR invested over 12 billion rubles in the industry 
between 1928 and 1975. In 1975 alone, 800 million rubles were 
invested which was almost triple the amount invested in the first 20 
years of planned investment policy.107
Up to 80% of the budget was spent on improving the Soviet 
fleet, with the remainder left for constructing port and onshore 
facilities through the 1960's. As a result of this discrepancy in 
expenditure, the fleet expanded faster than shore-based facilities. 
Consequently, the antiquated onshore facilities have not been able to 
handle the catch. Priorities have changed somewhat since 1969 with 
more emphasis on improving port, storage, repair, and processing 
facilities. During 1976 to 1980, a large percentage of the budget was 
spent on constructing 15 modern fish processing facilities as well as 
over 100 retail fish stores in urban areas.108 Currently, capital 
investments in the fishing industry fluctuate between one and one 
and a half billion rubles a year. About 60% of capital investments is 
spent on fleet construction, 3-3.5% on ports, 5-6% on shore-based
104The fishing vessels for the USSR built in East Germany and Poland 
are paid through a barter arrangement through the CMEA. Hard currency is 
used to purchase vessels from the West Germany, Finland, the Netherlands.
105United States Department of Commerce, Fisheries of the U.S.S.R.. 1976.
p. 391.
1 0 f> S u lik o w s k i ,  "Soviet Management of Ocean Affairs: The Case of the 
Fishing Industry," p. 272.
107United States Department of Commerce, Fisheries of the U.S.S.R.. 1976.
p. 378.
10*Ibid .
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processing plants and the remainder on the repair, research, and the 
improvement of technological equipment.109
As investment increased, fishing techniques and equipment 
became more efficient. The net-type mouth mid water trawls 
recently have been replaced with the more effective midwater rope 
trawls which have a lower hydrodynamic resistance and improved 
parameters. Trawl 2214 was designed for use on the BMRT class 
vessels for deep-water fishing. The midwater Trawl 115/182.4 was 
designed for catching concentrations of moving fish in the central 
and southeastern Atlantic and in the southeastern Pacific. The four- 
sheet bottom-trawl 33/64 is used on BMRT classes in the Atlantic 
and Indian Oceans.110
Drift net fishing is used primarily for quickly moving fish of 
medium or low concentration. The efficiency of this method has 
improved with the use of sonar. Drift net fishing is still important in 
the USSR and is actively practiced in the Far East, the Baltic, and 
Caspian Seas. Improvements in the design and rigging of the nets 
have enabled the USSR to surpass other countries in the 
mechanization of drift net fishing. Where these methods of fishing 
cannot be employed, drifting and bottom longline fishing are 
successful for catching low concentrations of fish in regions where 
other methods cannot be employed. The most valuable catch is tuna, 
halibut and salmon which are caught with longlines.
Netless commercial fishing gear was used successfully for the 
first time in the world in the USSR.111 Netless fishing became 
popular in the 1950’s and includes the technique of fishing with fish 
pumps and electric lights. Over 250 vessels use this method in the 
Caspian Sea which accounts for 90% of the catch there. Pacific saury 
fishing with electric light and conical and stick-held dip nets was
109Correspondence with Dr. V.A. Teplitsky dated September 26, 1989.
110Inrybprom  Marketing Materials, p. 124.
Ibid. Fish pumps are used for catching Caspian sprat, whose schools 
are attracted by use of electric light. Using fish pumps together with 
traditional fishing gear such as trawls or seines has made it possible to develop 
continuous action hydraulic mechanized equipment. In 1970, 67.3% of the fish 
caught in the USSR were by trawling; 9.1% by purse seining; 6% by light 
fishing; 1.5% by drift nets; and 16.1% by other methods.
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introduced in the Far East as early as 1956 and is still in use today.
On inland waterways, pound nets, drift nets, drag seines, fish traps, 
and hook-type of fishing gear are used.
Before the Revolution over 60% of all fishing nets were made 
by hand, with remaining amount imported. After World War 11, 
machinery was designed to make better nets.112 Currently, the 
Soviet Union ranks among the first in the world in production of 
netting materials—kapron knotted gill nets, shrink-proof knitted 
netting, knotted netting made from kapron twine, and netting made 
from multi-component kapron 40-filament yarn.
The major advantage of using these new netting materials is 
that their longer service life allows greater catch volume and 
efficiency. The Soviet Union began to use kapron synthetic fiber so 
that its nets could be pulled up more slowly thus saving a greater 
percentage of the catch. Previously, while hauling in deep water 
perch, their internal bladders would expand and burst the net upon 
reaching the surface. The fish would then float away to be picked up 
by small Norwegian coastal boats waiting nearby for their easy 
h arv est.113
In addition to improved netting materials for the harvest, the 
Soviet fleet has been equipped with improved equipment to find the 
stocks. The fleet is now equipped with new radio communication, 
radio navigation, and fish finding sonar equipment. Onboard fish 
finding is a method of locating fish for commercial purposes through 
active and passive underwater sonar detection. Active fish finding 
equipment includes echometers which search for fish in a vertical 
plane and sonars which are designed to located fish in all directions 
relative to the vessel. Passive fish-finding equipment includes 
hydrophones and noise indicators which are used primarily in 
fishery research to study the sounds of marine organisms. Passive 
equipment is also used to detect tuna which are difficult to find using 
the active type equipment. Television units are used for locating 
benthic commercial products such as crabs and mollusks and for
112Sysoev, Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry, p. 156.
113Lysenko, A Crime Against the World, pp. 50-51.
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studying the behavior of fish. Currently, aircraft and earth satellites 
are being developed to locate aquatic organisms in vast expanses of 
w ate r.114
The amount of electronic equipment installed on individual 
ships ranges from eight to 65 sets and can account for up to 30% of 
the ship’s value. The sonar Omul  is designed for purse seining for 
vessels with a displacement of 75 to 100 tons. It has a range of up to 
900 meters. The Kal'mar  is used for finding pelagic and demersal 
fish up to depths of 800 meters. The Sudak  and Yaz instruments are 
used on small and medium vessels.
In addition to the net making and equipment industries, the 
fleet is serviced by shipyards. Efficiency in shipyard operations 
varies among regions but, in general, has not improved over time.
The disproportion between the size of the fleet and the capacity of 
the yards has resulted in long repair time. Ships can spend 30% to 
sometimes 50% of their fishing time waiting for repairs, and 
additional time is spent waiting for cargoes to be unloaded as a result 
of insufficient onshore processing facilities. Ports have been a 
serious bottleneck in fishing operations and numerous articles in the 
Soviet press have appeared calling for the need to improve the 
efficiency of ship repair.115
H ^in ry b p ro m  Marketing Materials, p. 124.
115Sulikowski, "Soviet Management of Ocean Affairs: The Case of the 
Fishing Industry, " pp. 310-311. N.S. Goriunov, Director of the Administration 
of the Exploitation of the Fleet and Ports:
-time lost by ships in repair, approximately 30% of 
ship time is spent waiting for repairs because 
of insufficient facilities and slow work 
-time lost by ships in port
-time lost in transferring fish catch from fishing to 
transport ships because of too few processing 
and refrigerated transport ships and 
organizational problems 
-time lost by ships in transit from one fishing 
region to another 
-time lost to lack or equipment or accident.
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Summary
The Soviet fishing fleet is the largest in the world today. 
However, coastal pollution, overfishing, and the introduction of 
the EEZ changed the Soviet strategy from resource abundance to 
resource scarcity, leading to the development o f distant water 
fishing flotillas to harvest food for the Soviet population as well 
as earn much needed hard currency.
Contributing to the long distance capacity of the Soviet 
fleet are the introductions of the stern factory trawler and the 
flotilla concept. However, good the concept, the advanced age of 
many of the vessels has decreased the overall efficiency of the 
fleet with ships spending at least 30% of their time in port.
As a result of limited access to their traditional grounds, 
the Soviets must target lower value fish, thus decreasing the 
profitability of the catch.
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H istory of the Soviet Fishing Industry  through the post-EEZ
P e r i o d
A study of the history of the Soviet fishing industry with special 
emphasis on the effect of the Exclusive Economic Zone on Soviet 
fishing patterns and the resulting increased attention focused on 
fisheries in the high seas and inland waterways of the USSR.
The Soviet fishing industry emerged from a primitive fishery 
to become the number one nation in terms of fleet tonnage, and the 
number two fishing nation, after Japan, in the world, harvesting 11.2 
million tons or 12% of the total world catch for 1987.116 To become 
the second largest harvester, the Soviet fishing industry has had to 
recover from two world wars, regroup after major political and 
economic changes, and adapt to widespread stock depletions.
Probably the most dramatic event affecting the Soviet fishing 
industry was the worldwide acceptance and enforcement of a 200 
mile EEZ. First introduced by Latin America, the zone became 
customary international law during the United Nations Conferences 
on Law of the Sea. The law gives coastal state total jurisdiction over 
all living and nonliving resources within a 200 mile area from the 
shore. By 1977, more than four-fifths of the world's 200 mile zones 
were claimed by coastal states. Since over 95% of all fish are caught 
within these EEZs, developing nations now controlled two thirds of 
the world's fish supply. The EEZ has severely limited access to 
traditional fishing grounds of the Soviet distant water fleet. The 
immediate result was a 10% decrease in the Soviet annual catch.
More recently, Perestroika  has implemented a major restructuring of 
the industry which is currently in process.
During the nineteenth century, the Russian fishing industry 
was concentrated in the inland waterways near the main population 
centers of central and southern European Russia. These fisheries 
developed as a result of their proximity to a ready market, abundant 
labor force, and salt mines located near the Caspian, Azov and Black 
Seas as salting was the primary processing method used. The 
sturgeon fishery in the Caspian Sea accounted for 63% of the total 
catch in the 1800's. By 1830, the decrease in sturgeon, due to
116United States Department of Commerce, Fisheries of the U.S.S.R.. 1976. 
p. 379 and pp. 393-394. As a result of increased investment and modem vessels 
and equipment, the total catch reached prewar levels by 1947 and increased to 
5.77 million tons in 1965, and to over 10 million tons in 1975. This was an 18% 
increase in annual catch, more than twice the world growth of 6.7% for the 
same period.
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overfishing combined with the increased demand for fish products, 
led to the commercial fishing of bream, pike, perch, and carp.117
During the 1880's, the fishing industry flourished as the 
railroads connected the Volga towns with other areas in Russia. By 
1905, 3,000 tons of fish were carried by rail, increasing elevenfold 
by 1910. In addition, the introduction of the steamship reduced 
transit time between Astrakhan and Gorky from two months to two 
w eeks.118 The Far East fisheries remained mostly isolated until the 
Murmansk railroad was completed in 1916.119
Fishing operations came to a virtual halt during World War 1.
The industry made a comeback in 1917 with a total catch of 890,000 
tons, but fell again during the Civil War and "foreign intervention" to 
an all time low of 170,000 tons in 1919.120 To alleviate the ensuing 
food crisis, state management of the fisheries was introduced in 
October 1918, only to be reversed three years later by "The Fishing
Industry and Fishery" decree under the NEP.
NEP breathed life into the fishing industry by attracting private 
capital to accelerate the development of the economy. The total 
catch increased 85% by 1926. However, the capitalist influence was 
short-lived, as socialism soon replaced individual initiative with the 
1925 introduction of state-operated and cooperative fisheries. By 
1929, 60% of the fisheries were cooperatives.
As the population began to recover from the ravages of war 
and political purges, greater demands were made on the fishing 
industry to supply food to the people. Although the majority of 
fishing was still done in rivers, lakes, and inland seas of the Caspian,
117Sysoev, Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry, p. 17. Overfishing 
in the late 1800's led to a 33% decrease in catch in the Sea of Azov by the 1900's. 
Also, the sterlet population was exhausted in the Volga River, and there was a 
decline in the carp and sturgeon harvest in the Caspian Sea.
1 1 8 / b / d .
119There was salmon fishing in Kamchatka using passive fishing 
techniques in the spawning grounds. However, in general, the Far Eastern 
fisheries were underutilized at this time because of the scarce local population 
and the lack of reliable transportation.
12®The low harvest in 1919 was the result of the effects of World War 1, 
the Japanese occupation of the Far East, and the British seizure of Arkhangelsk 
in the spring of 1918.
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Azov and Black Seas, high seas fishing increased 130%,!21 expanding 
into the open waters of the Far Eastern and Northern basins, 
including the rich grounds near Medvezhii Island, Gusinaya Bank 
near Novaya Zemlya, and the Demidovskaya Bank. At this time, the 
fishing kolkhozes  and motorized fishing stations (MFS) introduced in 
1932 began to play an important role in the industry. The total catch 
of fish, marine animals and whales grew from 960,000 tons in 1929 
to 1,400,000 tons by 1940.122 This was due in part to the increased 
harvest of herring, Caspian kilka, Baltic herring, anchovy, Azov kilka, 
cod, and flounder. During the same period, the catch from inland 
waters remained the same, accounting for less than 60% of the total 
harvest by 1940.123
During the "Great Patriotic War of 1941-45," the Baltic, Black, 
Azov, and Barents Seas were part of the war zone. Fishermen were 
enlisted resulting in more than 40% drop in the annual harvest. At 
this point, measures were taken to develop fishing in Siberia and the 
Far East to supply food to the military.
The entire European fleet and most of the Pacific fishing fleet 
were destroyed during World War 11, as were the majority of ports 
and shore facilities. Direct losses in the fishing industry were 
estimated at 56 million rubles, including 11.5 million rubles for the 
fleet destruction. Indirect losses were over 200 million rubles. After 
the war, the immediate objective was to rebuild the fisheries in the 
inland and coastal waterways. Fishing was concentrated in the near
121Press Release May 1979. The amount caught in the high seas grew 
from 240,000 tons in 1928 to 560,000 tons by 1940.
122Note that the Soviet numbers are higher than those of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) because the FAO does not 
include the catch of marine mammals in metric tons and the amount of marine 
plants harvests.
123The drop was due in part to the decreased runoff resulting in a lower 
level of the Caspian Sea during the 1930’s. Also, the insufficient flow of water 
from the Don and the Kuban led to increased salinity of the Sea of Azov which 
adversely affected the reproduction of commercial stocks. The lower runoff 
was the result of the construction of hydro-development and land 
improvement measures such as the building of reservoirs, irrigation of arid 
zones, and snow retention. Simultaneously, there was an increase in the 
temperature in the North resulting in greater evaporation.
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shore areas of the Barents, Baltic, Japan and Okhotsk Seas.124 The 
harvest from the Western Basin, with its ice-free ports like Kalingrad 
and good transportation ties to the urban centers, experienced the 
greatest growth, increasing 66 times between 1940 to 1968. The 
catch in the Far Eastern region with its ice-free ports of Vladivostok 
and Nakhodka increased seven times during the same period.125
The postwar emphasis shifted to developing long distance 
fisheries. More than 80% of the investment in the industry by the 
late 1940's was dedicated to creating a modern industrial base for 
oceanic fisheries. In his new role as the Minister of Fisheries in 
1948, Mr. A.A. Ishkov repeatedly stressed the need to develop 
distant water capability. The first expeditionary voyage sailed to 
Iceland that year. Although no fish were caught, the trip was hailed 
as having "initiated the development of Soviet fishing in the high 
seas."126 By the late 1940's, 46% of the catch was from the high seas. 
This increased percentage was made possible by the introduction of 
large refrigeration vessels, followed by the addition of vessels with 
freezing capabilities, canning lines, and fishmeal reduction plants. 
Motherships, floating canneries and long range support vessels 
further enhanced the Soviet ability to fish the world's oceans. As a 
result of increased investment and modern vessels and equipment, 
the total catch reached prewar levels by 1947 and increased to 1.75 
million tons by 1950.
Khrushchev introduced an aggressive seven year plan which 
shifted funds away from the Navy to the fishing industry. With the 
additional rubles, the industry was able to branch out from its North 
Arctic and Pacific fisheries sending vessels to Iceland and the Faroe 
Islands in 1953 and to the Grand Banks off Newfoundland two years 
later. Increasing the annual harvest became a political priority. In 
1962, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of
124Sulikowski, "Soviet Management of Ocean Affairs: The Case of the 
Fishing Industry," p. 251.
125Sysoev, Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry, p. 205. Kamchatka
was the most important Far Eastern region.
126Sulikowski, "Soviet Management of Ocean Affairs: The Case of the
Fishing Industry," p 253.
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Ministers adopted the decree "On Measures to Increase the Catch of 
Fish and the Output of Fish Products" which set the industry 
objective-raise the catch of fish and marine animals to 5.5 million 
tons by 1965.127 The goal actually was overfulfilled by almost
300,000 tons.
The North Atlantic became the main fishing ground for the 
Soviet fleet during the 1950's. The fleet first concentrated on the 
Northeastern fishing grounds, i.e. the Barents, North, Norwegian, and 
Baltic Seas as well as the waters around Iceland and the Faroe 
Islands.128 The Barents Sea area accounted for 10% of the total catch 
with its rich harvest of cod, herring, capelin, perch, wolf fish, and 
flounders. The Norwegian Sea was of secondary importance with 
Soviet harvests of herring (50-60%), cod (12-20%), and coalfish (6- 
12%), and the remainder catch of haddock and ocean perch.
After depleting the commercially valuable stocks of those seas, 
the fleet moved on to George's Bank to concentrate on the herring 
fishery. The USSR took over 60,000 metric tons of herring from this 
area after Soviet vessels found a large concentration of herring 
during a research expedition in 1961. Approximately 400 to 500 
Soviet vessels would simultaneously drag trawls across the Bank 
which greatly increased the catch but destroyed the breeding 
grounds.129 After overfishing the herring stocks, the Soviets 
redirected their operations to the more plentiful haddock. As these 
stocks were depleted, the fleet moved southward along the American 
East Coast as far as Cape Hatteras in North Carolina.130
Soviet fishermen used 40 mm stretch mesh, smaller than the 
internationally accepted standard, which fired strong anti-Soviet
127Sysoev, Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry, p. 29.
128 Norman Polmar, Soviet Naval Power. MacDonald and Company 
(Publishers) Ltd., London, 1974, pp. 80-81.
129Conversation with Dr. Marvin Grosslein, NMFS, Woods Hole, MA.
13Conversation with Milan Kravanja. The story goes that the United 
States did not have a structured body to study Soviet activity until President 
Kennedy saw Soviet fishing vessels off Hyannisport while out swimming one 
day. At first, the President thought this was a military threat, but quickly 
realized instead it was an economic one. He called in experts to monitor Soviet 
activ ities.
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feelings among American fishermen. American fishermen talked 
about Soviet ships "harassing" American vessels, Soviet nets, "the size 
of football fields," full of fish, and discarded nets, tangling American 
vessel propellers.131 As a result of these Soviet aggressive tactics, 
the total harvest in this area increased from 147,000 metric tons in 
1962 to a record catch of 418,000 metric tons. The Soviet Atlantic 
catch increased from 46% of the total Soviet harvest in 1964 to 53% 
in 1973.
Depletion of the herring, haddock, mackerel, and flounder 
stocks prompted the need for international cooperation in the 
management of the stocks. As early as 1949, the International 
Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) was created 
in 1949 to establish quotas for native stocks.132 Canada went one 
step beyond the Commission's quota system by further by closing its 
Atlantic ports to all Soviet vessels until the latter decreased its 
fishing operations in this area by 40%.
Hake fishing in the Northeast Pacific, i.e. the Bering Sea, the 
Gulf of Alaska, and the areas off Washington and Oregon, began in 
the 1960’s when the USSR expanded its operation into the Gulf of 
Alaska. The fleet "invaded" the Gulf of Alaska in 1962, the coasts of 
Washington and Oregon in 1966, and California in 1967. The annual 
Soviet catch rapidly increased to 250,000 metric tons annually and 
remained at this level until 1975. Fishing activities moved further 
south to Mexico, and Central America which accounted for less than 
2% of the total catch in the 1970’s and even less after the 
introduction of economic zones. The total Soviet harvest for the North 
American grounds was consistently in the one to two million metric 
ton range until the strict enforcement of the US EEZ in 1977. The 
Soviet harvest from the American Pacific grounds was most affected, 
decreasing from 700,000 metric tons in 1974 to 2,400 metric tons in 
1983.
131 United States Congress, Hearing Before the Committee on Commerce. 
94th Congress, 1st Session, Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1975, 
pp. 28-30.
132The USSR joined the ICNAF in 1956.
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In 1980, the\ United States denied access to its fishing grounds 
to the USSR as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
President Reagan partially lifted the ban in July 1984 by allocating 
Soviet vessels 50,000 metric tons primarily of Alaskan pollack. The 
Soviet catch increased slightly in the American EEZ in 1984 and 
1985, but chances of'growth in this area are unlikely because of the 
development of the American fishing industry in this region.
Soviet activity in the Caribbean area has accounted for only a 
small portion of the total Soviet harvest each year. Just over 17,000 
metric tons were harvested by Soviet vessels in the Caribbean in 
1965. The harvest fluctuated from 37,400 metric tons in 1966 to a 
record high of 69,000 metric tons in 1975. No catch has been 
reported from this area since 1977.133 However, the USSR has had a 
close relationship with Cuba since it established a fishing base there 
in the early 1960's. The Soviets built a modern port at Havana giving 
them port access for their South American fishing activities as well 
as a base for possible intelligence surveillance.134
The USSR has had a stormy relationship with Latin America
since its first research expeditions to the region in 1961. Soviet 
fishing vessels targeted the Southwest Atlantic fisheries off 
Argentina and the Southeast Pacific fisheries off Peru and Chile. The 
fleet, including over 30 vessels and seven motherships, first 
descended on the coastal waters of Argentina in 1966, harvesting up 
to 73,000 tons, over 75% of which was Patagonian hake. The next 
year more than 70 Soviet vessels appeared, provoking the Argentine
government of General Juan Carlos Garcia to declare an EEZ on
January 19, 1967.135 The government implemented a licensing 
scheme, charging each vessel a nominal fee of US$ 30 every two
133Please refer to Appendices G and H for a breakdown of the Soviet 
catch by region from 1965-1987.
134 Kilmarx, Soviet Sea Power, p. 97. Citing Ghana as an example (Ghana 
had seized two Soviet trawlers in its territorial waters for suspected 
clandestine support of efforts to return the deposed leader Nkrumah to power), 
American officials stated that Soviet trawlers operating along the American
coast may be engaging in spying or smuggling activities.
135 £>ccrce number 17094. The Argentines were concerned by the size of
the hake harvest as this was the primary domestic fishery.
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months. Though refusing to officially recognize the EEZ, the Soviet 
trawlers, carefully watched by the Argentine Navy, paid for 102 
licenses. Despite these restrictions, the Soviet catch increased almost
9.5 times in one year. As a response, the Argentine government 
further restricted the Soviet fishing by introducing an increased fee 
of US$ 500 per vessel plus a permit charge based on the tonnage of 
the vessel. The fishing became unprofitable as the fees for a typical 
Soviet factory vessel cost US$ 50,000 for a seven month period.136
The Soviets were unable to negotiate a lower registration fee, 
so in April 1968, 30 vessels moved north to Brazil and Uruguay, and 
the rest set sail for the West Coast of Africa. This was not a quiet 
departure. The Soviet fleet so delayed its departure that the 
Argentine Navy finally shot at two Soviet stern factory trawlers 
which then surrendered to Argentine authorities. The vessels were 
released from Argentine custody after several weeks of negotiations. 
Violations continued through the 1970’s. The Soviet trawlers, the 
Bussol, Theodor Nette, Apatite, Magnite and later the Nereid , 
Prokipievsk , and the Frans Hals were arrested by Argentine naval 
vessels in the Patagonian Shelf during the fall of 1977.137
Uruguay was the next Soviet target. However, having watched 
Soviet activity in Argentina, Uruguay quickly claimed an EEZ. The 
Soviet vessels next steamed on to unsuspecting Brazil, harvesting
420,000 tons of fish in the area in 1970. Brazil quickly retaliated by 
also claiming a 200 mile zone in 1971, and completely closed its 
coastal waters to foreign fishermen at that time.
In the Southwest Atlantic region, the catch declined from a 
high in 1967, to 26,000 metric tons in 1971, and to under 5,000 
metric tons the following year. Bilateral agreements with countries
136United States Department of Commerce, Soviet-Latin American 
Fishery Relations. 1961-1989. p. 25. The US$ 500 fee was for a 12 month period. 
The permit charge was US$ 10 per GRT for fishing vessels and US$ 20 per GRT 
for processing vessels.
137Lysenko, A Crime Against the World, pp. 9-11.
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in this area reversed this trend so that by 1987 the catch was at a 15 
year high of 169,000 metric tons.138
A brief window of opportunity opened during the 1982 
Falklands conflict. The United Kingdom established a 150 mile 
protection zone around the islands to prevent Argentine patrol craft 
from entering the area. The British allowed unlimited access to other 
countries. Always opportunistic, the Soviets arrived with a flotilla of 
60 stern factory trawlers. The resulting catch consisted of 
approximately 50% squid and the remaining, grenadiers and 
southern blue whiting.139 Further Soviet activity ceased as soon as 
the British implemented a licensing and resource management 
regim e.
Since 1979, the primary ground for Soviet fishing off Latin 
America has been the Southeast Pacific which accounts for 85% of its 
total Latin American catch. Though the vessels have been restricted 
from operating inside the Peruvian and Chilean EEZs, the annual 
harvest increased over 100 times from 54,000 metric tons in 1978 to
547,000 the next year. Over 90% of the harvest is Chilean jack 
m ackerel.140 Most fleet activity centers around the Chilean and 
Peruvian boundaries, south and southwest of the Juan Fernandez 
Islands, along the Chilean Rise.
The USSR has not conducted any major fishing operations in the 
Eastern Central Pacific off the coasts of Mexico, Colombia and Ecuador 
since 1973 when Soviet vessels caught 138,100 metric tons of fish, 
90% of which were grunts. As a result of Soviet overfishing, the 
harvest dropped to 22,200 metric tons in 1974. After 1975, the 
catch dropped rapidly to under 2,000 metric tons and was reported 
as 100 metric tons in 1987.141
138United States Department of Commerce, Soviet-Latin American 
Fishery Relations. 1961-1989. p. 25.
139The squid was sold in Europe since this species has never been 
popular in the USSR.
140The USSR also caught 40,000 metric tons of chub mackerel annually 
from 1980-82.
14 U nited  States Department of Commerce, Soviet-Latin American 
Fishery Relations. 1961-1989. p. 13.
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The USSR shifted its fishing activity to the coast of Africa after 
being excluded from Argentine waters in 1968 when 50 of the 80 
trawlers in Argentine waters went directly to the coast of West 
A frica.142 This area contributed 3% to total Soviet catch in 1964. 
Catches more than doubled from 480,000 tons in 1965 to a record
2.3 million in 1978. The Soviet fleet harvested primarily horse 
mackerel. Since then, the annual harvest has fluctuated around the
1.5 million metric ton range. The actual catch in 1987 was 1.7 metric 
million tons which was the equivalent of 51% of the Soviet distant 
water catch that year.143 Like the Latin Americans, many of the 
African nations declared economic zones in response to the Soviet 
onslaught. Unlike the Argentines, most African countries have 
limited enforcement capabilities and fear routine Soviet violations of 
their coastal zones.144
142From conversations with Theo Brainard, an African graduate student 
at the University of Rhode Island in Kingston, RI. West Africa has the sixth 
most productive fisheries in the world. The East Central Atlantic Zone contains 
a wide variety of fish which are also highly migratory and are fished by 
African, European and Asian countries. The maximum sustainable yield (MSY) 
has been estimated to be as high as four million tons. The richest area is 
located in the north between Morocco and Guinea. The fishery is primarily 
pelagic fish, including sardines, sardinella, mackerel, and horse mackerel.
The most productive area for these is from Mauritania to Sierra Leone. The 
remaining fishery is made up of 15% demersal including hake from Morocco 
to Sierra Leone, sea bream from Mauritania to Guinea, big eye grunter from 
Senegal and Gambia and a variety of stocks from Mauritania to Guinea. The 
remaining 10% consist of cephalopods-octopus, cuttlefish and squid, tuna and 
shrimp. Pink shrimp is the most important crustacean resource, and is found 
in lagoon entrances to the ocean and near the mouths of rivers especially in 
the larger river areas from Senegal to Nigeria and offshore. These stocks are 
difficult to manage as a result of their highly migratory nature.
143United States Department of Commerce, Soviet-Latin American 
Fishery Relations. 1961-1989. p. 4. The total Soviet catch from distant water 
fisheries was 3.5 million tons in 1987.
144Notes from meetings with Theo Brainard at the University of Rhode 
Island and subsequent correspondence. Domestic fishing is primarily
artisanal, located in the coastal waters. Large foreign fleets operate outside 
the territorial limits and harvest the majority of the catch from this area.
Distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) accounted for 70% of the catch in 1977,
with the USSR the largest in terms of weight. With the introduction of EEZs 
and the resulting higher operation costs, the foreign fleet harvest dropped to 
less than 60% of the total production. Part of the reason for the drop was the
decline in the Soviet harvest from 1.3 million metric tons in 1976 to 800,000
tons by 1978. Though the increased jurisdiction benefited the West African 
financially, it also brought increased problems. Many of these countries
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After the extension of coastal state jurisdiction, the Soviet 
Union has negotiated agreements with the different African nations. 
These usually provide for Soviet economic aid, training, research 
information, and the construction of onshore facilities and ports. In 
exchange, the coastal states allow Soviet vessels limited access to 
their waters.
Despite agreements with the African nations, the USSR was 
severely restricted in its access to these fisheries. As a result, the 
Soviet Union developed a strong interest in the Southern 
Hemisphere. Soviet interest in the South Pacific began in 1965 when 
20 research vessels, making up the so-called "Lira Expedition," were 
sent to test the commercial feasibility of the region’s fisheries. 
Commercial fishing did not begin there until 1971, and the South 
Pacific still remains one of the most important to the Soviet industry. 
Officials have emphasized that the Soviet interest in the South Pacific 
has been primarily economic, not military. The USSR is interested in 
the tuna and salmon fisheries. Tuna is sought for food, not for 
foreign exchange.145 "Oceania" is growing in importance as the catch 
from this area accounts for 1.5% of the Soviet catch. The 1987 
harvest was 166,000 metric tons. Previously, the catch had 
fluctuated in the 70,000 metric tons range.
The Indian Ocean is of great interest to the Soviet Union.
Vessels from the Black Sea Administration began to operate in the
lacked regulatory or management organizations, and were often unable to 
patrol their EEZs.
Regional organizations were set up to help manage the stocks. West 
African Economic Community (CEAO) organization was created in April 1973 by 
Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta. CEAO is 
responsible for promoting the conservation and development of fisheries as 
well as the coordination of the legislation of member states. Fishery Committee 
for the Eastern Central Atlantic (CECAF) was created in 1969 under the 
Constitution of the FAO and is composed of 29 states, 19 of which are coastal 
African nations. Its objective is to assist members in establishing a scientific 
basis for regulating and conserving the area’s living resources. In 1981, 14 of 
the West African countries from Mauritania to Namibia signed a 
comprehensive conservation agreement, including an action plan for 
conservation measures in the Coastal areas of the West and Central African 
regions; a convention to protect the marine environment in this area; and a 
protocol for cooperation in fighting pollution in cases of emergency.
145 Correspondence with Dr. Anatoly Kolodkin, Professor of Law and 
Chairman of the Soviet Maritime Law Association, Moscow dated May 26, 1989.
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Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf in 1963. The catch increased to 76,000 
tons in 1966, but decreased the next year as a result of the closure of 
the Suez Canal during the Arab-Israeli War. A contract with 
Pakistan was short-lived in 1971, resulting in a declining harvest 
from 240,000 tons in 1971 to 44,000 tons by 1973.146
Another area of interest is Antarctica. Whaling activities 
expanded to this area in the 1950's. By 1954 there were four 
flotillas in this area, working around 40,000 ton ships. The Soviet 
Union decreased whaling activities in the mid-1960's under pressure 
from the International Whaling Commission. No Soviet whaling 
activities have taken place since the mid-1980's.
The Soviet Antarctic catch reached a high of 602,000 metric 
tons in 1982, but has since declined by 64% in 1987.147 Antarctic fin 
fish are primarily harvested by Communist Bloc countries who 
caught 104,000 tons in 1979 or 63% less than the 1976 catch. 
Depletion of Antarctic fin fish has forced the USSR to focus on krill.148
The USSR initiated a krill fishery in Antarctica in 1974, 
harvesting 105,000 metric tons of krill. The catch increased to
491,000 metric tons in the next decade, but then declined with the 
reduction of the number of Soviet vessels fishing in the region
14^United States Department of Commerce, Fisheries of the U.S.S.R.. 1976.
p. 410.
147The Soviet catch for 1987 was reported as 384,200. The FAO began 
recording statistics for Soviet activity in this region in 1976.
148Walter V. Reid, "Managing the Southern Ocean Krill Fishery," 
R esources. Spring 1988, pp. 11-14. Krill is a two inch shrimp-like crustacean 
that plays a primary role in the ecosystem of the southern ocean around the 
Antarctic continent—food for whales, seals and marine birds. This resource 
has become a significant fishery in this area. Worldwide catch has increased 
from 20,000 tons during 1973-74, peaking at 500,000 tons in the early 1980's.
The 1986-87 catch was approximately 375,000 tons. The fishery is dominated by 
the USSR which takes 80% of the catch. The remaining is mostly harvested by 
the Japanese with some taken by Poland, Chile, Korea, and Spain.
In the USSR krill is marketed as fishmeal and used as a protein additive 
for animal feed, while in Japan it is consumed by humans. Though there is 
some concern about overfishing it has been estimated that 150 million tons of 
krill could be harvested annually, "a shrimp cocktail the size of a city block 
and piled five miles high."
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because of the high operating costs.149 Most of the catch is used for 
meal. Given the high cost of Antarctic operations and specialized 
processing needs, this is a very expensive method to produce 
fishmeal. In addition, it takes two to three times as much krill meat 
to substitute for fish. These costs have been somewhat reduced with 
the introduction of improved machinery and krill processing 
techniques in 1987. No statistics have been made available on what 
percentage of the catch currently is made into fishmeal.
Though most of the press and attention have been focused on 
its distant water fleets, the USSR does have substantial fishing 
grounds in their coastal waters and internal water bodies. The USSR 
has 14 seas with a corresponding 47,000 kilometers of coastline so 
that two-thirds of its borders are actually shorelines.
As Soviet access to world fisheries was restricted, the Soviets 
turned their attention to their own coastal fisheries which now 
account for 60% of the total Soviet catch or 6.7 million metric tons. 
The total Soviet coastal catch reached an all time high of 7.2 million 
metric tons in 1984, but this number quickly fell as a result of 
overfishing. Most of the catch is from the Far East which accounts for 
approximately 5.5 million tons per year, including over 3.3 million 
tons of Alaskan pollack, 190,000 tons of Pacific herring, 188,000 tons 
of Pacific cod, 132,000 tons of salmon, 30,000 tons of shrimp, as well 
as ocean perch and other marine life.150
The USSR has increased it domestic catch by reducing Japanese 
and South Korean quotas in Soviet waters. For example, the Japanese 
quota was decreased from 1.5 million metric tons in the late 1970's 
to 150,000 tons in 1986. Over 30% of the increase in the Soviet catch 
has been at the expense of the Japanese harvesting of pilchard, 
capelin, Asian greenling, sculpins, cod, and Pacific herring. In 
addition, all South Korean fishing was halted which traditionally
149Correspondence with Dr. D.L. Powell, Executive Secretary of the 
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR), Hobart, Tasmania dated July 30, 1988.
150The Far Eastern portion of the catch has increased to 60% from 31% 
in 1977. The 1985 figure included 640,000 metric tons from the Japanese EEZ, 
but the Soviet quota has since been reduced to 150,000 tons.
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accounted for 400,000 metric tons a year. In the Okhotsk Sea, the 
redeployed Soviet vessels have operated as independent trawlers in 
coastal fisheries or as motherships for smaller local coastal catcher 
boats.151
Inland waterways accounted for over 16% of the total catch in 
1965 or 826,000 metric tons. The harvest averaged 800,000 metric 
tons during the following 20 years and recently reached an all time 
high of 988,000 metric tons in 1987.
The Caspian and Azov Seas have been the traditional source of 
fish for the Russian people and determined their preference for fresh 
water fish. Despite this preference for fresh water fish, the 
development of these fisheries, as well as pond fishing and fish 
farming, suffered during the increased attention to distant water 
fishing. The most important inland fisheries have been in the 
Caspian Sea, but these have been negatively effected by the building 
of hydro-power stations on the Volga River. The resulting reduction 
in river runoff in combination with increased industrial and 
agricultural pollution have decimated the stocks of roach and killed 
sturgeon roe.
The Azov-Black Sea area has been the second most important 
inland fishery.152 Productivity was very high in this area because of 
the abundant continental runoff, low salinity and favorable biological 
conditions in the Don and Kuban Rivers. As in the Caspian, the stocks 
have been negatively affected by increased industrial and 
agricultural pollution. Also, the 1952 construction of the 
Tsimlyanskoe Reservoir destroyed the natural spawning grounds in 
the Don River.153
The USSR has over 250,000 lakes with a combined area of 25 
million hectares, including 50 lakes with an area of over 10,000 
square kilometers. The largest lakes are Lake Baikal, Balkhash,
151Kaczynski, "The 200 Mile EEZ and Soviet Fisheries in the North 
Pacific Ocean; an Economic Assessment," p. 11.
152The two seas are regarded as one entity because many species such as 
herring, anchovy, and mullet migrate from the Black Sea to the Azov Sea and 
vice versa.
153Sysoev, Economics of the Soviet Fishing Industry, pp. 199-200.
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Ladoga, Onega, Peipus, and Ilmen. Lake Baikal is the deepest 
freshwater lake in the world. The most valuable commercial stock of 
this lake is whitefish, but harvests have been declining because of 
the effects of pollution and overfishing on the stock.
The total length of all rivers in the USSR is approximately three 
million kilometers of which 350,000 are accessible for fishing.
Fishing has also been done in 85 storage lakes with a total surface 
area of 100,600 square kilometers. The most important of these are 
the Kuibyshev, the Rybinsk, and the Volgagrad storage lakes. Fishing 
in these bodies has become an important source of catch for the 
inland waterways.
In addition to commercial fishing, over 20 million individuals 
fish for roach, perch, bream, and pike in the Russian Central Zone; 
cod, flatfish, and navaga on the North Sea coast; grey mullet and 
horse mackerel in the Black Sea; smelt and navaga in the Far East. 
Individual licenses are allocated for valuable species such as salmon 
and herring in the Far East and sturgeon in the Ural River. In some 
areas, angling has become so popular that it has reached the volume 
of commercial catches and becomes a factor in management decisions 
for the fishery.154
The USSR will continue to focus on the high seas in their search 
for underutilized stocks to increase its harvest as the more 
productive world coastal fisheries become less accessible. In 
addition, the inland waterways are becoming an increasingly 
important percentage of the total harvest as Soviet options 
worldwide are decreasing.
154Inrybprom  Marketing Materials, pp. 192-194. Fish protection bodies 
manage the fisheries on recommendations from scientific organizations and 
fix time limits, sites, methods and volume for individual basins. There are 
approximately 500 "fisheries functions" which offer services such as lodging, 
renting boats, fish tackle as well as carry out fish breeding programs and 
improvement works. Soviets can join fishermen societies enabling them to 
fish in the country's lakes, reservoirs and river areas and can take an active 
role in protection of the fish resources.
8 0
S u m m a r y
Today the Soviet fishing industry's harvest is surpassed 
only by Japan. Although affected by the 200 mile EEZ where
developing nations control two thirds of the world's fish supply, 
the Soviets still harvest over 12% of the world's catch.
During the 19th century, the Russian industry was 
concentrated in inland waterways near the main population 
centers, but expanded overseas with the introduction of the 
distant water fleet in the 1950's. The resulting Soviet flotillas 
caused worldwide concern with their massive overfishing of 
previously fertile fishing grounds. Most coastal states restricted 
access to the Soviet fleets, forcing the USSR to explore more 
plentiful stocks like krill in the high seas. The USSR also is 
focusing on its inland fisheries going full circle to the 19th 
c e n tu ry .
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Soviet R esearch C apabilities
study of the history of research for the fishing industry with 
special emphasis on current education and training as an 
important segment of that industry.
With the limitations presented by EEZs, oceanographic research 
has become an even more relevant part of the fishing industry. Its 
importance has grown rapidly as new techniques have become 
necessary to find decreasing stocks of fish in increasingly remote 
areas of the oceans. As a result, the government recently has made a 
conscientious effort to improve its oceanographic research 
capabilities as well as other support functions, including the training 
and educational system as well as the actual living conditions for 
those involved in the industry.155
The Russian research program, in essence, began during the 
circumvention of the world by the explorers, Ivan Kruzenshtern and 
Yuri Lisyanskii from 1803-06, followed by Fabian Gottlieb von 
Bellinghausen and Mikhail Lazarev from 1819-1821. The first 
research vessel, the Andrei Pervozvannii, was built in 1898.156
After the Revolution, the Soviet Government expanded the 
country’s oceanographic research capabilities by establishing the first 
marine institute. By 1922, the institute had its own specially 
constructed research vessel, the Persei. By the 1950's, oceanographic 
research organizations extended throughout the USSR. During 1957- 
58, the USSR mounted the world's largest oceanographical research 
program. At this time, the Soviets launched the Mikhail Lomonsov,
155Ryzhkov, Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the 
USSR for 1986-1990 and for the Period Ending in 2000. p. 31.
...a first-priority of the 12th five-year plan is that 
every engineering and managerial decision should 
be examined in the context of the gradually growing 
contribution by science and technology to 
production. Socialism's economic system enables us 
to make systematic use of the potential of the 
scientific and technological revolution. Unlike 
capitalism, where, in the final analysis, the great 
achievements of science and technology aggravate 
the social contradictions, in the hands of the 
socialist state they are a powerful lever for 
transforming society. Here socialism has a historic 
advantage, and must use it to the full.
156William E. Butler, The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea. John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1971, p. 160.
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the first Soviet research ship designed for distant water research. By
1964, the Soviet research fleet was a large as the American one, 
surpassing the American fleet six years later. At that time, the 
Soviet fleet displaced 320,000 tons and the American fleet 180,000 
tons.157
Since 1966, the Akademik Korolev has been the flagship of the 
research fleet. It is used to photograph the bottom of the ocean up to
5,000 meters and has discovered the large concentrations of iron and 
manganese nodules found south of latitude 10 degrees south.158 In 
addition, the older factory trawler, Akademik Knipovich, was 
refurbished and equipped for research by the Ministry of Fisheries 
and participated in 20 expeditions, primarily in the Southwest 
Atlantic and Southeast Pacific between 1962-1982.159 Another 
research vessel, the Vityaz, has completed more than 60 expeditions, 
including the exploration of several deep sea underwater mountain 
ridges such as the East Indochinese Ridge.
By 1970, the USSR owned 70 research ships, increasing to 200 
ships four years later. The total capacity in terms of tonnage grew 
over 60% in the 1980's. As a result of the increased size of the 
vessels, more laboratories and a larger number of scientists can be 
aboard each ship.
A large percentage of the research vessels built in the USSR 
have been converted from merchant ships, fishery trawlers, 
passenger ships and even ferries. Several of these vessels reportedly 
lack sophistication and often must use brute strength rather than 
technology to carry out research-oriented tasks. Many operations 
use side trawlers instead of stern trawlers. In addition, Soviet 
vessels sometimes are not equipped with a sufficient number of
157Mark Janis and Donald C.F. Daniel, "The USSR: Ocean Use and Ocean 
Law," Occasional Paper N. 21, Law of the Sea Institute, Kingston, RI, 1974, p. 6
158Butler, The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea, p. 161.
159Vladimir Kaczynski, "The Status and Potential of the Soviet Ocean 
Science after 200 Mile Economic Zone," Paper prepared at the University of 
Washington, Seattle, WA, March 1984, p. 7.
84
computers. In some cases, the vessels do not have the technology to 
determine the depth of the schools of fish.160
To gain access to Western technology, over 70% of the research 
fleet has been purchased outside the USSR, primarily from East 
Germany, Poland, and Finland, who have fewer trade restrictions 
with the West than the USSR. East Germany supplies 40% of these 
vessels including oceanographic/meteorological ships, fishery 
research vessels and fishery training trawlers. The Poles supply 
hydrographic/meteorological ships and Merchant Marine training 
ships. From Finland, the USSR primarily purchases smaller 
hydrographic research ships with an average tonnage of 1,390 GRT 
per vessel.
In the vessels purchased outside the USSR, main propulsion 
engines are built with licenses bought from Sulzer  in Switzerland, 
Burmaister  and We in in Denmark, and Fiat in Italy. Hydraulic 
machinery is built in East European countries from blueprint 
specifications from Sweden, adjustable pitch propellers and 
echosounders from Norway, and Decca Navigator Systems from Great 
Britain. In addition, fish processing equipment is supplied by West 
G erm any.161
In addition to surface research vessels, self-contained manned 
vehicles are one of the most important items of submersible 
equipment used in the ocean and continental shelf research. "Rif" is 
a manned submersible designed for a numerous underwater fishery 
operations. The vehicle surveys coastal waters to select plantation 
sites and checks the conditions of cultivated marine life.162
In addition to the fishing industry, research benefits the 
Merchant Marine and Navy by supplying them with information on
160This information is from a source who requested anonymity. He was 
amazed at the lack of sophistication, but said that despite the lack of computers, 
when one was available, the scientists were very familiar with the latest 
Western technology. Also, he noted that the Soviets were more economical 
than their Western counterparts—the Soviet fishermen would fix nets with 
holes the size of a wall which US fishermen would throw out.
161Kaczynski, “The Status and Potential of the Soviet Ocean Science after 
200 Mile Economic Zone," pp. 11-14.
161‘inrybprom  Marketing Materials, p. 141.
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wind and current conditions which is incorporated into charts and 
navigational aid publications. The Navy also benefits from the 
information on the movements of foreign navies. The USSR uses 
their research as a leverage in the international scientific community 
to gain access to foreign findings. Although research is used as a tool 
to assist Third World countries, it is most often collected to aid 
domestic economic development.
During the 1980's, the research objective was to find new 
fishing grounds since that the traditional ones were often closed to 
the Soviet fishing fleet. Over 70% of the research expeditions are 
currently sent to areas in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans located 
outside national jurisdiction, and are now also exploring potential 
commercial fisheries in the Antarctic and South Pacific.163
One of the main areas of interest in ocean research is physical 
oceanography, including the study of sea waves, currents, tides and 
ice covers on the oceans. The USSR has also concentrated on 
hydrometeorological studies of the Polar Navigational Route164 and is 
expected to continue weather studies in the Arctic and Antarctic.
Two major research programs were launched in the 1970's—"Polar 
Experiment North" and "Polar Experiment South."165
The USSR conducts biological oceanographic research as well as 
chemical oceanographic research on the properties of sea water. 
Geology and geophysics are also studied, focusing on the theoretical 
aspects of ocean geology, the development of tectonics in the 
lithosphere and the theory of oceanic sedimentation. The USSR has 
in recent years become involved in continuous seismic profiling and 
deep water seismic sounding. In addition, the USSR has carried out
163Conversations with Dr. Bruce Collette, NMFS, NOAA, Washington, D.C. 
in July 1989. The majority of these vessels are old converted fishing ships and 
lack the necessary scientific equipment, laboratories, computers, and express- 
analysis instrumentation to successfully do research. The USSR is in the 
process of installing electronic processing equipment onboard their vessels to 
process data quickly and utilize results in a much shorter time.
164As a result, the USSR has had a year round open route in the western 
part of the Arctic Ocean since 1980 as well as increased safety and protection of 
the Soviet fleet and fishing fleet in the Antarctic waters.
165Kaczynski, "The Status and Potential of the Soviet Ocean Science after 
200 Mile Economic Zone," pp. 4-5.
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oil and gas research in its internal waters and coastal seas. Some of 
this research has been done in cooperation with Japan and is 
continuing with East Germany and Poland.166
Scientific cooperation is based on multilateral and bilateral 
agreements, the most important of which is the intergovernmental 
Agreement of the Socialist Countries on Scientific-Technical 
Cooperation, signed July 28, 1962. Known as the "Six Country 
Agreement," this was originally signed by the USSR, Poland, East 
Germany, Romania and Bulgaria, followed by Cuba in 1978. The 
document concentrates on applied research that benefits the fishing 
industry. As part of the agreement, 16 institutes and laboratories 
are involved in joint scientific research located in the member 
countries. The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) 
"Project Xlll-4 World Ocean" is another multilateral agreement within 
the framework of the Eastern Bloc. This program is located in the 
P.P. Shirshov Institute of Oceanology in Moscow. Its main objective 
is to develop joint chemical, physical, biological and other 
oceanographic research to benefit the parties involved.
Cooperation within the Soviet Bloc takes the form of scientific 
conferences, joint publications, cooperative research expeditions, and 
joint research. The First International Expedition "Open Atlantic" was 
held in 1978 in conjunction with other Communist Bloc countries to 
better understand resource opportunities outside national 
jurisdiction. Soviet Bloc research operations also have been 
conducted on the open seamounts and plateaus in the Southeast 
Atlantic—Tristan de Cunha, Discovery Bank, Bouvet, Meteor Bank, 
Walvis Bank, and Walvis Ridge.167
In addition, the USSR has signed bilateral agreements with the 
West and with developing nations in order to assure research access 
to the coastal zones of these countries. Soviet fishery specialists also 
are involved in aid programs and consulting to developing 
Communist nations, such as Vietnam, North Korea, and the People’s
l66Ibid., p. 6.
167Kaczynski, "The Status and Potential of the Soviet Ocean Science after 
200 Mile Economic Zone," pp. 35-38.
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Republic of China (PRC) as well as several African and Latin 
American countries. In addition, the USSR has also become involved 
in international bodies such as the International Council for 
Exploration of the Seas, North Atlantic Fishery Organization, 
Commission for East Central Atlantic Fisheries, and the Baltic 
Convention.
Soviet research has sometimes been conducted in conjunction 
with international projects such as International Geophysical Year 
(1957-1959), International Indian Ocean Expedition (1959-1964), 
International Geodynamic Project (1971-1980). The Soviets vessels, 
the Akademik Kurchatov, Dmitrii Mendelejev, Professor Shtokman, 
Akademik Vernatskii, and the Mikhail Lomonsov participated in 
these expeditions.168
Research in the Soviet Union is managed by a variety of 
organizations with overlapping management responsibility. Gosplan  
coordinates the planning of Soviet research. The Academy of 
Sciences of the USSR primarily conducts research and is responsible 
for coordinating research operations and aid in the introduction of 
new equipment. This organization receives assistance from relevant 
ministries and agencies planning economic development.
Additional organizations have been set-up within the USSR to 
oversee its research operations, including the Oceanographic 
Commission of the Academy of Sciences and the Scientific Council for 
Study of Oceans and Seas. The latter body is composed of members 
from the Ministries of Fisheries, Defense, Geology, Transport, and the 
Academy of Science. In addition, the State Committee for Science 
and Technology uses a system of science councils to coordinate 
research across institutional lines.
Within the USSR, the ACY OP management information system 
has been developed to manage the fishing industry. This includes 
the system servicing the Ministry of Fisheries and the All-Union 
Associations' staffs as well as special purpose complex programs 
designed for long-term and short-term planning.169 In addition, the
168/&zd., pp. 5-6.
169Inrybprom  Marketing Materials, p. 187.
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fishing industry set up its own scientific and technical information 
system in the early 1970fs. This system caters to the needs of
282,000 subscribers including researchers, theoreticians, and the 
managers involved in scientific policy-making. In one year, 252 
officials in the various departments and regions of the Ministry of 
Fisheries were issued 8,700 pieces of information accessed from this 
system. Additional modernized systems are expected to be 
introduced in the early 1990's.170
While basic research is the primary responsibility of the USSR 
Academy of Science, most applied research is centered in industrial 
ministries. Most marine-related research is done at one of the 100 
specialized institutes such as the P.P. Shirshov Institute of 
Oceanology, the Acoustics Institute, and the Institute for 
Microbiology. The Ukranian Academy of Sciences is located near the 
Black Sea in Sevastopol. Environmental research is conducted by the 
Chief Directorate of the Hydrometeorological Service in Moscow, the 
Far Eastern Hydrometeorological Scientific Research Institute in 
Vladivostok, and the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute in 
Leningrad. Other research is carried out under the State Industrial 
Fisheries Committee, the Hydrographic Service of the Navy, and the 
All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Marine Geology and 
Geophysics in Latvia.
The Ministry of Fisheries has its own network of science and 
research facilities including VNIRO, AtlantNIRO, the Baltic Institute of 
Fisheries in Riga, PINRO,171 TINRO, AzcherNIRO, and KaspNIRO 
employing a total number of 2,400 scientists. An important part of 
their work is to develop an adequate total allowable catch (TAC) for 
the different fisheries to effectively manage the fisheries.
The TAC is calculated using past and present periods as the 
scientific basis for state annual plans for the fishing harvest. These 
include recommendations from a survey of 100 species in 27 major 
fishing areas in which are deployed the Ministry’s fleet of medium
170/fc/d., pp. 211-212.
17 ^ n  fact it was a researcher named Konstantinov at PINRO who caused 
so many problems by proclaiming the "inexhaustibility" of the Barents fish 
stocks during the years 1954-1968.
89
and large tonnage research vessels. Several different independent 
methods are used to determine the stock size. If the numbers are 
similar from the different methods, then the number is considered a 
reliable measurement.172
Investment in Soviet research has been high. In 1968, 37 
million rubles were spent on scientific development in the fishing 
industry. Almost three and a half times as much was spent 20 years 
later. In 1989, the Ministry of Fisheries spent 122 million rubles for 
studies of biological resources, including 88.1 million rubles for 
expenditures on the research fleet.173
Noting the inexperience of the new seamen, the Ministry 
ordered specially built training vessels. In 1950, the USSR had two 
training vessels and over 20 by the mid-1970's, with a total GRT of 
67,054 tons, the largest in the world. One half of the new vessels 
were built in East Germany, the remaining were purchased from 
Poland and Denmark. Four of the later vessels were built in the 
Soviet Union as its capabilities improved.174
The regional fisheries administrations apparently assume the 
operational expense of the training vessels and use the profit from 
the catch to help reduce expenses. The Western Administration was 
the first to have training vessels in 1963, and by 1975 had nine 
vessels including an East German stern trawler. The Azov-Black Sea 
Administration operate three vessels, including a 1969 Danish vessel 
of the Grumant class and an East German vessel built in 1973. The 
Far Eastern Administration fleet became the most modern after the 
delivery of three East German super trawlers of the Atlantik  class 
specifically designed as training vessels. This region now has six 
training vessels all constructed after 1968 with a total gross tonnage 
of 25,000 tons.
As part of its research program, the Soviet Union has invested 
heavily in its training programs, but apparently has not developed
17Correspondence with Dr. Teplitsky and conversations with Captain 
T kachenko.
173Press Release May 1989.
174United States Department of Commerce, Fisheries of the U.S.S.R.. 1976.
p. 439.
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an apprenticeship program on commercial vessels. However, the 
current emphasis on training shows a shift in thinking from using 
schools as a dumping ground for obsolete ships to making training an 
important segment of the fishing industry.
Part of the extensive training investment has been to improve 
the education system. Although a fisheries school system has been 
in place since the Revolution, today the Ministry of Fisheries has 
turned fishing into a highly skilled profession, with a developed free 
education system of secondary and university school programs.
These are administered through the Office of Personnel and 
Educational Institutions with branches in the five territorial 
administrations of the Ministry. Approximately 10,000 students 
graduate from the secondary and higher fishery schools system each 
year. Current student to professor ratios are approximately 20-25:1. 
An unusually high percentage of these professors belong to the 
Communist Party. By the mid-1970's, there were over 3,000 full­
time professors in the school system with 7,000 assistants.175 In 
addition, over 1,300 foreign students from more than 60 countries 
study at the fishery schools.176
The system has a wide variety of education programs. The 
lowest level is a trade school for eighth grade graduates. This is a 
one to two year program offered through six Fisheries Trade Schools 
and one Kolkhoz Training School. Secondary schools, developed to 
train officers, are offered through 15 Secondary Fishery Schools and 
10 Secondary Coastal Fisheries Schools which specialize in the coastal 
and inland water fisheries. The higher education institutions are 
equivalent to the American system of colleges and universities.
Fishing Industry Institutes have been created to train 
engineers, economists, and ichthyologists for employment in the 
fishing industry. These include the Astrakhan Fishing Institute 
founded in 1930; the Kalingrad Fishing Institute founded in 1930 in 
Moscow and moved to Kalingrad in 1958 with a branch in Riga; and
175/&id., p. 386. The large number of Communists may be the result of 
government pressure due to the amount of investment in the schools. In the 
1970's, the Ministry spent the equivalent of US$ 1,050 per student per year.
176Inrybprom  Marketing Materials, p. 8.
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the Far Eastern Fishing Institute founded in 1950 in Vladivostok 
with a branch in Petropavlosk-Kamchatskii. At these institutes 
training is provided in ship building and repairs; machinery and 
equipment for food production; ship machinery and mechanisms; 
ship propulsion units; ship electrical equipment; automation and full 
mechanization of chemical production; commercial fishing, 
ichthyology and pisciculture, navigation on seaways, operation of 
water transport, economics, and the organization of the foodstuffs 
industry. These institutes have day, evening, and correspondence 
divisions in undergraduate and graduate programs.177
Candidates for the fishing industry schools are abundant since 
the industry pays twice to three times the salary paid to most Soviet 
w orkers.178 For example, during the 1970's, deckhands on a freezer 
trawler earned as much as US$ 600 a month and captains over US$
1,000 whereas the average Soviet worker earned approximately US$ 
200 .
Stories abound about the horrendous living conditions onboard 
Soviet vessels. One defector, Captain Lysenko wrote an entire book 
on the harsh reality of life on a Soviet fishing ship when crewmen 
were expected to salt and gut fish 16 hours a day. In accordance 
with decisions made in the 26th Congress and the Soviet Food 
Program, the government has made a public effort to improve the 
env ironm ent179 of the fishermen and in addition, provide them with 
recreation and rest facilities onboard vessels during long voyages. 
Even the workers' diet seems to have improved. Apparently, now 
the crew no longer is forced to eat canned fish even though they are
177Also offering a selection of day, evening and correspondence 
courses, are the Murmansk and Kalingrad higher schools of maritime 
e n g in e e r in g .
178United States Department of Commerce, Fisheries of the U.S.S.R.. 1976.
p. 428.
179Conversations with Captain Tkachenko and Dr. Bruce Collette who 
has participated on several joint expeditions.
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"wading" in fresh fish or even having to buy food in order not to 
starve.180
Accommodations have also improved as a result of government 
attention to the welfare of the crews on the distant water fleets.
Even one American observer on a Soviet vessel said recently that the 
environment onboard ship has improved considerably in recent 
years.181 Crew members are accommodated in single and double 
berth cabins. Ships have saunas, shower stalls, laundries, dining 
rooms, and rest and recreation facilities. Many of the larger vessels 
operate shops trading in essentials. All medium and large tonnage 
ships have medical bays, and floating bases and factories have 
surgeries, dentists and X-ray rooms. The fleet employs 
approximately 2,000 skilled physicians and paramedical personnel. 
All medical care, treatment and drugs are financed by the state.182
Seaman are provided with free bed, clothes, and food. Meals 
are the same quality for all members regardless of rank. The diet is 
designed by medical scientists specifically for each region. All 
medium and large tonnage ships have radio telephones so that 
crewmen can speak with their families. The fleet has a total of 6,000 
radio sets, 2,000 television, 3,500 film projectors and video 
recorders. The film industry produces approximately 90 new feature 
films, 80 documentaries, 50 animated cartoons and dozens of popular 
science and training films in more than 50,000 copies for onboard 
projectors. In addition, there are about 3,000 onboard libraries with 
up to 3,000 books per library. Each ship receives annually a total of
57,000 copies of up to 50 different newspapers. More than 2,000 
ships have onboard fax machines which receive bulletins. Many 
ships have gyms and weight rooms, musical instruments, table games 
and sports gear. On shore there are 22 rest homes, 45 stadiums, 20 
gyms, 2 swimming pools, three yacht clubs, 12 health-building bases, 
and 19 fishing and hunting lodges for use by the fishermen and their
180Lysenko, A Crime Against the World, pp. 30-32 and p. 37. "In general 
the men, in true Russian fashion, accepted the situation as inevitable and did 
their best to adapt to it in order to keep up their earnings."
181 Conversation with Dr. Bruce Collette in July 1989.
182Inrybprom  Marketing Materials, p. 208.
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fam ilies.183 This may be propaganda since the welfare of the Soviet 
people has never been a priority to the Soviet government.
The Soviets now appear to realize that only through extensive 
research, training, and education will the Soviet fleet be modernized 
and competitive enough to provide a harvest capable of supplying 
food to the population.
Summary
The importance of research to the Soviet fishing industry 
has grown rapidly as new techniques become necessary to find 
stocks in remote oceans. The Soviets have been interested in
marine research since the Revolution, and now the Soviet 
research fleet has surpassed that of the United States. Despite the 
size and number of the Soviet vessels, they lack the necessary
technology and so the USSR has purchased much of its research 
fleet and equipment outside the USSR.
The Soviets use research as leverage in the international
scientific community to gain access to foreign findings. In
addition, Soviet vessels have participated in international 
expeditions and have signed bilateral agreements to assure access 
to coastal zones.
Educational and training programs enhance the Soviet 
research program and have developed fishing into a highly 
skilled profession with a more suitable onboard environment.
183/hid., p. 209.
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Soviet Political and Economic Ties
An indepth study of Soviet global fishing agreements and joint 
ventures with special emphasis on these after the 
implementation of the EEZ.
The general introduction of the EEZ during the 1970's changed 
the economic and political face of the world oceans. Now 95% of the 
world's commercially harvested stocks are under coastal state 
jurisdiction. Nations with large distant water fleets like the Soviet 
Union and Japan were greatly affected by the closure of their 
traditional fishing grounds.
In the post-EEZ period, politics in addition to technology have 
played a major role in the Soviet fleet's harvesting capability. 
Previously, as the major stocks declined, the USSR became dependent 
on more and more sophisticated technology to find the remaining 
fish and to discover new species. Now, instead of operating at will, 
the USSR has been forced to negotiate for access to fishing grounds in 
the deeper waters off coastal African States, the South Pacific, the 
West Central Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans.
The Soviet Union has had to increase its political and economic 
ties worldwide through aid programs, bilateral treaties, and joint 
ventures. By May 1989, the USSR had signed intergovernmental 
fishing agreements with 44 countries and participated in 14 joint 
ventures related to the fishing industry on Soviet soil and 16 
additional ventures abroad. The USSR also presently participates in 
international organizations, such as the Convention for the 
Preservation of Living Resources of Antarctica. In fact, the USSR 
"thinks it is important to actively participate in international 
management organizations," and membership in the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), opposed by the 
Ministry of Fisheries for many years is expected to be sought in the 
near future.184
Under aid agreements, the USSR has donated or loaned fishing 
vessels to the developing coastal state as well as trained their 
fishermen locally, onboard Soviet vessels, and even at Soviet 
education facilities. In addition, the USSR has helped developing
184Correspondence with Dr. Artemy A. Saguirian, Institute of World 
Economy and International Relations, Moscow, dated June 15, 1989.
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countries create a fishing infrastructure by aiding in the construction 
of shore facilities, including processing plants, canning factories, and 
ship repair facilities. The USSR has also surveyed local resources 
which benefits both countries. In addition, aid packages, as well the 
other types of agreements, usually have provisions to permit the 
establishment of local fisheries offices as well as landing rights for 
Aeroflot for crew changes.
Developing nations were initially eager to enter into fishery 
agreements with the USSR, motivated by the potential hard currency, 
technical equipment, and knowledge the relationship would bring. 
Their enthusiasm has waned in recent years with complaints that the 
USSR has abused the fishing privileges given to them by the coastal 
state, including fishing above the quota and supplying the coastal 
state with inferior quality fish to fulfill the Soviet part of the 
contract.
In additional to aid and cooperation pacts, the USSR has 70 
agent agreements to repair the Soviet fleet, and "is thankful to its 
partners for high quality service" in the ports of the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, 
Denmark, Spain, Argentina, Peru, Finland, New Zealand, Singapore, 
Morocco, Angola, Canada, and the United States.185
Of all these arrangements, joint ventures are receiving the most 
attention. A joint venture is a commercial relationship between two 
or more partners who share the profit and loss from a specific 
business venture. In the fishing industry, the partners are usually 
governments or private interests. In general, the coastal state has 
the resources but lacks the expertise. The foreign partner has the 
technical know-how but lacks access to the resources. The coastal 
state will often use a joint venture as a way to develop its resources 
and improve the domestic infrastructure of its fishing industry. The 
country also benefits from the increased efficiency of its operations 
from incorporating Soviet expertise. A major motivation for a joint 
venture is to increase the fish harvest without increasing costs. In 
addition, all partners benefit from selling the catch on either
185Press Release May 1989.
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partner’s domestic market or the international market to earn hard 
currency .186 Also, the joint venture increases employment 
opportunities as well as supplies additional food to the local 
population.
The foreign partner benefits from the joint venture by gaining 
access to restricted fishing grounds and employing its distant water 
fleet to produce hard currency and to attain food for its population.
In the case of the USSR, these ventures also have been used to gain 
political influence in the developing countries. In return, through 
research cooperation programs, the USSR gains knowledge of 
hydrographic and geophysical data of the area which can have 
military and economic importance.
Two basic types of joint ventures exist. In regards to the 
fishing industry, the first is a short-term arrangement which 
contracts a single venture like a survey project. The second is an 
equity venture, usually an ongoing commercial arrangement forming 
a jointly-owned company. Trawlfish are the primary target of this 
type of venture. Although the USSR participates in both these types 
of ventures, the majority of their partnerships are equity ventures 
which involve catching and processing at sea.187 In most Soviet 
ventures, local fishermen catch the fish which is then processed by 
the nearby Soviet factory ships.
The joint venture contract details the business arrangement 
concerning fisheries, fishing gear, fish processing or marketing to be 
entered into among the partners. The contract covers the percentage 
of equity, location of the headquarters of the company, fiscal 
favoritism under national law, training, and exchange of information.
The idea of a joint venture is relatively new to the Soviet mind. 
Although there was "some discussion of encouraging foreign capital
186If the fish is marketed in the domestic market, the foreign partner
may receive hard currency or payment in kind such as an increased national
quota and/or servicing of its fleet in the local ports. In addition, the fish may 
be sold in the foreign partner's domestic market.
187This is unlike the Japanese who tend to concentrate their
partnerships in land-based processing companies in the United States and
Canada.
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in the 1920's,"188 the concept was generally not popular until the 
April 1985 Plenum as part of Perestroika. By January 1, 1989, 191 
joint ventures had been registered on Soviet territory, but only a 
small number of these is associated with the fishing industry.189
Under the new rules of Perestroika ,190 the Soviet Union 
guarantees the security of the foreign partner's property and its 
right to transfer profits. Joint ventures also receive special privileges 
in that they receive priority status for building requirements. They 
can work outside the state plan as well as handle their own import 
and export activities. The state can tax the joint venture up to 30%, 
although this is reduced during the first years of activity. Earnings 
abroad are taxed at 20%, making it profitable for the enterprise to 
use its earnings for growth or re-equipment. Although the venture 
must conform to Soviet labor laws, the state pays the workers' 
benefits. In the case of disagreements or the closing down of the 
ventures, decisions are subject to international regulations.
In December 1988, the Council of Ministers further liberalized 
the conditions for joint ventures in the decree "Further Developments 
in Foreign Economic Relations." Under this decree, after 1989, the 
share of capital in Soviet and foreign hands no longer is regulated 
and can be decided by agreement where previously there was a 51% 
Soviet control mandated. Now the chairman and general manager 
can be citizens of a foreign country, and company decisions can be 
decided by consensus rather than solely by the Soviet participants. 
Special allowances are given to companies producing necessary 
consumer goods and also to companies willing to operate in the Far 
East. The USSR is also looking into the possibility of creating a special 
economic zone, probably located in the Far East.191
188Aganbegyan, Inside Peres troika . p. 107.
189/ftid., p. 197. Several hundred more joint ventures are under 
consideration. The total capital in joint ventures in the USSR is almost US$ 1 
billion, but by making the ruble convertible and becoming more competitive, 
the USSR will receive additional money. For example, the PRC has US$ 20 
billion in capital investment and over 10,000 joint ventures.
190piease refer to Appendix I for a copy of the latest draft law on Soviet 
jo in t ventures.
191 Aganbegyan, Inside Perestroika.pp. 204-206.
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Despite these measures, problems still remain particularly the 
inconvertibility of the ruble. This has been recently addressed, and 
the ruble was devalued 1.6 times in an attempt to price the currency 
more closely to its market worth. Complete convertibility is 
currently being discussed.192 No specific ideas are being mentioned 
publicly by the Soviets. Even at a June 1990 Soviet-Silicon Valley 
business summit, the Soviet delegation agreed that total 
convertibility was desirable, but was unable or unwilling to suggest a 
feasible method to do this.193
Another major obstacle to the setting up of joint ventures is the 
inability of the supply and distribution system to handle the flow of 
goods in the Soviet Union. For example, in the fishing industry as 
much as 30 to 50% of the catch spoils on the way to market because 
of a lack of refrigeration and processing facilities.194 In addition, the 
rail and road systems are inadequate to handle transportation of the 
harvest between the ports and the population centers. The 
government has committed funds to resolving these problems of 
major spoilage.
Currently, there are plans to improve the food-processing 
industry and build storage facilities. Some of these kinds of 
equipment will be purchased from West Germany and financed by 
either foreign credits or through joint ventures. Additional 
equipment will be produced by Soviet factories including those 
managed by the defense industry. One short term measure has been
l92Ibid.t p. 221.
The rouble can become convertible on the world 
market only if the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries are no longer subjected to artificial 
discrimination and restrictions in their foreign 
economic activities, if there is economic security for 
all states.
193The Soviet-Silicon Valley Summit was held in Santa Clara, California 
during June 1990. A Soviet delegation of engineers, scientists, and politicians 
met with business leaders in the high tech industry to discuss joint venture 
opportunities. I attended the seminar part of the conference which discussed 
business opportunities in the USSR. This type of conference would have been 
unimaginable only a few years ago.
194Marshall I. Goldman, Gorbachev's Challenge. W.W. Norton & Co., NY, 
1987, pp. 37-38.
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to use some of the Soviet ships equipped with refrigeration facilities 
which have been withdrawn from the American EEZ as port cold 
storage facilities until onshore plants can be built.
All practical export activity, including the creation of joint 
ventures and conducting cooperative transactions, are now left up to 
the local organization on the spot. Currently, ventures themselves 
determine with whom they will collaborate and in what direction. 
However, it is "natural" that such collaborations are carried out under 
"supervision."195 The Ministry is still responsible for working out the 
overall strategy for trade activities, including the planning and 
control for the execution of export/import operations, and control 
over state interest and laws concerning the joint ventures.
Soviet joint ventures in the fishing industry operate through 
Sovrybflot. The joint venture company acts as a commercial 
enterprise and shares its profits with Sovrybflot  on an agreed basis. 
Local port and service facilities are usually provided for the Soviet 
fishing fleet. A portion of the joint venture's catch is marketed 
locally. The remainder is retained by the USSR for domestic 
consumption or re-export. Sovrybflot has organized 11 joint 
companies and two joint expeditions. In 1988 joint ventures were 
organized with companies in Sweden, Finland, Japan, the United 
States, Singapore, and West Germany.196 Currently, Sovrybflot is 
negotiating a joint venture with a West German company, Sokop,  to 
refit the Soviet fleet, and additional Sovrybflot  negotiations have
195Press Release May 1989.
196/&id. In 1988 the following joint ventures were organized: 
-Soviet-Swedish joint venture on marine resources 
called "Neptune"
-Soviet-Finish joint venture called Esva  
-Soviet-US joint venture called Sovelan Aroma 
-Soviet-Japanese joint venture called Pilenga Godo 
-Soviet-Japanese joint venture called "Diana" 
-Soviet-West German joint venture called Allimpeks  
-Soviet-West German joint venture called Alin ter  
-Soviet-Singapore joint venture called "Atol" 
-Soviet-Japanese joint venture called O khotsk  
Suisan.
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begun for joint ventures with six developing nations, Angola, 
Morocco, Tanzania, Liberia, India, and Korea.197
197Press Release May 1989. Sovrybflot  is now responsible for:
-export and import of fish and sea products, canned 
fish and sea products 
-organization of work of fleet in EEZ or foreign 
countries on a licensed basis and other 
commercial conditions as well as carries out 
fish exchange operations, i.e. fresh fish for 
fish goods
-import of ship equipment, packaging and
processing production equipment and other 
navigational and fish finding equipment, 
refrigerators, and other commercial goods for 
the Ministry 
-import of technology goods on a barter basis 
-agenting supply and repair of vessels of the 
Ministry in foreign ports as well as the 
transport of ship crews to and from foreign 
p o rts
-purchase and exchange operations with regard to 
fuel for the fleet 
-charter of vessels of the Soviet fleet for transport 
of cargos from Soviet organizations and 
foreign charters. Also charters foreign 
transport ships for distribution of Soviet fish 
products to foreign buyers 
-creation and work of joint ventures and of fishing
expeditions outside the USSR 
-legal defense and arbitration abroad of Ministry 
vessels and property 
-capital repair and refitting of fleet abroad
-free market work on all commercial operations 
-advertising and presentation of fish products at 
international expositions and fairs
-technical collaboration with developing countries 
on planning, building and fisheries and use
of fleet.
The Ministry has recently created these entities to efficiently fulfill export 
operations and intermediary activities:
-Moreprodukt  is involved in the export and import
of fish
-Okean  is an organization of work of vessels of the 
Ministry in foreign zones and of foreign 
fleets fishing inside the Soviet EEZ Also 
involved in the purchase of raw fish from 
foreign fishermen at sea and with the 
appropriate preparation on Soviet ships 
-Inrybmash  is involved in the import of various 
types of fish processing equipment; 
refrigeration; tin can producing, different
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Since its creation in 1964, Sovrybflot's  activities have expanded 
considerably. In 1988, the operations resulted in a turnover of over 
one billion rubles, including 700 million rubles in import/export 
activities. In addition to its joint venture responsibilities, Sovrybflot  
handles the import and export of all fish and sea products as well as 
the import of ship hardware, including packaging, processing, and 
navigational equipment needed by the Ministry. Sovrybflot  also 
organizes and oversees the repair of vessels overseas, and handles 
the shipchandler service for an average of 6,700 Ministry vessels 
and the in-port technical service for 1,500 vessels each year. In 
addition, over 150,000 crew members and repairmen are 
transported annually by Aeroflot  from Moscow to the foreign 
fisheries and back.
types of packaging; fish breeding equipment; 
oceanographic equipment including 
navigation equipment and fish finding 
equipment; computers; and is involved in the 
export of fish processing equipment 
manufactured by the Ministry 
-Tekhsnabzhen ie  is involved in the importing of 
packaging materials and technological 
supplies including olive oil and the flavor 
and aromatic additives; spices; cans; special 
clothing and chemical goods 
-Flot  is the agent organization or shipchandler 
(supplier for ships) which supplies Soviet 
vessels in foreign ports and is involved in the 
purchase and trade operations of fuel 
-Sudoserv is  is involved in the organization of in 
port repairs of vessels in foreign ports and 
also handles the airline transportation for 
crew members and repair teams to and from 
the ports
-Sudoremont  is involved in capital repairs and
refitting of the Soviet fleet overseas, the sale 
of ships for scrap, and the leasing of ships 
which eventually become the property of the 
M in istry
- In ryb fra kh t  is responsible for the chartering of
foreign transport vessels for carrying export 
cargos for the Ministry 
-Tekhsodeis tv ie  collaborates in the planning, 
construction and utilizing of the coastal 
fisheries and is responsible for full 
utilization of national fleets of developing 
c o u n trie s .
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Sovrybflot  carries out the "technical collaboration" with 
developing nations on planning and constructing local industry 
infrastructure, as well as overseeing the training local fishermen. For
example, in 1988, Sovrybflot aided in developing the national fishing
industries in Cuba, Poland, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, 
Yemen, and Mauritania.
Several other organizations have been formed to "efficiently" 
handle the Soviet export operations under Sovrybflot. These include 
a number of overlapping bureaucratic entities such as Moreprodukt  
which is directly involved in exporting fish products; Okean which 
purchases fish from foreign fishermen at sea; and Flot which handles 
the provisioning of ships in foreign ports as well as purchasing fuel 
for these ships.
The current trend in the USSR to become more consumer-
oriented is evident in the Ministry of Fisheries. As a result,
Sovrybflot  has created three specialized marketing divisions—a term 
virtually unheard of in the pr^-Perestroika period. The first division 
analyzes the market and demand for products, while the second is 
responsible for developing new products to satisfy consumer 
preference. The third division is a marketing and advertising group 
to educate the public on fish and fish products. As an increasing 
percentage of the Soviet catch is from unpopular species, this Soviet 
"Madison Avenue" has an enormous task to attract consumers.
Sovrybflot  represents the Soviet government in its joint 
venture activities. Sovrybflot has traditionally avoided capital 
intensive projects since the Soviet Union learned its lesson in Egypt 
during the 1970's. The Soviets invested heavily in the construction 
of the Aswan Dam hoping for a high presence in the Third World, but 
were expelled by Anwar Sadat gaining no political or economic 
return on the investment. The USSR now focuses on lower risk, less 
capital intensive projects. The advantage of fishing vessels is that 
these are mobile and repayment is usually in resource access, fish,
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and domestic market access as opposed to hard currency so 
repayment is more likely.198
The following examination of Soviet political and commercial 
relations globally is broken down alphabetically by area: Africa,
Latin America and the Caribbean, South Pacific, North America, Asia, 
and Europe. Each section discusses the more important aid packages, 
bilateral treaties and joint ventures entered into by the Soviets on a 
country by country basis. In general, the USSR has been most eager 
to encourage relationships with developing countries in Africa, Latin 
America, and the South Pacific. These ties that began as aid packages 
in the 1960’s and 1970's, progressed to access agreements in the 
post-EEZ period, and more recently, to joint ventures. Joint ventures 
received a great deal of attention in the 1980's, but future prospects 
are not as favorable for the current decade as coastal states become 
more self-sufficient in their fishing industries.
Soviet agreements and joint ventures have focused particularly 
on the fertile fisheries off the African coast. Like the Latin 
Americans, many of the African nations declared economic zones in 
response to the Soviet onslaught. Unlike the Argentines, most 
African countries have limited enforcement capabilities and fear 
routine Soviet violations of their coastal zones.199 African officials 
had hoped for more significant assistance from the Soviets in 
developing their local fishing industries. Some officials believe that 
the USSR under-reports its catch, and as a result, Mauritania, 
Morocco, and Somalia have terminated their agreements with the 
USSR. These countries have approached the West for more profitable 
arrangements. However, the USSR still has many fishing 
arrangements in this region including ties with Angola, Guinea 
Bissau, Mozambique, Senegal, and Sierra Leon. Currently, there are
198Vladimir Kaczynski,"Joint Fishery Ventures and Three Ocean 
Powers," Paper prepared at the University of Washington, Seattle, WA, 1983, 
pp. 51-52.
1 "N o te s  from meetings with Theo Brainard at the University of Rhode 
Island, Kingston, RI, and subsequent correspondence.
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no Soviet operations off the Ivory Coast. Discussions for a joint 
venture with Liberia are currently in progress.200
Angola, the People's Republic of Angola, first signed a fisheries 
cooperation agreement with the Soviets in April 1977 which 
provided for unlimited Soviet fishing and research access in 
exchange for 12% of the catch and assistance in rebuilding the 
Angolan fishing industry. In addition, the USSR agreed to train 
Angolan fishermen both locally and in the USSR and to deliver 10 
fishing boats to Angola as partial payment for the fishing rights. The 
agreement was not as favorable to the Soviets as they had hoped 
because of depleted local resources. The total harvest was only a 
small percentage of its pre-independence level in 1975 of 450,000 
tons. For example, in Benguela, one of the two main fishing 
provinces, only 32,698 tons were landed in 1983, 81% below 
target.201 Angola signed an additional pact in Moscow on January 13, 
1984 which guaranteed them Soviet funding for the construction of 
an Angolan fish processing plant. Today, Soviet relations with 
Angola appear to be more political than economic because of the 
overfished waters.
The Soviets had an agreement with Guinea during the Sekou 
Toure administration. This arrangement allowed 15 Soviet vessels to 
operate in the Guinean waters as long as 12,000 metric tons were 
landed in Conkary each year.202 Their recent relations with the USSR 
have been strained.203 The implementation of a new government 
policy on fishing precluded any additional agreements with the 
Soviets.
Relations also have been tense with Guinea-Bissau. The Soviets 
have been particularly interested in signing an agreement with this 
country as the fishing grounds apparently contain the largest
200Other agreements include Gambia (1975), Ghana (1963), Seychelles 
(1978), Sao Tome (1981).
201 "Soviet Fishing off the Developing Countries,” p. 3.
202Correspondence with Marc Taconet, UN Representative, Dakar, 
Senegal, dated November 28, 1989.
203Kaczynski, "Joint Fishery Ventures and Three Ocean Powers," pp. 51-
52.
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biomass off northwest Africa.204 Their EEZ extends approximately
70,000 square kilometers to 150 kilometers from the outer islands of 
the Bijagos Archipelago. The maximum sustainable yield (MSY) for 
this area has been estimated to be 300,000 metric tons, up 50% from 
previous estimates because of a recent increase in triggerfish.205 The 
industry has been developed through joint venture agreements with 
the Soviet Union and the European Community (EC) and now fish 
rank number two after agriculture as the country's most important 
export.206
A joint venture, Estrela do Mar, was formed in June 1975 
between Sovrybflot and Guinea-Bissau in which the latter held 51%. 
Despite this division of equity, in reality, the Soviets manage the 
com pany.207 Estrela do Mar has two objectives: to increase the 
domestic supply of fish and to export valuable seafood to earn hard 
currency. The venture operates 10 trawlers with freezing 
capabilities to fish primarily for shrimp and demersal stocks. Trans­
shipments take place at sea because the capital of Bissau has no 
shore facilities or onshore freezing capacity. The number of vessels 
in this venture was increased to 14 vessels in 1982. Eight of these 
are owned by the joint venture, and all 14 vessels are medium-size 
Soviet trawlers built in the 1970's208 and are manned by Soviet 
officers under the Guinea-Bissau flag.209 The USSR provides fuel, 
equipment, gear and spare parts as well as technical and managerial
204Bruce Epler, "The Fisheries of Guinea Bissau," Working Paper #7,
International Center for Marine Resource Development, University of Rhode 
Island, Kingston, RI, June 1983, p. 3.
206/&/d. Approximately 90% of the resource is offshore, 75% pelagic , 
16% demersal, 5% tuna and the remaining mostly shrimp. The coastal fishery 
is 95% fin fish and 5% shrimp.
206Ib id ., pp. 8-10. The Guinea-Bissau fishing industry is made up of 
three sectors, the artisanal, industrial, and foreign fleets. The first is made up 
of approximately 3,000 vessels, mostly canoes, some of which are motorized.
The industrial sector is more capital intensive, composed of vessels purchased 
through joint ventures. The foreign fleet is made up primarily of Soviet and EC 
vessels which are permitted to fish in the territorial waters by bilateral 
ag reem en ts .
207Correspondence with Marc Taconet dated November 28, 1989.
208Epler, "The Fisheries of Guinea Bissau," p. 11.
209Correspondence with Marc Taconet dated November 28, 1989.
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assistance to oversee joint venture operations. Most vessel repairs 
are done in the USSR, but some minor work has been done in Las 
Palmas and Dakar. The company's primary trading partners have 
been Portugal, Senegal, and Las Palmas, Spain. The company 
currently is looking to expand into France and Nigeria.210
Guinea-Bissau has tried to increase the economic benefits of its 
fishery resources through an increased number of joint ventures and 
licensing of foreign vessels with other countries. With the exception 
of Estrela do Mar, these attempts have been unsuccessful because of 
the country's lack of port facilities and supplies. In addition, the 
country suffers from a generally depressed economy and an 
undependable source of fuel. Also, there is a lack of ability for 
surveillance and few reliable statistics. Although Guinea-Bissau 
officials complain that a number of foreign vessels illegally fish in 
coastal waters, only two were actually verified according to 1982 
statistics, pointing up the country's lack of surveillance capability.
In addition to Estrela do Mar, the USSR has an agreement with 
Guinea-Bissau which did allow 40 Soviet vessels fishing access to 
operate 150 miles off the coast. The number was reduced because of 
overfishing and is currently down to 22 Soviet vessels.211 Under this 
arrangement, the USSR pays 15% of the value of the catch to the local 
government and trains local personnel in the Soviet Union. The 
government has used the money from the USSR to construct onshore 
freezing facilities capable of freezing 10 tons of fish each day and 
storing 6,000 metric tons of fish.212 Fifty percent of the catch is 
processed and frozen, and the remaining is made into fish meal.
2l0Ibid.
211 Conversation with Dr. Bruce Epler, University of Rhode Island, 
Kingston, RI, in June 1988. The exact terms of the agreement are not known, 
but it appears that Guinea-Bissau receives a percentage of the total value of 
the catch. Statistics on Soviet activity are the trip sheets sent to the Guinea- 
Bissau Statistics Department which identify the vessel, including information 
of GRT, motor size, etc. as well as information on fishing effort and catch. A 
secondary source of data is from letters sent by the Soviet fishery 
representative in Bissau. These cover a 10 day span and report the 
registration numbers of the Soviet vessels, total catch by gear type, quantity of 
fishmeal produced and quantity of frozen fish processed by species.
212Kaczynski,"Joint Fishery Ventures and Three Ocean Powers," p. 53.
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Equatorial Guinea gave the USSR a virtual fishing monopoly 
under its 1973 fishing agreement with the Macias Nguema regime. 
This agreement included Soviet access to the port of Luba for 
supplies and crew exchange. In exchange, Equatorial Guinea received 
fish, access to Soviet research, and training in the USSR. The 
agreement was not renewed when it expired in January 1980 as the 
new government wanted to develop its own fishing industry. Under 
the terms of the Soviet agreement, nationals were not allowed to 
participate in fishing operations. All Soviet personnel were expelled 
at this time.213
Mauritania's fishing industry has been the driving force of its 
economy. The waters have a potential harvest of over 600,000 tons 
a year. Regulations ensure the catch is processed locally through a
Mauritania company to benefit the domestic economy.214 The
Soviets set up a joint fishing venture, La Maussov, in June 1978. As 
part of this venture, the Soviets supply the fishing vessels, freezing 
equipment, and 49% of the capital. The vessels harvest primarily 
small pelagic fish.
The USSR also has signed an agreement with Mauritania 
providing fishing access to Soviet trawlers in exchange for a US$ 2.1
million investment in a fishery institute and a canning and cold
storage facility. In addition, the Soviets provide 25 trawlers and two 
training vessels to Mauritania to be used off their coast to harvest 
squid, octopus, and fin fish.
The USSR signed an agreement in 1974 allowing Soviet access 
to Moroccan waters in exchange for building processing and cold 
storage facilities in that country. The government has signed 
agreements with the USSR to aid in the development of the 
phosphate industry, agricultural and industrial commodity 
exchanges, and expansion of the fishing industry.215 Morocco
2l3Ibid., p. 64.
2 ^Correspondence with Marc Taconet dated November 28, 1989.
215”Morocco—Difficult Two Years Lie Ahead, but Long Term Prospects 
are Favorable, " Business America. November 6, 1978, V. 1, N. 2, pp. 12-13.
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appears also to be interested in negotiating a fishing access 
agreement with the Soviet Union.216
A joint equity venture was created in the late 1970’s between 
Mozambique and Sovrybflot called Sociedad Mozambicana De Pescas, 
or Mosopescas.  The Soviets supplied research information and 
training facilities to Mozambique. In return, Mozambique agreed to 
purchase Soviet freezer trawlers to be operated by Soviet and local 
fisherm en.
No agreements have been signed with Namibia. Namibian 
grounds were overfished following the rapid build-up of modern 
stern trawler fleets, notably from the USSR and other East European 
nations. From a peak of 600,000 tons of hake caught in 1972, the 
current annual harvest has dropped to 100,000 tons per annum.
Soviet relations with Senegal have been unsuccessful. The joint 
venture between the USSR and the Societe Senegalaise D'Armement a 
La Peche, headquartered in Dakar, authorized the USSR to provide 
Senegal with fishing vessels. The venture was reorganized in 1974 
and went bankrupt in 1976. Senegal further severed the 
relationship by ordering the Soviet Fisheries Bureau at Dakar to close 
in 1980. Senegal was to receive Soviet vessels and training in 
exchange for Soviet fishing access. The poor quality of the Soviet 
vessels and continuous overfishing by its trawlers provoked the 
termination of ties.217
The May 1976 agreement with Sierra Leone is typical of the 
agreements signed with African countries. The document expresses 
the desire of the two countries to cooperate and provide mutual 
assistance in fisheries. Article two outlines the Soviet technical 
commitments, including Soviet surveys of the the marine resources, 
and training of domestic fishermen in Soviet institutions. All 
research findings are to be shared with Sierra Leone. Article four 
discusses the future possibility of joint ventures, but no details are 
given. Article five outlines Sierra Leone's responsibilities including 
allowing the Soviet fleet port access. The next section of the
21 Correspondence with Marc Taconet dated November 28, 1989.
2 l l Ibid.
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agreement allows the USSR to establish a permanent representative 
in Sierra Leone. The agreement establishes a joint committee to 
oversee these arrangements. The final article states the agreement is 
in force for five years and is automatically renewable for three years 
if neither party gives a six month cancellation notice.
The relationship with Sierra Leone has not been without 
controversy. Sierra Leone has complained of Soviet overfishing and 
the Soviet demand for payment in hard currency instead of frozen 
fish. According to the USSR, operations here lost money. The 
average annual catch has been under 70,000 tons of mostly small 
fish. In response, Sierra Leone formed the Sierra Fishing Company 
(SFC) to try to regain control of their resources. In addition to the 
government, ownership of SFC now includes private individuals and 
even the Soviet Union.218
SFC receives 15% of the catch and has an option to buy up to 
50% of the catch under an agreement with Fransov-Cannes , a joint 
French-Soviet fishing operation. In return, Fransov-Cannes  is 
allowed to operate tuna vessels in the local waters. During the first 
six months of 1989, four Soviet trawlers, 12 shrimpers, 11 sardinella 
purse seiners, seven tuna seiners, and seven factory ships operated 
in Sierra Leone's waters. The Soviets harvested 4,710 metric tons of 
tuna during this period, which is a 432% increase over the 1987 
catch.219
The USSR first signed a fishery agreement with Somalia as part 
of its foreign aid program to them in the 1960's. The Soviets created
218/b /d . Sierra Fishing Company (SFC) is the largest fishing operation 
in the country and has operations ranging from fishing to processing to 
distribution and export marketing. SFC owns 15 shrimp trawlers, only seven of 
which were active in 1987. There are also five trawlers/purse seiners. The 
company currently employs 600 people and indirectly supports hundreds of 
fish m o n g ers .
Presently, there are 10 active fishing companies operating here. 
However, the SFC is the primary importer of fish products into the country 
and exporter of shrimp in commercial amounts.
219/fr/d. Under a separate agreement, the Soviets will expand into the 
shrimp fishery. In 1987, the Soviets were granted licenses to operate 42
trawlers/purse seiners, 10 shrimpers, 5 tuna vessels, and three additional 
vessels.
1 1 1
20 fishery cooperatives and helped develop the Somali processing 
industry as well as supplied fishing gear and housing.
A joint venture Somalfish between Sovrybflot and the Somali 
Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Transport was created in April 
1974 with US$ 400,100 in capital. The Somali government had a 51% 
share and the option to purchase the remaining equity. Somalfish  
was created to harvest fish, crustaceans, cephalopods, as well as do 
on-board and in-shore processing. The joint venture operated 10 
Soviet freezer trawlers.220 In addition, the Soviets trained local 
personnel and aided in the creation of fishing cooperatives.
However, political tension increased between Somalia and the USSR 
as a result of the military conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia. The 
joint venture was cancelled and the Soviet trawlers returned to the 
USSR in November 1977. Somalfish continues as a state-owned 
business marketing fish and fish products.221
South Africa has never had a bilateral treaty with the USSR. 222
The USSR has had several fishing agreements with Yemen, the 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, since the latter’s 
independence in November 1967. The two countries have had a joint 
venture operation in effect since 1971. The venture involves eight 
vessels—five local vessels, two Soviet fishing vessels, and one Soviet 
research ship. The number of Soviet ships increased in 1980 to five 
fishing and two research vessels. Two of these Soviet vessels 
harvested primarily for the Yemen market. The quota established 
for the remaining three Soviet vessels was 13,000 metric tons, 2,000 
of which was to be given to the coastal state as fees. More recently, 
the number of vessels increased to 11, each over 600 GRT.
In 1979, an additional agreement with Yemen was signed 
providing for a training center in Aden, a cannery in Mukalla, and a 
port in Aden. Since the Aden center's completion, over 500 local
220Five of these vessels were supposed to be purchased from the Soviets 
by the Somali government, but this never happened.
221Kaczynski, "Joint Fishery Ventures and Three Ocean Powers," pp. 66-
67.
222Correspondence with Denzil Miller, Sea Fisheries Research Institute, 
Department of the Environment, Roggebaai, South Africa
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fishermen have been trained there and an additional 100 have been 
sent to be educated in the Soviet Union. The Mukalla cannery has a 
capacity of 15 million cans a year of tuna, mackerel, kingfish, 
sardines, and other fin fish. In return for building the center and 
cannery, Soviet vessels have free access to domestic grounds for 
research. This relationship has not been without problems. Domestic 
fishermen routinely complain that Soviet vessels operate in 
protected areas and harvest endangered stocks.
Despite opposition form the local population, the Yemen official 
stance remains pro-Soviet. For example, the Yemen Minister of 
Fisheries was dismissed in 1980 after openly criticizing Soviet 
officials for abusing the agreement. Since then, public criticism of 
the Soviet fleet has been veiled.
In July 1971, the USSR established a joint venture called 
Sovhispan  between Sovrybflot  and two Spanish companies— 
Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas of Barcelona and Vapores 
Suardiez  of Madrid. This venture expands Spanish operations in the 
Canary Island ports of Las Palmas and Santa Cruz de Tenerife and 
services Soviet fleets operating in the Central and Southern Atlantic, 
including the Antarctic waters. The Canaries became an even more 
important port after the Suez Canal was closed. Prior to the joint 
venture agreement, the Soviet fleet was forced to return to Odessa 
for supplies and repairs. Expansion of operations of Sovhispan cost 
approximately US$ 5,000,000, including the construction of offices 
and fleet service facilities.223
In 1975, Sovhispan  and Spanish International Export/Import 
Company, Sioesa , formed an additional joint venture, Pesconsa, with 
offices in Madrid and Las Palmas. The objective of this venture was 
to develop new fishing grounds and equip Spanish vessels with 
Soviet equipment such as cold storage facilities. By early 1976, 10 
medium stern trawlers were delivered to the company by the 
USSR.224
223Kaczynski, "Joint Fishery Ventures and Three Ocean Powers," p. 57.
224Ibid ., p. 58.
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The USSR has had a volatile relationship with the Latin 
American countries. Soviet-Latin American relations which began 
with Cuba in 1962, can be divided into three basic phases. The first 
period spans from the 1960's until the late 1970’s. During this time, 
the USSR gave economic aid and technical assistance to expand its 
influence in Latin America. Soviet vessels conducted extensive 
research operations off the coasts of Latin America, but until the 
extension of coastal jurisdiction in the mid-1970's, had little 
incentive to fish outside the traditional northern Atlantic and Pacific 
grounds. The next stage was brief— from the late 1970's until the 
USSR was expelled from several of the countries in the early 1980's. 
The USSR worked on developing strategic relationships with Grenada, 
Guyana, Jamaica, and Nicaragua, and continued a strong presence in 
Cuba.
In the third and current stage, the USSR is seeking access to 
coastal fisheries in Latin America and the Caribbean through a series 
of bilateral agreements and joint ventures. The USSR has sought to 
increase its political ties, and in the past several years has met with 
several Latin American political leaders, including Raul Alfonsin and 
Jose Samey. Even though the Soviet fishing presence is at an all time 
high in Latin America, accounting for almost 30% of the total 1987 
Soviet harvest, its fishing activities are not expected to expand 
further as a result of nationalism which has seriously affected Soviet 
quotas in this region. Although negotiations continue with Brazil, 
Uruguay and Chile, only with Chile are relations expected to 
significantly improve depending on its political situation.225
The Soviet relationship with Argentina has been tumultuous. 
Soviet research vessels first surveyed stocks in the Patagonian Shelf 
in 1961, initiating a commercial fishery five years later. All Soviet 
vessels were expelled one year after that. There was not a formal 
agreement between the two countries until Juan Peron's government 
in 1974 negotiated an agreement providing for technology exchange, 
training, joint research, and the eventual formation of a joint
225United States Department of Commerce, Soviet-Latin American 
Fishery Relations. 1961-1989. p. 119.
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venture. However, no Soviet fishing operations resulted. Isabel de 
Peron ended all commercial ties with the Soviets after the death of 
her husband.
However, the relationship with Argentina improved in the 
1980's. Motivated by fear the Soviets would sign an access treaty 
with the British in the Falklands (Malvinas) giving the latter de-facto 
recognition, the Argentine government concluded an fishing 
agreement with the USSR in 1986.226 Under this agreement 18 
Soviet stern trawlers are allocated up to 180,000 metric tons 
annually .227
Also under the agreement, the Soviet fleet is granted port 
access to Punta Quilla, Buenos Aires, and Caleta Oliva for repairs, 
supplies, and crew exchange. In return, local fishermen are trained 
onboard Soviet vessels, and 10% of the crew has to be Argentine. In
addition, these vessels must carry an Argentine inspector. The
Soviets are responsible for paying a 3% licensing fee as well as 
purchasing the equivalent of 30% of the value of the catch from the 
domestic processing industry. Despite strong local criticism, the 
agreement was renewed until 1990.228
An agreement similar to the 1974 document under Juan Peron 
was negotiated recently, but once again, no joint venture was formed, 
and the talks broke down. A service agreement was signed in 1985
and renewed in April 1989 with Tandanor Shipyards in Buenos
Aires. It is interesting to note this company is owned by the 
Argentine Department of Defense whose strong anti-Communist 
stance has been instrumental in blocking ties with the USSR.
2 2 f>In addition, large Soviet grain purchases helped improve relations 
despite strong opposition from the military.
227/&id., p. 30. Under the agreement, the USSR is not allowed to take a 
sizable catch of hake as the local industry concentrates on harvesting hake 
and squid for export.
228The Argentines concluded a similar treaty with Bulgaria in 1986, but 
were dissatisfied with Bulgarian compliance so did not renew the agreement 
when it expired in 1989.
115
In April 1987, the USSR signed an agreement with five 
Argentine processing companies to supply fish to the USSR for US$
15 million. The catch is marketed in the USSR.229
Bermuda has had limited fishing relations with the USSR. This 
country declared a 200 mile EEZ in 1978, and since that time has 
received no requests from the USSR for fishing licenses. The USSR 
has reported no catch in the Western Central Atlantic since 1976.
Brazil has never had a formal fishing agreement with the USSR. 
A joint venture in the hake fishery was negotiated in 1969, but 
rejected by the government. The Soviets tried again after Brazil 
declared an EEZ on March 25, 1970, sweetening the deal to include 
60% local ownership, and US$ 100 million in credits to purchase 
Soviet-made vessels and gear. The offer was again rejected.
The USSR and Brazil were supposed to sign a cooperation 
agreement on aquaculture, harvesting, and marketing fish in July 
1979 but it is not clear if this were signed. In addition, a joint 
venture, Brasovpesca , between Sovrybflot and a local Brazilian 
company was proposed, but not signed. The USSR hopes to develop a 
modern fishing port at Suape as a way to decrease the current trade 
deficit. However, it is unlikely Brazil will allow access to any foreign 
fleets in the near future.230
The first Soviet contact with Chile was in 1966 when 
approximately 20 Soviet vessels conducted research in the Southeast 
Pacific. A trade agreement was concluded in 1967 providing for a 
US$ 42 million credit to build a fishing port in Chile. Relations began 
to heat up during the short-lived leftist administration of Salvador 
Allende from 1970-73.
The Soviet Union has never fished inside the Chilean EEZ, 
despite close ties to the Allende government. A 12 year bilateral 
agreement was signed in 1971 between the Chilean government and 
a Soviet delegation personally headed by the Minister of Fisheries, 
A.A. Ishkov, to show the importance of the agreement. Under this
229The companies are Argenpez, Bajamar, Frigorifico Gepa, Pesquera 
Argentina del Sur, and Pesquera Cono del Sur. Frigorifico Gepa went bankrupt 
in 1988.
230Conversations with Milan Kravanja.
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agreement, the USSR was to provide aid in the construction of a 
modem port on the Bi-Bio River and in the modernization of the 
ports in San Antonio and Caleta Membrillo. In addition, the USSR 
promised to train Chilean fishermen, conduct joint stock assessment 
surveys, as well as loan of a number of 1,000 ton fishing vessels to 
the state-owned company, Pesquera Aravco. The agreement 
included the immediate delivery of three trawlers in January 1972, 
followed by eight additional trawlers and two research vessels, the 
Astronomy and Jantar 1. In return, Chile paid the USSR US$ 870,000 
in fishmeal.
During this time, the USSR also created a joint venture called 
Arauco  located in the port of Talcahuano in southern Chile to take 
advantage of the abundant local hake fishery. The venture chartered 
three Soviet factory trawlers at an annual cost of US$ 800,000 per 
vessel. After heading, gutting and freezing on board the chartered 
vessels, the fish was delivered to Talcahuano for final processing.
The final product was consequently sold in Santiago. As a result of 
the low quality of fish, a large percentage of the catch was reduced to 
fishmeal. Other problems in processing were the lack of cold storage 
and the distance between the two cities. In addition, the local 
fishing communities suffered from the lower price charged by the 
venture. After one year of operation, the venture was disbanded.231
Despite severe local reaction to the Soviet relationship, Allende 
continued to expand ties and established a Joint Commission on 
Fisheries in 1972. This Commission proposed the construction of a 
fisheries institute to which the USSR donated US$ 69,000. It is not 
clear if the school was ever completed.232
The USSR has had no diplomatic or commercial relations with 
Chile since the military coup on September 11, 1973. One Soviet 
vessel was trapped, and the fishermen were arrested and, according 
to Soviet reports, tortured by the military. The vessel was released 
after one week.
23 ^aczynski,"Joint Fishery Ventures and Three Ocean Powers," p. 68.
232United States Department of Commerce, Soviet-Latin American 
Fishery, Relations. 1961-1989. pp. 50-53.
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Relations may open up again after the 1990 elections. Soviet 
vessels have never fished inside the Chilean EEZ, but have been very 
active outside this zone, especially after being closed out of American 
waters in the late 1970's. Forty-two Soviet vessels were sighted 
operating 210 to 250 miles off the Chilean coast in 1981, increasing 
to 73 vessels by 1983, and to over 80 one year later. Charges have 
been made by the government that the vessels illegally fish inside 
the EEZ. The Chilean government also has claimed that Soviet fishing 
activities in the Antarctic are illegal. Much of the Soviet krill fishing 
is done near the Palmer Peninsula which has been claimed by both 
Chile and Argentina.
The Soviet Union engaged in limited activity off the coasts of 
Columbia during the 1970's.233 The government declared an EEZ in 
1978, not enforced until the mid-1980's. Columbia and the USSR 
formed a joint venture in 1981, comprising of Intermar , Sovrybflot , 
and an American tuna company. The Columbian government hoped 
this venture would develop its tuna industry. Sovrybflot  delivered 
two Soviet trawlers in 1981, seven in 1982, and an additional eight 
in 1983. These trawlers were to be converted into tuna seiners and 
were reportedly 720-GRT Alpinist class seiner-trawlers. The US 
company provided technical expertise in tuna fishing as well as 
purchased and marketed the catch. No catch statistics or profitability 
information are available, though this must have been somewhat 
successful at least politically, because in August 1982, Intermar  and 
Sovrybflot signed a seven year extension. In 1986, the two countries 
signed an economic aid package which provided for a joint stock 
assessment and technology transfer to Columbian industry, but no 
information is available on whether or not this happened.234
The Soviet Union has a longstanding relationship with Cuba 
which started in September 1962 with a fisheries assistance
233Conversation with Milan Kravanja. One instance made headlines in 
December 1979 when the Soviet trawler, the B u tka , was attacked by pirates 
while docked in the Columbian port of Buenaventura. The pirates escaped with 
the entire Soviet catch.
234According to my conversation with Mr. Kravanja, the USSR was 
interested in discussing joint ventures with the Columbian government, but 
the latter's refusal to let the Soviets pay in fish was a major obstacle.
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program. This arrangement provided for an information and 
technology exchange, joint stock assessments, training, and the 
creation of the Joint Commission on Fisheries. By 1965, over 120 
Cubans had been trained aboard Soviet vessels and an additional 100 
at Soviet institutes. The agreement automatically renews every 10 
years.
A subsequent March 1963 cooperation package provided for 
the joint construction of a modem fishing port at Havana. The 
Soviets covered the cost of construction and paid the Cuban labor 
force with fish. In return, the Cubans gave Soviet vessels 10 years of 
free port access. The Soviets continue to have access to the port, but 
now pay a fee. The port gives the Soviet fleet a strategically located 
fishing base for its activities in the Southeastern and Western 
Atlantic grounds. Previously, the fleet had to return to the USSR for 
repairs. The relationship continues despite philosophical differences 
between Gorbachev and Castro, but will probably weaken as the 
Soviets reduce the amount of their Cuban subsidies.
Ecuador has shown little interest in developing a fisheries 
relationship with the USSR. The first known contact was in 1975 
when a Soviet research vessel, the Leonid Sabolov visited Ecuador. 
The Soviet Deputy Fisheries Minister, V.I. Rytov visited Ecuador in 
May of the following year to discuss Soviet scientific and technical 
fisheries assistance. No agreement emerged from these discussions, 
nor from the subsequent visit in November 1983. The recently 
elected leftist government of Rodrigo Borja Cevallos may be more 
open to negotiations with the Soviets.
The short-lived relationship with Grenada developed through 
the encouragement of the leftist government under Maurice Bishop. 
Bishop wanted Soviet and Cuban assistance to develop the local 
fishing industry. A fishing school was opened in 1979, staffed by 
Cuban nationals who were later joined by Soviet personnel. The 
USSR surveyed the local stocks in June and July of 1980, discovering 
deepwater shrimp stocks 15 to 30 kilometers offshore. The 
relationship abruptly ended with the American "intervention" in
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October 1983. At that time, all Soviet and Cuban personnel left the 
island.235
Relations with Guyana were nonexistent until the latter's 
independence from the British in 1966. The first fishery contact was 
in 1969 when the Akademik Kurchatov made a port call. An aid 
program was established in 1977 which provided for joint fishery 
research and Soviet training of local personnel. An access agreement 
was signed by the Prime Minister of Guyana and General Secretary 
Leonid Brezhnev in April 1978. A protocol, signed a month later, 
allowed for two Soviet vessels to operate in Guyanese waters with as 
many as six additional ones allowed in 1981. The agreement also set 
up a joint company to catch, process, and market shrimp. The USSR 
has recently pursued access agreements with the government, but 
with limited success. Relations between the two countries appear to 
have deteriorated since 1981 when Guyana accepted a Japanese aid 
program instead of the Soviet one.236
The fisheries relationship between the USSR and Jamaica was 
limited to the 1979-80 period when, during his visit to Moscow in 
April 1979, Prime Minister Michael Manley initiated a bilateral 
agreement calling for cooperation and mutual aid. Two research 
expeditions were held, the first along the Pedro Bank during the 
winter of 1979-80, and an additional one to assess longline fisheries 
in the spring of 1980. Fisheries cooperation ended after the election 
of Prime Minister Edward Seaga, but is expected to continue after 
Manley's re-election. It is interesting to note that Manley's pro- 
Soviet stance has been more subdued recently than during his 1970's 
tenure in office.
As with Argentina, the Soviet relationship with Mexico has 
fluctuated since the 1960’s. The USSR has never achieved its desired 
goal of access to the Pacific grounds. The first Soviet visit was in 
October 1962 when a 500 ton research trawler made a port call in 
Veracruz followed by an additional 20 research vessels which
235United States Department of Commerce, Soviet-Latin American 
Fishery Relations. 1961-1989. pp. 66-68.
236/Md., p. 69.
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conducted research operations in the Eastern Pacific off the Mexican 
coast in 1966. However, local fishermen complained of the Soviet 
presence, forcing the government to limit Soviet port access in the 
spring of that year. The relationship has appeared to improve in the 
1980's possibly the result of the officially denied Soviet US$ 450 
million aid package to Mexico.
The Soviet relationship with Nicaragua mirrored the one with 
Cuba: first came the technical assistance, followed by the construction 
of shore facilities. Soviet interest in the country increased after the 
1979 ouster of President Anastasio Somoza. The first Soviet research 
vessel, the Koryfena,  visited the area in July 1980. Within 14 
months, six Soviet research operations were conducted in these 
w aters.
A cooperation agreement was signed with Nicaragua in 
September 1981 under which the Soviets provided technical 
assistance, training of local fishermen, the creation of a fishing school 
on the Atlantic coast, and the formation of a joint venture. In return, 
the USSR received port access, repair facilities, and Aeroflot landing 
rights for Soviet crew exchanges. On return from a trip to Moscow, 
Daniel Ortega Saavedra announced a Soviet grant of US$ 166.8 
million for projects, including shipyard construction and other 
fisheries programs.237 In additional in 1987, 650 metric tons of 
frozen fish were delivered by the Soviets to Nicaragua as the first 
installment of a 2,000 metric tons donation valued at US$ 2.5 million. 
Two years later, the Soviets delivered 23 tons of equipment for the 
fisheries school at Bluefields as well as an additional US$ 3 million in 
material assistance, including three freezer trucks. Over 100 
Nicaraguans are currently being trained in Soviet fishing schools.
The United States has been very concerned about the proximity 
of the Nicaraguan shipyard at San Juan del Sur to the borders of 
Costa Rica and the Panama Canal. The size of that facility, which 
includes a 7,000 ton drydock and 18-m pier, makes this a potential 
military base, though allegedly, it is used by the Soviet tuna seiners
237Most of the money was earmarked for the construction of a 
hydroelectric plant, satellite communications base, and a hospital.
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operating in the Eastern Central Pacific. The USSR pays Nicaragua 
US$ 200,000 in rent each year for shipyard privileges.
The profitability of the Soviet fishing operations in Nicaragua is 
not known. The total Nicaraguan catch has remained static after 
declining 80% during the first years of the Sandinista government. It 
is interesting to note, that unlike in Cuba, the USSR did not help 
develop the Nicaraguan distant water fleet.238 The profitability of 
this relationship is political. The Soviets gain a base in the traditional 
American sphere of influence and has been able to expand its 
presence in the area. The Soviets appear to continue their political 
interest in this country despite the recent change in governments.
The establishment of Soviet-Panamanian fishery relations is 
directly linked to the deterioration to the latter's ties with the United 
States. In November 1987, the USSR and Panama signed an 
agreement allowing landing rights for Aeroflot in Panama City for 
crew exchanges at a cost of US$ 40 million. The first crew of 160 
fishermen arrived on November 27,1987. The two countries have not 
yet established diplomatic relations, but in January 1989, officials 
signed their first trade agreement. Panamanian companies hope to 
sell seafood products to the USSR. Currently, the Soviet Union does 
not fish in Panamanian waters, although it does have access to 
supplies for its fleets fishing in the Peruvian and Argentine zones. In 
a recent press conference, Soviet Deputy Minister of Fisheries Zilanov 
was guarded, but seemingly unconcerned about the future of the 
relationship: "It is difficult to say if the internal conflict will affect 
Soviet relations with Panama. It has not so far, but we have Peru 
and Argentina ready as a back-up."239 Soviet influence is expected 
to wane in Panama under the new Pro-American government.
Peru is the only other Latin American country to allow 
significant Soviet fishing operations within its EEZ. Peru currently 
has three active arrangements with the Soviets: the 1971 cooperation
238Soviet aid is the reason behind the twelvefold increase in the Cuban
catch from 1958 to 1986. Unlike Cuba, Nicaragua's catch has declined since the
Sandinista coup and beginning of Soviet influence in 1979.
239Press Release May 1989.
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agreement, the 1988 bilateral protocol, and a joint venture created in 
the same year.
The 1971 agreement provided for Soviet port access and crew 
exchange privileges. As part of the agreement, the USSR financed 
60% of the cost of the construction of the fishing port at Paita.240 The 
US$ 38 million project included building facilities to process 180,000 
metric tons of fish per year and 100,000 metric tons for fishmeal.
The port was considered "a white elephant"—only utilizing 10% of its 
capacity. Capacity increased to 90% under the Belaunde 
Administration in power from 1980-85.241
Technical training and scientific aid also were included in the 
1971 Peruvian economic package. Local fishermen were trained 
onboard Soviet ships and in Soviet fishery schools. In addition, the 
Joint Commission for the Collaboration on a Fishing Development 
Project was created to discuss protocol issues as well as ways to 
enhance the Peruvian fishing industry. The 1971 agreement has 
been renewed three times, most recently in 1986. This has allowed a 
large Soviet presence in Peru for almost 20 years, upsetting the 
country's neighbors to the south.242
Officials from both countries began negotiating a now defunct 
joint venture in 1982 to permit a small number of Soviet vessels to 
fish in Peruvian waters. The agreement was between Sovrybflot  
and Empresa Publica de Servicios Pesqueros (EPSEP), a state-owned 
company created to promote domestic sales of fishery products. Five 
BMRT class Soviet trawlers were allowed to catch up to 50,000 
metric tons of mackerel annually. Approximately 75 metric tons of
24®The original negotiations were for a port at Bayovar in northern 
Peru for a cost of US$ 54 million, but the project was too ambitious, and the 
negotiations failed to produce an agreement.
24U nited  States Department of Commerce, Soviet-Latin American 
Fishery Relations. 1961-1989. p. 85.
242Chile, under General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, was concerned that 
Paita was in reality a Soviet military base. In addition, Chile has been worried 
about Soviet military purchases by Peru and by rumors of a secret Soviet 
submarine base to be built in northern Peru. Conflict between Chile and Peru 
is not new. It began because of a territorial dispute over the Atacama Desert, 
which Chile seized from Peru and Bolivia during the War of the Pacific in 
1881-8.
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fish per vessel was delivered each month to EPSEP. In return, the 
USSR was paid a 12% fee in fish.
This now defunct venture was expanded in 1983 to allow 20 
BMRT class vessels to fish in Peruvian waters in conjunction with 
EPSEP and another company, Mercurio. A total of 15% of the catch 
was paid to ESEP for fishing rights. In addition, local fishermen 
were trained in trawler operations. Fishmeal and oil was sold in the 
local market. The Soviet portion of the catch was sent to the USSR. 
The Peruvian press criticized the USSR for depleting the local fish 
stocks and claimed the Soviets only delivered 9% of the catch. There 
was also a controversy concerning the accidental death of two 
Peruvian fishermen aboard Soviet vessels. The venture was allowed 
to lapse in 1986 in the midst of controversy as the USSR refused to 
pay taxes and fees it said were the responsibility of the Peruvian 
companies. The Garcia Government tried to renew the joint venture 
agreements in 1986, but the USSR refused, saying the terms were not 
feasible.243
The 1988 bilateral protocol was negotiated between the Soviet 
Minister N.I. Kotlyar and the Peruvian Economy and Finance Minister 
Gustavo Saberbein during the latter's visit to Moscow in January 
1988. Reportedly, the Soviets linked debt negotiations with the issue 
of fishery access.244 One month later, both parties agreed to sign a 
letter of intent245 to allow Soviet access to Peruvian waters. The 
document included a technical contract between EPSEP and Sevryba. 
This was highly unusual as Sovrybflot represents the USSR in these 
m atters.
243United States Department of Commerce, Soviet-Latin American 
Fishery Relations. 1961-1989. pp. 88-89.
244/&/tf., p. 91. Negotiations first started up in 1987 to discuss 
refinancing Peru's US$ 1 billion debt to the USSR. The Soviet government 
agreed to refinance it at 3% interest. Part of the debt payment was to be made 
in textile products, mining machinery, copper and zinc products. The USSR 
also agreed to purchase in US dollars additional products in amounts 
equivalent to the repayments. Peru would provide US$ 52 million in products 
as repayment, and the Soviets would purchase US$ 52 million in non- 
traditional goods and US$ 120 million in traditional goods.
245The letter was actually signed on December 6, 1988.
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Signed in December 1988 the protocol permits Soviet access to 
Peruvian waters, and calls for the formation of a joint venture 
company between EPSEP and Sevryba. Twenty Soviet stem factory 
trawlers are allowed to harvest up to 400,000 metric tons, and in 
return, must land 17.5% of the final production or about 30% of the 
catch in Peruvian ports. EPSEP will market the fish domestically.
The contract is valid for three years. The Peruvian government will 
place three inspectors on each Soviet vessel to monitor the 
operations within the EEZ.
EPSEP is responsible for obtaining permits for the Soviet 
vessels, for paying the salaries of the Peruvian inspectors and all 
costs associated with landing the catch at local ports. The company 
must give the joint venture vessels at least 20 days notice at which 
port to land the harvest. The company must accept the fish as fast as 
the Soviets can unload the catch, up to 150 tons per day between 8 
am and 11 pm. Otherwise, EPSEP pays Sevryba US$ 1 per GRT of 
each vessel per 24 hour period that the vessel has to wait to be 
unloaded.
Sevryba  is responsible for guaranteeing that each vessel will 
report to Callao for inspection and licensing before fishing operations 
commence. Sevryba is responsible for supplying all provisions to 
Soviet and Peruvian personnel onboard, paying all repair expenses 
and Soviet salaries, and for landing commercially valuable fish such 
as black ruff, rock bass, and tuna at local ports.246 EPSEP must be 
notified at least 72 hours in advance of a vessel’s arrival time in port. 
Once in port, EPSEP must be notified of the vessel's readiness to 
unload the catch. If notification is before noon, unloading must 
commence by 1 pm the same day. If after noon, unloading does not 
have to start until 8 am the following morning. There are no 
restrictions on what Sevryba  can do with its share of the catch.247
A second joint venture contract was signed between Sevryba  
and the privately-owned Peruvian company, Pluton, on December 7,
246Fishmeal production is limited to 0.5 tons per hour per vessel.
247United States Department of Commerce, Soviet-Latin American 
Fishery Relations. 1961-1989. pp. 94-95.
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1988, one day after the the EPSEP-Sevryba agreement. However, 
this venture has not yet been authorized by the Peruvian 
government. This second venture allegedly allows for the 
deployment of 15 Soviet Alpinist-class trawler-seiners of 750 GRT to 
be leased by Pluton. The entire catch is to be landed in Peruvian 
ports. It is doubtful that these vessels will be allowed to compete 
with domestic fishermen for the popular species of sardines and 
anchovies. The agreement has been tabled until a government 
commission can further study local concerns regarding this joint 
venture contract's lack of specific catch quotas, limits on the number 
of Soviet vessels, and restrictions on fishmeal production.248
Soviet fishing activities in Peruvian waters have been more 
restricted since February 1989. Under pressure from the local 
fishermen and popular press, the Peruvian Defense Ministry issued a 
statement prohibiting Soviet fishing north of six degrees south, or 
within an eight mile radius of Lobos de Afuera Islands. In addition, 
Soviet vessels are now required to report their position to the 
Peruvian Navy every four hours inside the EEZ.
Unlike its relationship with Peru, the USSR has made little 
publicly known contact with Suriname. The only known one 
between the USSR and Suriname occurred in February 1988 when a 
Soviet research vessel visited Paramaribo. The results of the studies 
on salinity and temperature at 5,000 meters apparently will be 
shared with the Suriname government.249
Soviet relations with Uruguay have improved since the 1960's. 
Montevideo has been an open port and is regularly visited by most 
of the large distant water fleets operating in the South Atlantic. The 
port has been a convenient rest stop for Soviet oceanographic and 
whaling vessels returning from Antarctica. The relationship 
deteriorated in the late 1960's as local fishermen complained of "oil 
scum" from Soviet trawlers damaging their beaches and local fish 
stocks.250 The Soviets were also accused of fishing inside the
24*Ibid., p. 96.
249l b i d p. 109.
2501bid., p. 111.
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territorial sea. Later Soviet criticism of the Uruguayan military 
government cut off all fisheries relations until April of 1987.
Recently, the two countries opened negotiations for an 
agreement which calls for Soviet and Uruguayan cooperation in the 
improvement of fishing technology and study of local fisheries. The 
agreement further provides for the creation of a joint venture to 
catch nontraditional fish, no hake or squid, and to provide fish to 
local processing plants. The USSR has agreed to train local fishermen 
on Soviet vessels and help improve the local infrastructure, such as 
ports and repair facilities. In return, Uruguay will provide port 
services to Soviet vessels. A joint commission will be created to 
oversee activities and will meet annually. The agreement will be in 
effect for three years. However, the agreement has not been 
implemented because of heavy local opposition to Soviet fishing 
within the EEZ.
Venezuela and the USSR do not have a formal fishery 
relationship. The last known visit was in 1975 when the Akademik  
Krylov paid an official visit to Puerta Cabello. President Caldera 
stated in a March 1973 press conference that the Soviets had not 
requested access to local fishing grounds. No public information on 
current relations is available, but there are rumors of illegal Soviet 
fishing in the Venezuelan waters.
As a result of its restrictive access to the Latin American and 
Caribbean fisheries, the Soviet Union has increasingly focused on the 
fishing grounds in the South Pacific. The major resource in this 
region is fish. The South Pacific accounts for 25% of the world tuna 
harvest, over 90% of which is caught by distant water fleets. The 
South Pacific states created the Forum Fisheries Agency in 1979 to 
promote regional cooperation in fisheries and collect and distribute 
fisheries information from statistical data. This agency also advises 
the member states on marketing and pricing fish products, as well as 
helps them to negotiate fisheries agreements. Member governments 
include Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, 
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua 
New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western
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Somoa. The Marianas were not admitted because of their decision to 
seek commonwealth status with the United States.
The South Pacific has enormous resource potential and has 
been targeted as a growth area by the USSR, "the place where 
civilization is stepping up its pace."251 The USSR went as far as to 
create a Pacific Oceans Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
1986. This interest was openly proclaimed in Gorbachev's now 
infamous 1986 speech in Vladivostok where the Soviet President 
made the seemingly innocuous statement, "the Soviet Union is also an 
Asian-Pacific country." Western hawks perceived an ominous 
tone,252 saying the statement followed on the heels of a tremendous 
buildup in the Pacific Naval Fleet.253
As a result of the South Pacific island groupings, the following 
analysis of Soviet fishing relations in this area is done by region 
rather than by alphabetical order. Soviet fishing relations with the 
South Pacific were virtually nonexistent until the mid-1980's. The 
resulting relationships have not been profitable for the Soviets. 
Negotiations for a proposed fisheries survey off the Cook Islands and 
Papua New Guinea were cancelled following the invasion of
251 Nlikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika . Harper & Row, Publishers, NY, 1987,
p. 180.
The East, specifically Asia and the Pacific Region is 
now the place where civilization is stepping up its 
pace. Our economy in its development is moving to 
Siberia and to the Far East. We are therefore 
genuinely interested in promoting Asia-Pacific 
cooperation .
252This is the largest of the four Soviet Naval fleets. Western analysts 
fear that the Soviets were aided by the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam. 
When the Americans left, there were two naval piers at Cam Rahn Bay, which 
the Soviets have expanded now to six, each having up to 30 naval vessels, 
including attack submarines. Military aircraft operate out of the adjacent base 
and also from nearby Da Nang. The USSR is in a position to threaten American 
bases in the Philippines and block US access to the Indian Ocean and the 
Persian Gulf.
253i)avjcl North, "Pacific Vulnerable to Soviets, But Only If US Errs," 
Pacific Island Monthly. February 1986, p. 11. A recent unpublicized report 
funded by the US Department of State says that the Soviet Union is not a threat 
in the Pacific. The US has made mistakes with its relations in this region 
including overreacting to the Jeanette Diana seizure, its rigid system for 
distributing allocations of sugar imports at high subsidized prices, and the lack 
of a US signature on the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.
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Afghanistan. Western Somoa also refused a Soviet request to 
undertake tuna research. Only Tonga allowed a Soviet research 
vessel to conduct tuna research. Fiji’s ports have been closed to 
Soviet ships since the government accused the USSR of interference 
in its 1982 general election. Access to the Fijian EEZ was denied in 
September 1984. The Solomon Islands and Tuvalu both rejected 
Soviet advances for access to their EEZs in June 1985.254
The United States unwittingly gave the USSR leverage in the 
South Pacific during the mid-1980's. The traditional South Pacific 
relationship with the United States was disintegrating as a result of 
the perceived insensitivity of American tuna fishermen, resulting in 
a "tuna war.” Talks between the American Tuna Boat Association 
(ATA) and the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, and Palau 
failed because of the American refusal to pay higher access fees to 
the island states, and thus, American access to these fisheries expired 
in December 1984 and was not immediately renewed. The American 
tuna fishermen were not motivated to renew the arrangement 
because the United States government is required to pay any fishing 
fines under the Fishermen's Protection Act. The United States 
military blamed the American tuna industry for loss of American 
influence which opened the way for a Soviet presence in the South 
Pacific.255
254"Soviet Fishing off the Developing Countries," p. 6.
255Controversy and competition between the US and the USSR in the 
South Pacific most recently has been centered around the "Rarotonga Treaty 
for a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone." The treaty establishes a nuclear free 
zone from the west coast of Australia eastward to the Latin American Nuclear 
Free Zone and from approximately the equator south to the Antarctic Treaty 
Zone. The USSR ratified Protocols Two and Three of the treaty, whereas the 
United States has not. The United States has stated that ratification would 
damage its ability to protect the Pacific region. "The South Pacific Nuclear Free 
Zone Treaty" came into force with its eighth ratification by Australia in 
December 1986. Upon signing the Protocols, the USSR warned that countries 
which permitted American vessels under a "neither confirm nor deny" 
formula would not be protected by the Soviet pledge under Protocol 2. Protocol 
2 is the promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the 
countries in question.
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The first qualified Soviet success was the August 1985 
agreement signed with Kiribati256 in Manila which came into force in 
October of that year.257 For a price of US$ 1.7 million equivalent to 
10% of the country's total annual income, the agreement allowed 16 
Soviet purse seine and longline vessels and one processing factory 
ship to operate in Kiribati's EEZ for one year, but Soviet vessels were 
not allowed in their 12 mile territorial sea zone and were denied port 
privileges. In addition, Soviet vessels were required to report their 
location and the quantity of the catch on a continual basis. The one 
year agreement was styled after other access treaties, complying 
with the minimum standards accepted by the South Pacific Forum 
Fisheries Agency.258 Though the agreement drew protest from the 
Christian churches and the Christian Democratic Party, it was called 
"purely economic" by the President of Kiribati.259 A major 
motivation of Kiribati was to decrease local dependence on the 
British aid program. The Soviet fee more than offset the 
"humiliating" British subsidy.260
Fishing off Kiribati was not a successful commercial venture for 
the Soviets. The total catch was estimated at 2,300 tons of tuna
256U.F. Neemia, "Russophobia in Political/Economic Self-Determination 
in Kiribati," Paper presented to a Seminar Series on Social Theory and Pacific 
Development on April 10, 1986, pp. 3-6. Kiribati's EEZ covers approximately 
three million square miles. The fishing industry is underdeveloped, so when 
the country became an independent state on July 12, 1979, the new 
government decided to expand its fishing industry by creating a state-owned 
corporation in 1981 and actively pursuing joint ventures with the Philippines, 
Japan, South Korea, and the US. Fishing fees currently account for 25% of the 
government budget.
257Please refer to Appendix J for a copy of the fisheries agreement 
between these two countries.
258Davjd J. Doulman, "Fishing for More than Fish: Soviet Fisheries 
Initiatives in the Pacific Islands Region," Unpublished Paper, March 1987, p.
4.
259Roniti Teiwaki, "Access Agreements in the South Pacific," M arine 
Policy. October 1987, pp. 273-284. Despite the controversy, the President was 
re-elected to his fourth term in 1987.
260/b id ., p. 283. The British aid was for Australian $ 1.5 million.
...the Kiribati people are prepared to discipline 
themselves to enhance their traditional value 
system of autonomy and self-reliance...Kiribati did 
not get involved with the Soviets to incite 
international attention.
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valued at US$ 1.7 million, or the same amount as the fees paid to 
Kiribati. Most of the tuna was sold to Thai canners through the 
Soviet joint venture in Singapore, and the remainder was shipped to 
the United States which is the largest market for canned tuna. The 
USSR sought a 50% decrease in fees for the next year. Kiribati 
refused the new terms, so the agreement expired in October 1986. 
Kiribati remains willing to renegotiate, but the Soviets refuse until 
the terms are more profitable.
The agreement with Kiribati startled the West who expected 
the South Pacific to remain anti-Soviet. The American government 
took steps to improve US relations, announcing a US$ 9 million aid 
program in 1986 to the South Pacific islands which was substantially 
less than donations by Australia, New Zealand, the EC, and even 
Canada. Australia encouraged the United States to increase its 
diplomatic ties in the area and to control its tuna industry.261 The 
United States subsequently opened diplomatic offices in the Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu, in addition to the ones established in Fiji and 
Papua New Guinea. However, the US has not taken the final step to 
cement relations which would be to sign the 1982 United Nations 
Law of the Sea Convention as requested by the South Pacific states 
because of a perceived conflict of interest with the issue of deep-sea 
mining.262
In addition to the aid program, the United States signed an 
agreement giving 15 South Pacific states US$ 60 million for tuna 
licenses over a five year period.263 It is doubtful that the US would
261 Also, Australia promised to provide patrol boats to six of the South 
Pacific islands and increase its number of naval visits to the region.
262During these discussions, Japan was silent and did not increase aid 
despite strong encouragement from the United States.
263An agreement was signed with the US in 1987, motivated in part by 
the interest the USSR has shown in the area. The "US-Pacific Island Treaty" 
gives US tuna boats 5 years access to the EEZs of 15 Pacific Islands. In 
exchange, the US tuna industry will pay license fees and give technical 
assistance. In addition, the US government will provide US$ 10 million 
annually in economic assistance. The US hopes that this agreement will help 
the US unpopularity in the region.
In my reading and personal correspondence I was amazed at how strong 
the anti-American sentiment is in the South Pacific. Even talking with the 
former London School of Economics graduate student, Anote Tong, I was
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have been quite so generous in its aid package had the Soviets not 
expressed interest in the area. A Soviet representative has said that 
his country will not be drawn into a competition with the United 
States for influence in the South Pacific. Dr. Nikolai Shcherbina, Head 
of the International Law of the Sea Division at the Academy of 
Sciences,264 recently reiterated that the interest of the Soviets in the 
South Pacific was in the need for tuna as a source of food, not as 
foreign exchange.
Noting the financial benefits accrued by Kiribati, Vanuatu 
asked for a Soviet proposal in July 1985. This resulted in January 
1987 in a US$ 1.5 million deal or 15% of Vanuatu’s annual income.265 
Although the fishing grounds are not as fertile as off Kiribati, the 
USSR was granted landing rights. The treaty was opposed by the two 
new political parties, the New People’s Party and the National 
Democratic Party, as well as by the main opposition group, the Union 
of Moderate Parties.266
The agreement was very similar to the Kiribati-Soviet 
agreement of 1985, though this one provided for eight Soviet fishing 
vessels and allowed for Soviet port access in an area more 
strategically favorable than Kiribati. Some observers suggested that 
Vanuatu should have charged a higher price because of its strategic
surprised at his continuous anti-American, anti-Western rhetoric despite his 
friendliness and helpfulness.
264His full title is: Head of the International Law of the Sea Division, 
Institute of Economic and International Studies on Ocean Development, Far 
Eastern Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Vladivostok.
265£>ouiman  ^ "Fishing for More than Fish: Soviet Fisheries Initiatives in 
the Pacific Islands Region," pp. 3-7. Unlike Kiribati, Vanuatu had no prior 
fisheries agreement with the US, so was primarily motivated by economics. 
Vanuatu was interested in a Soviet arrangement as early as 1984, but wanted to
wait and see the success of the Kiribati. Also, Vanuatu was motivated by the
imminent closure of its tuna base at Palikula. The base was operated by the 
Japanese company Mitsui since the 1950's. The Japanese decision to leave was 
the result of a corporate policy to disinvest in primary production on a
worldwide basis. This was a great financial blow to Vanuatu as tuna accounted
for 40% of export income. Also, local purchases by the Mitsui longline fleet 
stimulated the economy.
266Ib id ., p. 13. The USSR is thought to support the pro-Libyan radical 
Barak Sope Party.
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location.267 The treaty allows the USSR to establish ground facilities 
at Palikula on the island of Espiritu Santo, to maintain and replenish 
ships, and transfer crews via Aeroflot. This extends the Soviet 
presence into the Pacific from the Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam by 
6,200 miles. The location of Vanuatu, in the heart of Melanesia, 
midway between New Caledonia, Fiji, and the Solomon Islands, gives 
the USSR access to the Coral Sea, only 1,054 miles off the coast of 
Australia.
Both the United States and Australia have warned the Pacific 
countries about the "dire" consequences of a relationship with the 
USSR, stating that Soviet trawlers routinely carry more than just 
fishermen on board. In addition, onshore access for fishing may be a 
first step on an irreversible course from a fish-processing plant to a 
repair facilities to a military base.
Despite the American and Australian concern, the South Pacific 
islands are more receptive to Soviet overtures. The current situation
can be described as a financial free-for-all. In addition to Kiribati in
Micronesia, Pravda  has reported that the USSR has opened relations 
with Nauru, but no details were discussed. Melanesia, Fiji and Papua 
New Guinea have indicated an interest in establishing fishing 
arrangements with the USSR. Previously, Fiji had been openly 
critical of Kiribati, but changed its mind saying it, too, would sign a 
Soviet agreement if the terms were financially favorable. However,
despite extensive negotiations during 1986, no treaty with Fiji was
concluded as this would cause Fiji to change its licensing policy.268
267David Knibb, "The Soviet's Big Fish," Wall Street Journal. January 26, 
1987, p. 23. Vanuatu is made up of 80 islands and is strategically located next to 
the French territory of New Caledonia. The base at Vanuatu also gives the 
USSR a base to track French warships entering and leaving the naval port at 
Noumea, as well as the chance to exploit political tensions that threaten New 
Caledonia. They can also capitalize on the anti-western stance of Prime 
Minister Walter Lini’s government in Vanuatu. Mr. Lini has recognized Cuba 
and Nicaragua and has encouraged other members of the South Pacific Forum 
to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization.
268 Correspondence with David Doulman, Deputy Director, Forum 
Fisheries Agency, Honiara, Solomon Islands, dated August 25, 1988. Currently, 
Fiji does not license tuna vessels unless they offload at Fiji's Levuka cannery. 
Also, commentators thought that Fiji's attempt to conclude a treaty with the 
USSR was done to bother the US, rather than actually conclude a treaty. Fiji
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This country recently has had to focus on its racial problems rather 
than international relations as the first Indian majority government 
was voted into office in April 1987 instead of representatives from 
the native population.269 Two military coups followed. A republic 
was declared and a constitution drawn up guaranteeing a majority 
vote to the Melanesian population. The Commonwealth status was 
revoked, and a number of the Indian population left the country.
Papua New Guinea openly supported Kiribati during the latter's 
negotiations with the USSR, but when approached by an Australian 
company representing the interest of the Soviet government, the 
country hesitated. Its Minister of Primary Industry was opposed to 
the idea, but other ministers were in favor because of the economic 
benefits.270 The country currently suffers 80% unemployment, so 
the additional source of hard currency from the USSR would be 
welcomed. Despite this, a fishing relationship with the USSR became 
a back burner issue during the general elections. Recently, the 
foreign minister for Papua New Guinea announced that a Soviet 
Embassy will be opened in Port Moresby.
The Solomon Islands have consistently rejected Soviet 
overtures for a fisheries access treaty. Despite the country’s political 
and population problems, as over half the population is under 20 
with few job prospects, the Islands do not want to become embroiled 
in a superpower controversy. Their main export is tuna, followed by 
timber and palm oil, all of which have had declining prices in recent 
years.
Relations with the Polynesian states have been very successful. 
Although the Soviet research vessel, the Akademik Oparin, arrived 
in Rarotonga in the Cook Islands in January 1988,271 Soviet relations
was annoyed with American attitudes and was particularly unhappy with its 
recent sugar quotas.
269The Indians were brought by the British to work on the sugar 
plantations in the 1800's, and the Indians soon outnumbered the natives.
270The country has been independent from Australia since 1975. 
Currently, only 20% of the population is employed, primarily by the copper 
and gold industries.
271 Western observers believe the vessel was actually doing research for 
the submarine force rather than pure oceanographic research.
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with Polynesia have been generally unproductive. Both Western 
Somoa and Tuvalu have consistently rejected Soviet proposals for a 
fisheries agreement.
The USSR first approached the Australian government in the 
late 1970's. Initial approval was granted by the Australian 
government in 1979 for a proposed venture between Marissco  and 
the Craig Mostyn Co., Ltd. of Australia which would allow three 
Soviet trawlers to fish for fin fish and shrimp in the Dampier-Barrow 
Island area, off the west coast of Australia. Approval was withdrawn 
by the Australians in 1980 as a result of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.272
In the 1980's, the USSR approached the Australian 
government for access to the port facilities of Hobart located on the 
island of Tasmania. Concerned about spying273, the conservative 
government of Malcom Fraser rejected the request which would have 
been worth US$ 7.9 million. The USSR had a joint venture, Sovaust 
Fisheries, with two Australian companies located in Victoria, Bight 
Trawlers Fisheries and Commercial Bureau Australia Ltd. The joint 
venture was 55% Australian. The five Soviet factory trawlers were 
replaced by Australian vessels, and the venture was ended in 1981. 
Relations with the Australia have improved under the Hawke 
government who appears to be more willing to negotiate with the 
USSR now that Soviet troops have withdrawn from Afghanistan.
New Zealand has had friendly relations recently with the USSR. 
In 1987 alone, over 200 Soviet vessels visited New Zealand. The 
Soviet Union has stipulated that any agreement with New Zealand 
must include landing rights for Aeroflot.
The major Soviet land base for the entire South Pacific area 
was established through a joint venture in Singapore in 1975 when 
Sovrybflot  entered into an equal partnership with Straits Fisheries 
Ltd., a subsidiary of Singapore Marine Enterprises and the 
Development Bank of Singapore called Marisso Ltd. The venture was
272Kaczynski, "Joint Fishery Ventures and Three Ocean Powers," p. 59.
273The Australian navy periodically issues "Clam Alerts" which shuts 
down electronic equipment on Australian warships so that Soviet or Eastern 
Bloc trawlers cannot collect information on the signals.
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started with Singapore $12 million in capital to build a fully 
integrated seafood processing plant and facilities to service the 
Soviet fleet.274 A cold storage plant, including processing and 
warehouse facilities in Jurong Port, was completed in 1981. The joint 
venture processes fin fish, lobsters, squid, cuttlefish, prawns, 
fishmeal and oil. These products are then marketed under the 
"Neptune's Pride" label in Japan, with some additional products sold 
in the US and Australia. The company also provides a limited 
amount of seafood to the local market.
One of the reasons the USSR turned its attention to the South 
Pacific was the result of the introduction of EEZs in its traditional 
grounds in the Northern Atlantic and Pacific fisheries off North 
America. To gain access to their traditional grounds, the Soviets 
signed fishing treaties with Canada in 1971 and the United States in 
1976. President Jimmy Carter banned all Soviet fishing in 1981 in 
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. President Ronald 
Reagan lifted the ban slightly in July 1984 and allocated 110.2 
million pounds of fish, primarily Alaskan pollack, in the Pacific 
region to the Soviets. The ban remained in tact for the US Atlantic 
region. In April 1985, the US Secretary of Commerce "certified” the 
USSR for its whaling activities, but has "decertified" the USSR when 
the operations ceased soon after. Relations have recently improved 
as the US and USSR agreed to develop a long-term fishing agreement 
in the 1988 May summit.275
As a result of these summit negotiations, the United States 
legislature signed bill number HR 4919 which guaranteed reciprocal 
access. Now American fishermen will be allowed to operate within 
the Soviet EEZ for the first time. In addition, the legislation requires 
foreign fishing vessels to stow their gear when in innocent passage 
through the US EEZ, and mandates the use of transponders or other
274This has not been without controversy. Alexander Bondarev, the 
Soviet marine superintendent, overseeing repairs in Singapore was charged 
with engaging in espionage and expelled in 1982.
275Mention by Ambassador Edward E. Wolfe, Oceans and Fisheries 
Affairs, Department of State, Washington D.C., at the Law of the Sea Institute 
(LSI) Conference at the University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI, June 1988.
136
vessel position-fixing devices by foreign vessels while fishing in US 
waters. This legislation went into effect on October 3, 1988 and has 
helped to ease tensions between the US and USSR.
Both the US and USSR are aware of the importance of research 
to the fishing industry. As a result the two countries have been 
cooperating in fishery research for over 20 years. Starting in 1967, 
the US proposed a program of cooperative fishery research with the 
U SSR276 in the international waters off the coast between Cape 
Hatteras and Cape Cod. The US was motivated to propose this
27^M.D. Grosslein, "Cooperative USA-USSR Fishery Research in the 
Northwest Atlantic," Unpublished Paper prepared for the Northeast Fisheries 
Center, Woods Hole, MA, August 1971, pp. 11-18. US-USSR groundfish studies 
were done from October 3-11, 1967 in the area off Block Island and Martha's 
Vineyard using the US research vessel Albatross IV  and a USSR side trawler 
also by coincidence named Albatros.  A second survey was done on groundfish 
from Cape Hatteras to Cape Cod. The surveys were encouraging as both vessels 
came up with relatively the same abundance and distribution numbers. In 
1968, the survey was expanded to include Georges Bank. The two vessels again 
covered the area from Cape Hatteras to Georges Bank in 1969. Since 1970 all 
the groundfish surveys of the US, Canada and the USSR on the Nova Scotian 
shelf have utilized the stratified random sampling design and the same 
sampling strata. The success of the US-USSR programs lead to the development 
of the ICNAF Working Group in 1970 to consider the feasibility of developing a 
coordinated ICNAF groundfish survey program.
In addition to the groundfish surveys and the trawl comparison 
experiments, the US-USSR program included the evaluation of sampling gear 
for plankton and studies of sea herring spawning on Georges Bank. In 
September 1968, the US and USSR Albatros{s) vessels conducted research with 
the Canadian vessel, the Theta,  on the effects of various plankton sampling 
techniques on catches of fish eggs and larvae. This included tests on sampler 
size, mesh size, tow configuration, speed and duration of haul. An additional 
US-USSR experiment was done in 1969 to compare systematic vs. random 
sampling designs.
In the fall of 1969, US-USSR scientists conducted research on the 
distribution and density of herring egg patches at the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS) laboratory in Maine. In 1970, the Canadians again 
joined the US and USSR to study herring spawning and in the fall of 1971, US, 
Canada, USSR, France, and West Germany took part in a coordinated plankton 
survey to map out dispersion of sea herring larvae in the ICNAF area.
The most important accomplishment of the US-USSR joint fishery 
research has been the additional confirmation of the fact that research vessel 
surveys can provide data on abundance which are sufficiently accurate to 
serve as a basis for assessing effects of fishing. Another benefit has been the 
more accurate picture of the distribution of certain fish important to US 
fishermen which help the US to manage and protect certain stocks. It is also 
an important benefit that cooperative research is effective in the planning 
process.
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program by Soviet overfishing in the waters off the US coasts. 
Basically this agreement encouraged American inshore domestic 
fishing activities while reducing Soviet offshore activities. It 
established a 3,000 square mile no fishing zone in the deeper waters 
of the mid-Atlantic during the January to March time frame. This 
applied only to vessels over 110 feet long which greatly affected 
Soviet activities in the area, but did not change domestic Operations. 
In exchange, the Soviet fishing vessels were allowed a token access 
to several small fishing and loading zones within the US 12 mile 
contiguous sea. The agreement was amended in 1968 and continued 
to December 1970 when the closed season was increased to April 
15.277
Research activities continued into the 1980’s. The most recent 
joint cooperation agreement was the "Agreement on Cooperation in 
the Field of Basic Scientific Research" on May 6, 1989 which 
established a formal procedure for access to research facilities in the 
two countries, including the National Science Foundation and the 
Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
In addition to research access, the USSR has entered into joint 
ventures with American companies to gain access to the North 
American fisheries.278 The most successful Soviet joint venture has 
been an equal equity partnership created in 1976 between 
Sovrybflot and the American company, Bellingham Cold Storage 
Company called the Marine Resources Company (MRC). The 
headquarters are located in Seattle with additional offices in 
Nakhodka near Vladivostok, Moscow, and Dutch Harbor, Alaska. Two 
Soviet nationals and their families reside in Seattle, and American 
nationals are stationed in Moscow and Nakhodka. The company has 
over 30 permanent employees279 and 50 seasonal technicians during 
the peak fishing period.
277/bid., p. 4.
278The United States first proposed a joint venture with the Soviets in 
1973, but was refused until the implementation of the US EEZ under the the 
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act in 1976.
279Correspondence with Bert Larkins, General Manager, Marine 
Resources Company International, dated April 19, 1989. Before the 1989 
reorganization and subsequent lay-offs, the company employed 30 Americans
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This venture coordinates operations between US catcher boats 
and Soviet processing ships in the American EEZ. The trawlers target 
hake and Pacific whiting off the coast of California, Oregon, and 
Washington, flounders and Pacific cod in the Bering Sea, and Atka 
mackerel along the Aleutian Island chain.
Local opposition delayed hake harvesting off Washington and 
Oregon until 1978. Final approval came late in the season so only 
two US vessels were employed, transferring their harvest to two 
Soviet processing ships. The number increased to 11 US trawlers and 
six Soviet processors in 1979, but due to weather, technical and area 
restriction problems, the total catch was only 9,054 metric tons 
instead of the targeted 30,000 metric ton catch.
Despite a resolution by the Pacific Fishery Management Council, 
calling for a fishing boycott off Washington and Oregon, the venture 
successfully harvested hake during the 1980 season.280 During its 
peak years, the hake harvest exceeded 255,000 metric tons, utilizing 
58 US catcher vessels. Payments to American fishermen fluctuated 
from US$ 120,000 in 1978 to the high of almost US$ 37 million in 
1988. The catch has declined in the past few years dropping almost 
30% to an estimated 180,000 metric tons in 1989 from 50 US vessels 
with a corresponding US$ 13 million drop in payments to American 
fisherm en.281 This arrangement has increased the domestic harvest 
of Pacific Coast ground fish by two-thirds, because US vessels are 
employed in catching the fish.
Once caught, the fish are transferred to the Soviet processing 
vessels using an efficient detachable codend system. Instead of
and two Soviets in Seattle, nine Soviets and one American in Nakhoda, and four 
Soviets and one American in Moscow.
280Subsequent telephone conversations with Bert Larkins. The boycott 
was called to protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. From a total catch of 
56,400 metric tons in 1980, over 26,900 metric tons of hake were caught by 16 
US trawlers and processed by seven Soviet processors; seven US catcher vessels 
harvested 11,300 metric tons of primarily Alaskan pollack. In the Central 
Bering Sea, five trawlers caught 13,150 metric tons of yellow-fin sole 
processed by three Soviet factory ships. The MRC's target of 5,000 metric tons 
of herring from the Bering Sea was successfully blocked by an Alaskan native 
lobby. Sales were US$ 15 million for 1980.
281MRCI Marketing Materials, Seattle WA, 1980-1989, sent by Bert 
L ark in s.
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hauling the catch onboard the US trawlers, the nets are brought to 
the stem of the vessels. The part of the net containing the catch 
weighing up to 30 tons, or codend, is detached and reattached to a 
line from the Soviet processing ship. The catch is then winched 
aboard for immediate processing with a minimum of handling. The 
process also allows the trawlers to more quickly return to fishing 
activities.
The fish is shipped to Nakhoda or marketed by the MRC on the 
international market after being processed into frozen blocks of 
fillets and whole fish including Pacific cod, Alaska pollack, Atka 
mackerel, several species of flounders, and Pacific whiting. The 
company also trades in Alaskan king crab, Dungeness crab, halibut, 
shrimp, pollack, and cod blocks and fillets. In addition, MRC markets 
the catch from the Soviet fleet, such as mackerel, horse mackerel, 
squid, pink salmon, herring, herring roe, king crab, Antarctic krill, as 
well as fish meal and fish oil produced from the fish waste. The king 
and tanner crab products bought by the MRC are repackaged and 
sold in the US market. Some of the fish goes to the Soviet domestic 
market, but the majority of the catch is sold to the Third World.
At first, the MRC negotiated a barter exchange using a hake for 
crab ratio. Negotiations were held yearly to determine this ratio. All 
other fish products sold to the USSR were pegged to the price of 
hake. Now, each month the value of the fish, fuel, and provisions 
provided to the Soviet processing vessels is compared to the value of 
the Soviet products handled by the MRC during the month. Any 
difference is settled by hard currency exchange.282 In addition, the 
fishermen are paid in cash each month for the catch.
Now known as Marine Resources Company International 
(MRCI), the company has expanded to include international seafood
28Conversation with Dr. Kaczynski in November 1988. For example: the 
USSR buys 225,000 tons of pollack from US fishermen at an average price of 
US$ 130 per ton. The fish is processed onboard a Soviet ship and sold back to 
the MRC along with some Soviet originated fish products including krill. The 
MRC sells the products overseas and the revenues from these sales are divided 
equally between the partners. Two transactions—the resale of processed fish 
and the export of those products—earn dollars for the USSR whereas before 
there was only one way to earn hard currency.
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marketing and trading activities, ship provisioning and repair. The 
company also acts as the representative of American manufacturers 
of timber and fishing equipment in the USSR.283 In addition, the 
MRCI added a domestic broker network throughout North America. 
The company has developed a substantial trading business including 
the purchase and distribution of US-origin king and snow crab meat, 
pollack and cod fillets and blocks, and halibut, tuna and salmon 
steaks.
Since the beginning of 1989, the MRCI has been moving from 
being primarily a joint venture fishing company to becoming an 
extensive marketing and trading company. As a result of the 
continuing "Americanization" of the fisheries as larger and larger 
allocations are awarded each year to US factory ships and shore- 
based processing plants at the expense of joint venture operations,284 
the traditional backbone of the company—the joint venture—is now 
being phased out. In March 1989, MRCI signed an agreement to 
establish a new Soviet-American joint venture—the Kamchatka 
Pacific Company (KPC)—located in the USSR. This organization will 
fish for seafood to sell through the MRCI as well as construct shore- 
based processing facilities. KPC has recently been given permission 
to commercially fish for crabs in Soviet waters.
283SovAm is a division of MRCI created to represent American firms in 
the USSR. SovAm  is currently concentrating on representing Pacific
Northwest firms producing a broad range of equipment for fishing, 
harvesting timber, and producing lumber, plywood, chipboard and other wood 
products.
284Walter T. Pereyra, "Some Preliminary Results of a US-Soviet Joint 
Venture," The Journal of Contemporary Business. V. 10, N. 1, First Quarter 1981, 
pp. 7-19. The venture and the US fishermen involved were significantly
affected by the withdrawal of Soviet fish quotas in January 1980; it is felt that a 
quota for the joint venture processors of 20% of the expected US deliveries is 
reasonable and justifiable. The MRC strongly recommends that the joint 
venture be regarded as a model of change for improving US-Soviet relations.
The introduction of joint ventures in the US EEZ led to the explosive 
growth of domestic harvesting activity in 1981-87 and the consequent 
reduction of foreign fleet quotas. The current joint ventures appear to be 
temporary measures until the American processing industry can handle the 
catch processing requirements. Each year a smaller and smaller portion of 
the catch has been relegated to the joint ventures, as the American processing
industry is better able to process the harvest.
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Motivated by the success of the the joint venture with MRCIr 
the USSR established a USSR-US East Coast joint venture in June 1989 
called285 Resource Trading Company (RTC), a seafood processing and 
exporting company based in Portland, Maine. In June 1989, the 
Soviet processing ship, the Riga, purchased over 20,000 metric tons 
of Atlantic menhaden, "pogies," from Maine fishermen. The Riga  
processes the catch into fishmeal for chicken, hog, mink feed, as well 
as fish oil for margarine and industrial uses. The pogie is too bony to 
be used for human consumption and is domestically used only in 
small amounts as lobster bait. The prospect of a joint venture is 
attractive as the species is abundant, and the domestic fleet is 
underemployed. Currently, no menhaden processing plants operate 
north of Virginia. If the 40,000 metric ton quota is fulfilled, over 60 
local fishermen in 11 catcher boats will earn over US$ 1.5 
million.286
In addition, RTC has applied for a state permit to transfer an 
initial 3,000 metric tons of herring caught by 65 Maine fishermen in 
17 vessels to the Soviet vessel, the Artika, for freezing and 
barrelling. This project will offer US$ 300,000 in export earnings to 
the domestic unemployed fleet. The domestic processing industry 
will not be affected in the near-term since the Maine factories are 
currently supplied to capacity by fixed gear vessels.287
The Donut Hole in the Bering Sea has been an area of interest 
and controversy for both the United States and the USSR. This is a
45,000 square mile pocket formed by the boundaries of the US EEZ 
on the south and east and the Soviet EEZ on the west. Though the 
area is technically labeled as "high seas," the two countries have 
decided to jointly manage fishing operations in the area288 and in
285Captain Tkachenko gave me the name and telephone number for a 
third venture, but the telephone is disconnected, and no company with that 
name is listed in that area code. Also, the Department of Commerce was not 
familiar with the company.
286Resource Trading Company 1989 Marketing Materials and follow-up 
telephone calls to Thomas Dowling, Managing Director.
287/bzd.
288The USSR suggested that Article 123 of the 1982 LOS Convention be 
used to deal with the Bering Sea straddling stock issue. This article covers the 
cooperation of states bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas.
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1982 an agreement was signed to control the area's resources. 
American fishermen have complained of foreign fishermen freely 
"sneaking” into the US EEZ from the Donut Hole on a regular basis, 
and fear that the area has become a haven for illegal fishing 
activities.
The US and USSR established a bilateral working group to look 
at technical, enforcement, and international legal aspects. The idea of 
US-USSR regulating fishing in the Donut Hole raises new legal and 
policy issues regarding the areas outside the EEZs. A new 
comprehensive fisheries agreement was signed between the US and 
USSR on May 31, 1988 addressing the Donut Hole issue. This 
document establishes a basis for US-Soviet cooperation, consultation, 
and, if necessary, action on appropriate conservation and 
management measures of living marine resources in international 
waters beyond US-USSR respective EEZs. It is thought that some 
foreign vessels are illegally fishing in the US EEZ and reporting the 
catch as if it were from the Donut Hole.289 A follow-up scientific 
symposium was scheduled in Sitka, Alaska July 19-22, 1988. The 
purpose of this meeting was to assess current knowledge and 
determine areas of future study of resources in the Bering Sea, 
focusing primarily on the fish stocks in the Donut hole.290
In the North Pacific and the Sea of Okhotsk, the Soviet vessels 
have traditionally competed with the Japanese fleet for resources. 
This competition has not been without controversy. Japan was 
effectively kept out of the Soviet Far East after World War 11. The 
MacArthur Line restricted Japanese fishing to the area immediately 
surrounding the home islands and the Ryukyus, eastward into the 
Pacific to the 165th median. Despite these restrictions, the Japanese 
were close to their prewar catch by 1955. Fearful that the Japanese 
would deplete salmon stocks, the Soviet Council of Ministers
289Conversation with Ambassador Wolfe. In the early 1980's, the 
Japanese, Koreans, PRC, and Poland had only small catches from this area, but 
since 1985 the catch increased dramatically so that an estimated 1 million 
metric tons were harvested per year in 1986 and 1987.
290In addition to the US and USSR, Poland, Canada, PRC, Japan and South 
Korea have shown interest in this area.
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established the Bulganin Line to protect fish stocks on the high seas
adjacent to the territorial waters off Siberia.291
In 1976, the Japanese and the Soviets signed a reciprocal
agreement in 1976 establishing a Japanese quota of 450,000 metric 
tons for the June-December period, and a Soviet quota of 335,000 
metric tons in Japanese waters. The agreements terminated 
Japanese herring and crab fishing and drag net operations off West 
Kamchatka. Under a separate agreement, the Japanese were given a 
quota for salmon on the high seas at 62,000 metric tons which was a 
substantial reduction from 87,000 metric tons caught in 1975. These 
quotas have been renegotiated on a yearly basis.
The USSR and Japan turned to joint ventures as an alternative
to the quota system. The first Soviet-Japanese joint venture, Pilenga  
Godo , was set up to stock salmon on Sakhalin Island. The two 
countries are working out the details for a similar venture in the 
Magadan oblast (region).292 The USSR also established an association 
working with Japanese state and private organizations, Nigiro Gege 
and Taie Gege, and an association of Japanese fish producers, on the 
question of raising the effectiveness of salmon production. Also, the 
USSR currently is discussing a joint processing venture with the 
Japanese firm, Morikawa Shoji. As part of the agreement, the 
Japanese firm would re-equip Soviet vessels and build a fish 
processing plant on the Soviet Pacific coast in exchange for fishing 
access to Soviet waters.293
In Asia, in addition to Japan, the USSR has also cooperated with 
the PRC. An agreement for cooperation in research on fisheries was 
signed in Peking by the PRC, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the 
USSR on June 12, 1956 covering the area of the Sea of Japan, the 
Yellow Sea, and the East and South China Seas. This established a 
fishery commission headquartered in Peking. The agreement had
29S u tle r , The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea, p. 190. The result of this 
was the Japanese-Soviet agreement to regulate the exploitation of marine 
resources in this area signed on May 14, 1956.
292Press Release May 1989.
293"USSR: Morikawa Shoji (Japanl."Business Eastern Europe. February 2, 
1987 p. 39.
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four sections, fisheries, oceanography, fresh water, limnology and 
protection of fishery resources. Land-locked Outer Mongolia joined 
the agreement on December 15, 1958, probably out of interest in 
fresh water limnology. The PRC was reported to have withdrawn 
from the agreement in 1967.
Recently, the USSR has collaborated with the PRC on the 
preservation, reproduction, regulation of fish in the Amur Basin. 
Discussions are taking place for cultivating salmon.294
To deal with issues within the Soviet Bloc, COMECON was set up 
in 1949 to coordinate the world socialist economic system. In the 
1960's the COMECON countries started to coordinate their long-term 
economic plans. These countries have cooperated in regulating 
fishing and research. For example, the USSR signed an agreement 
with Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia to regulate fishing 
on the Danube. In 1959, the USSR, Bulgaria and Romania signed an 
agreement regulating fishing in the Black Sea. An additional 
agreement was signed by the USSR, Poland, and East Germany later 
joined by Bulgaria and Romania, to coordinate research and regulate 
of fishing activities including designing new fishing vessels and 
processing factories. The USSR signed an assistance agreement with 
Bulgaria in 1963 to help that country develop its ocean fishing 
capabilities.
Within the Soviet Bloc, Soviet trawlers coordinate fishing 
operations with those from Bulgaria, Cuba, East Germany, and Poland 
under the "Six Partite Agreement on High Seas Fisheries." This was 
originally a three party agreement signed by the USSR, Poland, and 
the GDR on July 28, 1962. The remaining three were added later.
In addition to the Eastern Bloc, the USSR has had several joint 
ventures with European countries, including a short-lived agreement 
to purchase fish at sea from British trawlers which lasted until 1978. 
Three British companies, including Joint Trawlers Ltd., Boyd Line, 
and Richard Irwine targeted mackerel and blue whiting which was 
then delivered to Soviet motherships. Over 87,000 tons were 
delivered in 1976, almost doubling to 186,000 tons or 19% of the
294Press Release May 1989.
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total British catch in 1977. The market value was estimated up to 
US$ 2 million.295 The USSR has also discussed the possibility of 
managing the Soviet tuna fleet with a French company. Another 
possibility under negotiation is with a Spanish company to establish 
a joint venture to harvest, process and market fish harvested off the 
coast of Spain. In addition, the USSR established several commercial 
ties with West Germany in 1988, including two joint ventures,
Allimpeks  and Alinter  and is negotiating for an additional venture 
with the West German company Sokop to refit the Soviet fleet with 
modern Western technology.296 The USSR has had partnerships with 
Scandinavia countries including a venture with Sweden to market 
Soviet fish products, and a venture with Finland called Esva.
Officially, the USSR is enthusiastic about the future of joint 
ventures especially with developing nations. In a recent press 
conference, one Soviet official suggested that the USSR is on the 
verge of creating additional partnerships with seven countries, 
primarily African nations including, Angola, Morocco, and Tanzania. 
Also, the Soviets are negotiating with Liberia, a country they have 
had little contact with in the past. The USSR is discussing a venture 
with India, although no mention is made of what type of 
arrangement this will be. In addition, the USSR is negotiating with 
South Korea, a country with which it has had no diplomatic relations 
until recently. No information is available on the progress of these 
talks, although activity in this area would not be new. Russian 
whalers first operated off the east coast of Korea in the 1890's.
Despite the announcement of new ventures and the recent 
easing of restrictions on the formation of companies, the prospect for 
joint ventures in the 1990's is not promising. Coastal states are 
currently using the Soviet expertise to develop the local industry. 
Once the domestic vessels and onshore facilities can handle the 
operations, the Soviets will be excluded from these grounds.
295Vladimir Kaczynski and Dominique LeVieil, "International Joint 
Ventures in World Fisheries: Their Distribution and Development," Washington 
Sea Grant Technical Report, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, August 
1980, unpaginated paper.
296Press Release May 1989.
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The situation is somewhat different in the US where Soviet 
expertise is not needed. Instead, the Soviet catch has stimulated the 
domestic fishing and processing industry. Pressure from the local 
processing industry has forced the US government to allocate smaller 
and smaller quotas to the Soviet processing ships. The MRCI will 
survive because it has expanded into international trade activities, 
but many of the other ventures will not. For example, the Soviets 
Australian joint venture ended after two years when the local fleet 
replaced the Soviet vessels.
The USSR will continue to pursue access agreements, but these, 
too, will become increasingly expensive. As a result of rapid 
worldwide communications, the developing coastal states quickly 
discover the provisions of other country’s agreements and expect as 
much if not more from the USSR. Thus, the very expensive 
agreement with Kiribati was probably short-sighted even though the 
relationship did cause the desired havoc in the West, and did 
increase the Soviet's stature in the South Pacific, but it also raised 
the cost of fishing access for any future negotiations.
Sum m ary
With the introduction of the EEZ, the Soviet Union has been 
forced to increase its political and ties worldwide as 95% of the 
fish stock are now under coastal state jurisdiction. By 1989, the 
Soviets had signed intergovernmental fishing agreements with 
44 countries and participated in many joint ventures.
Developing nations initially were eager to enter into 
fishing agreements with the USSR, but their enthusiasm waned 
when fishing privileges and agreements were abused by the 
Soviet fleet. As a result, the Soviet Union has turned to joint 
ventures to gain access to coastal grounds.
Joint ventures operate through S o v r y b f l o t .  Since its 
creation in 1964, Sovrybflot 's  activities have expanded to include 
the import and export of all fish and sea products. It has even 
created a marketing division.
The outlook for Soviet joint ventures in the fishing 
industry for the 1990's is less optimistic than in the previous 
decade. Coastal states used the Soviets to develop their domestic 
infrastructure and technical expertise and now exclude Soviet 
o p era tions.
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Law of the Sea
A study of the Soviet position on law of the sea with special 
emphasis on the articles of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea 
Convention relating to fisheries.
Law of the sea emerged during the 15th century as the sea 
powers, Spain, Portugal, Britain, France, and later the Netherlands 
began to commercialize and militarize the high seas. The concept of 
freedom of the high seas actually was codified by the Dutch scholar 
Hugo Grotius in Mare Liberum, in which he stated that the use of the 
open ocean could not be controlled by a state or an individual. 
Hundreds of years and a variety of interpretations later, the concept 
of law of the sea has been addressed by the United Nations. The first 
session of the United Nation Conference on the Law of the Sea was 
held in 1958, followed by subsequent formal meetings in 1960, 1973 
and 1982. The objective of these conferences was to codify 
international law relating to ocean issues.
Russian interest in law of the sea has been traced to Peter the 
Great and even earlier.297 Russia first incorporated the concept of 
the freedom of the high seas in its "Declaration of the Armed 
Neutralities of February 28, 1780" which proclaimed the right of 
neutral states to navigate the seas freely.298
The Soviet position on law of the sea has been strongly 
influenced by politics and economics. The government's positions 
strayed little from Czarist law until the 1940's. Despite its weak 
Navy, the USSR codified the Czarist extension of jurisdiction from 
three to 12 miles in 1918 with "On the Establishment of the Border 
Guard.” Within the 12 mile area, all Russian and foreign vessels were 
under supervision of the Border Guard.
In 1920, motivated by widespread famine, Lenin nationalized 
the fishing "fleet," all 12 trawlers. He also introduced legislation 
entitled the "Protection of Fishing and Hunting Grounds in the Arctic
297Butler, The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea, p. 167. Soviet 
lawyers trace Russian official endorsement of the concept of freedom of the 
high seas when in 1587 Czar Ivan Fedorovich rejected Queen Elizabeth's 
request that the White Sea be closed to all foreigners except the English. 
Freedom of the high seas became even more important with the creation of the 
Russian Navy by Peter the Great.
298I.P. Blishchenko (ed.), The International Law of the Sea.. Progress 
Publishers, Moscow, 1988, p. 8.
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Ocean and the White Sea" which protected natural resources in the 
Barents Sea from exploitation by foreign fishermen, primarily the 
British and Norwegians. After strenuous objections by the United 
Kingdom and the alleged arrival of British warships, the USSR signed 
a treaty allowing British access to Soviet fishing grounds. Due to the 
fall of the Labor government, this was never ratified.
Additional fishing regulations were introduced at this time 
which protected the country's natural resources and also set up the 
organizational structure of the industry, including: "On the 
Reorganization of the Chief Administration of Fishing and the Fish 
Industry in Russia and its Local Organs," February 26, 1920; "On the 
Institution of the Floating Sea Institute," March 10, 1921; "On the 
Preservation of Fish and Animal Goods in the Northern Frozen 
Ocean," May 24, 1921. On March 2, 1923, with the legislation 
entitled "On the Order of the Exploitation of Fish and Sea Creature 
Industries in the Far East," the Soviets revoked all treaties 
concerning fishing or sealing in the Far East signed before the 
November 14, 1922.299
After World War 11, as a result of a strengthened Soviet Navy 
and Stalin’s obsession with security, the Soviet 12 mile territorial sea 
was strictly enforced. At this time, foreign fishermen were excluded 
from their traditional grounds off the Soviet coast. Soviet patrol 
boats routinely apprehended vessels for illegally fishing. In addition, 
more than 1,000 Japanese vessels were seized inside this territorial 
zone in the Far East during the period 1945-1960.
The USSR increased its international presence in maritime 
issues by participating in the United Nations Law of the Sea 
Conferences. The was first Conference held in Geneva in 1958 when 
the USSR was represented by some its best known jurists and 
maritime law experts.300 At that time the international standard of a 
three mile territorial sea was strongly opposed by the Soviet 
delegation for security and economic reasons.301 As an alternative,
299Press Release May 1989.
300These included G.I. Tunkin, Chairman of the delegation as well as 
A.N. Nikolaev and S.B. Krylov.
301 Butler, The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea, p. 41.
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the USSR suggested at that Conference that each state determine the 
width of its territorial sea zone in accordance with its economic, 
geographic, and historical perspective.302
The Conference developed three Conventions relating to the 
fishing industry. The first of these was the 1958 Convention on the 
Territorial Zone and Contiguous Zone which the USSR subsequently 
ratified. These regulations were included in Soviet domestic 
legislation through the enactment303 on August 5, 1960 of the 
"Statute on the Protection of the USSR State Boundary" which 
established a 12 mile territorial zone as agreed in the Geneva 
Conference. The breadth of the territorial waters was calculated 
from the normal baseline on the mainland and around the islands 
from the farthest point seaward of the internal sea waters of the 
USSR. The baseline was a straight line not exceeding 24 miles drawn 
from shore to shore of bays, inlets, coves and estuaries whose entire 
coasts belong to the USSR. In addition, waters of bays, coves, inlets, 
estuaries, seas, and straits historically belonging to the USSR were 
considered to be internal waters.304 This legislation allowed passage 
of nonmilitary vessels on the condition that they follow a 
"customary" navigational course.305
The USSR also ratified the Convention on the Continental Shelf 
on October 20, 1960. To preserve the resources of the continental 
shelf,306 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted 
the Decree on "The Continental Shelf of the USSR" nationalizing the 
shelfs resources. On October 29, 1968, the Ministry of Fisheries
302The proposal was defeated at a plenary meeting of the Conference by 
47 votes to 21 with 17 abstentions. A similar proposal on March 21, 1960 was 
submitted and later withdrawn in favor of one submitted by 18 Third World 
nations. This, too, was defeated by 39 votes to 36 with 13 abstentions.
303Fishing was regulated by the "Statute for the Protection of Fish 
Stocks and the Regulation of Fishing in Soviet Waters." Regulations were 
introduced on September 15, 1958 to establish fishing seasons and catch 
methods for the individual basins at this time.
304Historic waters are those which have a special economic or strategic 
significance or special geographic conditions for the coastal state.
305Butler, The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea, p. 44. Coastal state 
authorizations were required for the passage of military vessels.
306/b/d., pp. 44-50.
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published a "List of Living Organisms Which Are Natural Resources of 
the Continental Shelf of the USSR," containing 52 species of marine 
life, including some crab species, lobster, fungi, and algae.307
The Council of Ministers adopted the decree "On the Procedure 
for Conducting Work on the Continental Shelf of the USSR and the 
Protection of its Natural Resources" on July 18, 1969 which stated 
that any research, exploration or exploitation of natural resources 
was permitted only with government authority.308 The Ministry of 
Fisheries was responsible for enforcing the edict with assistance from 
the Border Guard. Violations were punishable by fine up to 10,000 
rubles or imprisonment for up to one year.309 Foreign vessels and 
any equipment and catch were subject to confiscation.
However, unlike the previously mentioned two Conventions, 
the USSR never ratified the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and 
the Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, because of
the compulsory procedure for settling disputes detailed in the
Convention.
During the years of Law of the Sea (LOS) Conferences following
the original one in 1958, the composition of the Soviet delegation
changed. In the beginning, the members were primarily professional 
diplomats from the Soviet mission to the United Nations. Several 
officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense were also 
included. By the 1970's, the delegation was made up of maritime 
specialists and included officials from the Ministries of Fisheries, 
Merchant Marine, and Geology. The Soviet mission to the United
307Ministry of Fisheries Order No. 315 of October 1968.
308The USSR used direct negotiations in accordance with the principle 
of the 1982 Convention when deciding the delimitation of the continental shelf 
between the USSR and Poland (1969), Finland (1965 and 1967) and Turkey 
(1978). The 1968 "Declaration on the Continental Shelf of the Baltic Sea" 
entered into by the USSR, GDR, and Poland stipulates the exclusively peaceful 
uses of the Baltic continental shelf, prohibits the transfer of any areas of the 
shelf to non-Baltic states for exploration, exploitation or any other uses and 
provides for relevant consultations among the parties to the declaration.
3 09 Control over the propriety of exploiting the mineral and other 
nonliving resources of the Soviet continental shelf was delegated to the State 
Mining-Technical Inspection Agencies of the USSR.
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Nations no longer participates directly in the Conferences, leaving 
this responsibility to the maritime specialists.
During the Conferences, the USSR carefully balanced its political 
and economic interests. Publicly, the Soviet Union tried to be the 
self-proclaimed leader of the developing nations. The Soviet 
delegation vocally supported the popular concept of coastal 
jurisdiction over territorial waters. However, as a maritime power 
with a strong navy and expanding distant water fleet, economics 
dictated different voting behavior. The Soviet position moved 
further from the Marxist concept of international law based on class 
interest to one more similar to the Western capitalist stance.
Freedom of the high seas was crucial for the Soviet naval, 
fishing, research, and merchant marine fleets. The only limit sought 
by the Soviets was on any military use of the seabed. At this time, 
the United States was ahead of the USSR in deploying underwater 
antisubmarine detection devices in the seabed.
By the mid-1970's, the official Soviet stance was to "achieve 
the universal cooperation for the utilization of the resources and for 
the progress and advancement of the nations of the world"310 Many 
of the Soviet positions were ploys to gain Third World support. The 
USSR felt that its policy portrayed "true socialism" and criticized the 
Chinese, who also claimed leadership of the developing nations, for 
wanting to turn the oceans into an arena of anarchy and discord.
Under strong pressure from the developing nations who 
wanted to increase coastal jurisdiction, the Soviets accepted the 
concept of "progressive development." One of the issues associated 
with this concept was the EEZ. The developing nations wanted to 
protect and control their natural resources within 200 miles of their 
coastline. This stance was strongly opposed by the major fishing 
nations since the majority of the most commercially valuable stocks 
were located within the EEZs of Africa and Latin America. The 
Soviets opposed the concept of the EEZ in the LOS Conferences during 
the 1960's. The official reason was the Soviet concern that a large 
portion of the available food would be inaccessible to the world
310paviov, "Detente and the Oceans,"p. 3.
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population. Instead, they proposed a 12 mile zone with exclusive 
fishing rights that would supposedly protect the developing 
countries’ interests.
An "understanding” USSR did recognize the economic necessity 
that the developing coastal state be allowed to reserve a share of the 
catch equal to the harvest caught by local vessels. In addition, it 
proposed that the coastal state receive a share of anadromous species 
equal to the total number spawning in the state's waters. A regional 
fishing organization or bilateral agreement would determine the total 
catch and the amount to be allocated to foreign fishermen. This 
position was viewed skeptically by developing nations. Regional 
fishing organizations were notoriously weak, and the end result 
would probably have been unrestricted Soviet fishing in the coastal 
w aters.
In general, the USSR supported this type of regional consensus 
decision-making body instead of the creation of a powerful 
international authority which could be dominated by the Western 
imperialist powers. In the same vein, the USSR supported a 
cooperative body instead of coastal state jurisdiction so that the 
Soviets would have a vote. Characteristic of the Soviet position was 
its vocal support of the Inter-governmental Oceanic Commission 
(IOC). The advantages of the IOC was that it had a Soviet director 
and that it worked on a basis of coordinating national efforts rather 
than directing them. In addition, it was a forum for cooperation 
rather than an effective decision-making organization. The IOC failed 
to gain Western or developing nations' support. As the majority 
became in favor of an international authority, the Soviet delegation 
reluctantly agreed, but wanted assurances that the body could only 
coordinate the activities of states, not direct them.
This forum type of organization would coordinate research 
activities to be responsible to prevent "control and exploitation from 
imperialistic monopolies."311 Despite developing countries fears that 
research would only benefit a few rich nations economically and 
militarily, the USSR strongly supported research. The Soviets felt
311 Ibi d .
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that any limitation on scientific research would be detrimental to the 
interest of the global community.312
The Soviet opposition to the 200 mile EEZ was relaxed in the 
spring of 1975 in exchange for unimpeded navigation through the 
international straits such as Dover, Gibraltar, and Ormuz.313 Once 
assured of free passage, the Soviet delegation fully supported the EEZ 
with only economic restrictions on the use of the ocean in 1976.
The EEZ was incorporated into Soviet law on December 10,
1976, when the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a 
decree "On Interim Measures to Protect Living Resources and 
Regulate Fishing in Sea Areas Adjacent to Soviet Shores."314 The 
Decree was enforced on March 1, 1977, and included "Regulations on 
the Protection of Fishery and Other Living Resources in the Coastal 
Waters of the USSR," confirmed by Decision No. 174 of 25 February 
1977 of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. This Decree and 
Regulations established the regime of a provisional fishery
conservation zone. Decisions of the USSR Council of Ministers
introduced interim measures to protect living resources and regulate 
fishing in Pacific and Arctic Ocean areas adjacent to Soviet shores on 
February 24, 1977, in the Barents Sea areas on May 17, 1977, and in 
the Baltic Sea areas on March 24, 1978.
The EEZ was now acceptable to the Soviets as long as its fleets
were guaranteed freedom of passage through international straits. 
The Soviet concern on the strait issue stems from the country's
312Janis and Daniel, "The USSR: Ocean Use and Ocean Law," p. 12.
313The USSR has the world's longest coastline but very few ports. Most 
of the coast is blocked by ice for all or part of the year. Only the Black Sea 
offers the Soviet Navy ice-free ports. Geography also restricts the Soviet fleet. 
Passages are through narrow channels surrounded by territory of American 
allies. For example, the Northern Fleet's route to the Atlantic skirts the coast of 
Norway. The Baltic Fleet must sail through the 40 mile wide Kattegat between 
Denmark and Sweden, and the Black Sea ships pass under a bridge linking two 
halves of Istanbul at the Bosporous to reach the Mediterranean and then 
through the Straits of Gibraltar to reach the Atlantic. The main naval base in 
Vladivostok is hemmed in by the Sea of Japan where the 110 mile wide Korea 
Strait between South Korea and Japan is the widest exit. There is only the 
remote outpost of Petropavlosk-Kamchatskii on the eastern coast of the 
Kamchatka Peninsula which is not easily accessible by land.
314Blishchenko, The International Law of the Sea, p. 203.
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geographical location for access to the oceans is often possible only 
via international straits.315 For example, the only year-round 
maritime route connecting the European part of the USSR with the 
Soviet Far East runs through the Indian Ocean and calls for passage 
through international straits such as Bab el Mandeb and the Strait of 
Malacca. The USSR and other socialized countries sponsored a 
proposal on international straits which would preserve unimpeded 
transit through straits connecting two parts of the high seas.
The related issue of innocent passage was also important to the 
Soviets and has been a point of contention between the United States 
and the Soviet Union.
Historically, innocent passage is a right ceded by 
coastal states from their sovereignty to foreign 
states for precise purposes; e.g. shipping. The USSR 
supports this, but interprets the right strictly: it 
must be necessary to go somewhere and there is no 
other way except through territorial waters.
Territorial waters are a very important part of
315The Northeast Passage is the 18,000 km Soviet areas adjacent to the
Arctic coast. It is the shortest route connecting the western and eastern areas
of the USSR. It is of great importance for the development of the Soviet polar 
areas and thus regarded as the USSR's most important sea lane. The Northeast 
Passage Administration was established to regulate all navigation issues in the 
area. The resolution "On Designing Lands and Islands in the Arctic Ocean as
Soviet Territory" adopted by the Presidium of the USSR Central Executive
Committee on April 15, 1926 strove to assert Soviet sovereign rights in the 
Arctic and establish a legal regime for the area. The US wants to 
internationalize the Arctic a move which is opposed by the USSR. The US 
challenges the right of the USSR to control access to the straits in the 
Northeast Passage and objects to the Soviet rule of compulsory icebreaker 
pilotage in the Vilkitskii and Shokalskii Straits. The 1982 Convention supports 
the coastal state right to enforce rules and regulations to prevent pollution 
and protect the marine environment in ice-covered areas. The USSR is taking
the necessary steps to safeguard its rights in the Arctic by issuing the legal 
decree adopted by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On the 
Continental Shelf of the USSR" (1968) and "On the Economic Zone of the 
USSR"(1984). Also in order to protect the environment in this area, the USSR 
Supreme Soviet approved on November 26, 1984, the decree "On Strengthening 
Environmental Protection in the Areas of the Far North and in Sea Areas 
Adjacent to the Northern Coast of the USSR." This decree states that the harsh 
climate increases the vulnerability of the area and calls for greater 
environm ental protection.
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coastal state security which must be taken into 
consideration . 3 16
This issue was incorporated into the Soviet legislation entitled "Rules 
for the Navigation and Presence of Foreign Vessels in the Territorial 
Waters (Territorial Sea), Internal Waters and Ports of the USSR," on 
April 28, 1983. This legislation on the innocent passage of foreign 
ships through Soviet territorial waters was in complete accord with 
the intent of the 1982 LOS Convention. Under the domestic 
legislation, innocent passage of naval vessels crossing Soviet 
territorial waters without entering Soviet internal waters is allowed 
through sea lanes, such as the two traffic separation schemes in the 
Baltic Sea, two in the Sea of Okhotsk and one in the Sea of Japan. 
Innocent passage317 of foreign naval vessels entering Soviet internal 
waters and ports was allowed with permission of the USSR Council of 
Ministers or through treaties.
However, in reference to two situations in which the United 
States naval vessels "violated" Soviet territorial waters in the Black 
Sea,318 the Soviets claim that the American warships do not have the
3 ^ T ranscribed  Notes from the Law of the Sea Institute Conference held
in Moscow in December 1988, Law of the Sea Institute, Honolulu, HI, April 1989,
unpaginated paper.
317/b/d . The Soviets made reference to the need for consistent domestic 
legislation on navigation matters and on the exercise of control over scientific
re sea rc h .
On port state jurisdiction, the Soviets denied that a Soviet flag ship in 
trade in a US port may be required to request permission in advance of its visit.
On the right of innocent passage, the Soviet delegates to the Moscow 
Workshop stated that the right of innocent passage is predicated on passage 
from one high sea to another or from the high seas to another nation's EEZ and 
that it was not meant to cover simple navigation in the territorial sea without 
any destination-related purpose. The 1985 and 1988 incidents in the Black Sea 
involving US warships were based on an official US view that broadly 
interprets the right of innocent passage. In the Soviet view, their geographic
situation is such that the necessity of traversing USSR territorial sea to move 
from the high seas to high seas or high seas to another nation's EEZ is limited 
to a very few places. In these areas the USSR has identified sea lanes for the 
exercise of innocent passage as defined in Article 12 of the Soviet Council of 
Ministers Decree No. 384, April 28, 1983 on "The Rules of Sailing and Stopovers 
of Foreign Warships in the Territorial Waters of the USSR, Internal Waters and 
Ports of the USSR."
318The USSR considers the Black and Baltic Seas essentially as bays of 
the coastal states. They cannot be used for transit or through passage, hence
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right of innocent passage as the destination of the latter is not the 
internal waters or the ports of the Soviet Union and so the American 
ships have no purpose to be within this area. This situation 
worsened on February 12, 1988, when the Soviet government 
ordered two Soviet frigates to intentionally ram the American 
warships, the Yorktown and the Caron , for violating Soviet territorial 
waters. According to the US government, these ships were exercising 
their right of innocent passage under the "assertion of rights 
program" which allows US naval vessels to navigate in waters around 
the world in accordance with the American interpretation of the 
1982 Convention.
The Soviets have a different interpretation and supported their 
action, saying that Soviet law requires foreign warships to receive 
permission to navigate in Soviet waters 30 days before entry. 
Warships are allowed to navigate only if in sea lanes created for 
international navigation. A list of these sea lanes is published in 
Decree Number 384 of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on April 
28, 1983. The Black Sea is not included in this decree. In addition, 
the Soviets charged the warships with gathering military information 
so that the concept of innocent passage did not apply. The US 
strongly denied this allegation. The conflict was "resolved" recently 
when Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister 
Eduard Shevardnadze signed a joint statement on September 23,
1989 in Jackson, Wyoming pledging to bring domestic legislation in 
conformity with the 1982 Convention. In addition, the two countries 
will develop a system to allow warships to indicate their status.319
The Soviet stand on the law of the sea issues mentioned above, 
including the EEZ, access through international straits, and the right 
of innocent passage are incorporated in its public support of the
their status as enclosed seas. The 1936 Convention on the Regime of the Black 
Sea Straits limits the total displacement of such countries' naval forces and sets 
a maximum limit of 21 days for the presence of their naval vessels in the Black 
Sea. In 1974, the Baltic states created a Convention on the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area. A similar Convention is being 
discussed for the Black Sea.
319Eduard Shevardnadze, "News Conference in Jackson Hole, Wyoming," 
TASS. September 24, 1989 in Reprints from the Soviet Press. V. 49, N. 10, 
November 30, 1989, pp. 38-43.
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1982 LOS Convention. The Soviet Union has called the 1982 
Convention "a starting point"320 in the codification of ocean law, and 
signed the Final Act and the LOS Convention on December 10,
1982.321 In the statement made at the signing of this Convention, 
the USSR chose arbitration under Annex V I1 as the principle means 
for the settlement of disputes. With respect to disputes concerning 
fishing, protection and conservation of the marine environment, 
marine scientific research and navigation, including pollution from 
ships, the USSR selected the special arbitration established under 
Annex V I11. Under Article 298, the USSR is exempt from the 
application of compulsory procedures on disputes relating to sea 
boundary delimitations and military activities.322 Under the Soviet 
doctrine of international law, decisions by the United Nations 
International Court of Justice do not represent principle sources of 
international law. They do not modify nor create legal norms.323
Soviet experts expect the 1982 Convention to be in force 
within the next six years.324 Since signing the Convention, the USSR 
and other socialist countries "have been doing everything to have its 
principles and the new institutions it set up translated into 
reality ."325 Officially the Convention is viewed as an international
320Transcribed Notes from the Moscow Workshop. Dr. Brochanian from 
the Ministry of Fisheries stated, "In our view the 1982 Convention does provide
a starting point for an effective search for the solution."
321 The Third United Nations Conference adopted the text of the
Convention on LOS on April 30, 1982.
322Soviet Association of Maritime Law, Soviet Yearbook of Maritime 
Law. Moscow 1988, p. 19.
323/bzd., p.31.
324Correspondence with Dr. Budislav Vukas, University of Zagreb, 
Zagreb, Yugoslavia, dated June 30, 1988.
325Blishchenko, The International Law of the Sea, pp. 5- 6.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union 
and the Soviet Government have especially 
emphasized that the signatory states should refrain 
from activities incompatible with the objectives of 
the Law of the Sea Convention. The primary task of 
all countries that have at least signed the 
convention is to make sure that the balance of 
interests developed in the convention is maintained.
It is not the absolute but certainly the optimum 
balance of interest between the international
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success and officials smugly note that the United States has not
signed. The USSR has become a strong supporter of the United
Nations effort, even to the point of paying their bills:
Wc were often unwilling to put up the money for UN
operations. Now we pay in good time, even on
arrears, contributing tens of millions of dollars 
under the old but formally unacknowledged 
financial obligations. ..326
After signing the 1982 Convention, the USSR incorporated the 
text into its domestic law, the "Decree on the Economic Zone of the 
USSR", passed by the Presidium on February 28, 1984.327 This 
decree, in force since March 1, 1984, superseded the Decree "On
community and the coastal state, taking into account 
the interest of many countries in the world.
Maintenance of this balance is particularly 
important because national legislation has not yet 
been harmonized.
326"United Nations-Rebirth," Izvestia.  August 26,1988 in Reprints from 
the Soviet Press. V. 47, N. 6, September 30, 1988, p. 26.
327Blishchenko, The International Law of the Sea, pp. 6-7.
The problems of the world oceans are not being 
dealt with by Soviet scholars in the context of the 
changes taking place in this country...a new 
political thinking has developed ...that the Soviet 
Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
have placed heavy emphasis on the need to protect 
universal humanitarian values and resolve 
universal humanitarian problems...the world ocean 
is a common asset to all the world community and 
not only of coastal states....This problem is broadly 
related to the need to maintain peace and security 
apart from the need to diminish military presence 
and to ensure the safety of maritime navigation. It 
is important to set up an international system of 
security. It is regrettable that attention is seldom 
paid to the fact that the maritime aspect forms an 
important element of international security.
Furthermore, Soviet leadership has given primacy 
to international law over all other rules and 
regulations, and over conflicting domestic 
regulations..It is necessary for states to clearly 
establish the primacy of international treaties over 
domestic law because treaties are basic instruments 
reflecting the will of states and their determination 
to continue progressive development.
160
Interim Measures to Protect Living Resources and Regulate Fishing in 
Sea Areas Adjacent to Soviet Shores" of December 10, 1978. The 
Soviet legislation is in complete accord with the 1982 Convention.
For example, Article 3 states that the competent Soviet officials will 
ensure that proper conservation measures will be taken to manage 
the anadromous fish stocks. This changed the 1976 legislation which 
bestowed sovereign rights over anadromous stocks except in other 
states’ coastal waters or economic zones.
Guidance for the management of fish stocks is contained in 
Articles 61-61 of the 1982 Convention which is reflected in Article 5 
of the domestic Soviet legislation, which provides for the competent 
authorities, under the direction of the Council of Ministers, to set a 
TAC for each species of fish and other living resources on an annual 
basis. In addition, the Council is responsible for determining the 
portion of the harvest which is not caught by Soviet fishermen and 
can therefore be allocated to foreign fishermen. The authorities, 
under the Council of Ministers, are also responsible for setting 
conservation measures to secure "rational" fishing and reproduction 
of living resources. The MSY determined by these authorities is the 
basis for the TAC and is determined by use of all available scientific 
data.
Article 6 of the Soviet legislation is based on Article 5 of the 
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and 
Article 8 of the 1982 LOS Convention. The Soviet laws prohibit 
foreign civilian and naval vessels from engaging in harvesting, 
research, and exploration activities in Soviet waters without proper 
permission from Soviet authorities.328
Article 19 of the Soviet legislation lists violations such as illegal 
exploration or exploitation of living resources within the economic 
zone and marine pollution. The Soviet government imposes fines of
10,000 rubles for these violations, increasing to 100,000 rubles for 
"violations in aggravating circumstances." The Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution on November 12, 1984 on the 
procedure to enforce Articles 19.
328/&id., pp. 26-27.
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...Officials of the authorities exercising protection of 
the economic zone of the USSR are entitled to 
confiscate from violators...fishing or hunting gear, 
equipment, tools, other objects and documents, as 
well as all illegal catch or bag. In cases where ships 
violating legislation on the economic zone of the 
USSR resort to force, or in other emergency 
conditions, the frontier guard may respond by 
taking all measures justified by the circumstances 
and necessary for suppressing the violation and 
detaining the offenders according to a procedure 
established by the USSR Council of M i n i s t e r s . 3 ^
Two years after the 1984 Soviet legislation,330 the USSR issued 
three additional decrees, one from the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet, and two from the Council of Ministers. The first decree from 
the Council of Ministers was issued in February 1986 and outlines 
the utilization of the living resources in the economic zone including 
anadromous species, those stocks which originate in Soviet rivers 
which then migrate outside the economic zone. This decree was later 
reinforced by the decrees from the Council of Ministers.
In addition to the 1982 Convention and its domestic 
implementation, the Soviet Union has become actively involved in 
expanding its international multilateral and bilateral agreements 
relating to fisheries. The USSR is party to 64 intergovernmental and 
13 interdepartmental agreements with 44 countries. All 
intergovernmental fisheries organizations have been established on 
the basis of international conventions. The Soviet Union is even 
considering joining the FAO and has been actively involved in the 
1984 FAO Conference on Fisheries Management and Development 
held in Rome.
This following section traces cooperation agreements 
chronologically by ocean region starting with the Northeast Atlantic 
and ending in the Baltic and Black Seas. Updated information on 
conventions and agreements is included in the paragraph discussion.
229Ibid.
330Please refer to Appendix K for excerpts pertaining to fisheries from 
the "Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet" dated February 28, 1984.
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International cooperation on the regulation of fisheries can be 
traced as far back as the early 1900's. The Russians, Dutch, Danes, 
Swedes, Norwegians, and Germans decided to establish the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) in 1902 to 
manage the Northeast Atlantic fisheries. A more recent Convention 
on the ICES was signed in Copenhagen in 1964 by 18 governments 
including Great Britain, the US, and the USSR. Its objective was to 
sponsor research programs in the Northeast Atlantic and publish the 
results.
Also in the Northeast Atlantic, the USSR became a member of 
the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention (NEAFC) which 
established the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission in January 
1959. This was revised in 1980 because of increased coastal 
jurisdiction after the Northeast Atlantic states established 200 mile 
EEZs. The new convention came into force on March 17, 1982 with 
members including the USSR, Bulgaria, Faroe Islands, the GDR,
Iceland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the EC.
The USSR has participated in trilateral agreements such as the 
1973 treaty with Iceland and Norway on the Atlantic herring 
fisheries and the 1974 agreement with Norway331 and the United 
Kingdom on North Atlantic cod. The USSR was not invited to 
participate in the Convention for the Conservation of North Atlantic 
Salmon, enforced on October 1, 1983 between Canada, the EC,
Iceland, Faroe Islands, Norway, Sweden and the USA, but has asked 
to qualify for membership. The convention established a general 
interdiction on salmon fishing outside the coastal states jurisdictional 
waters, and a qualified interdiction to fish outside 12 miles. The
33 Conversation with Captain Tkachenko. Norway and the USSR have 
been negotiating delimination of their continental shelf since 1971. Norway 
wants to apply the median line principle, while the USSR argues for special 
circumstances and the application of a sector line. The USSR and Norway 
concluded the Grey Zone agreement in 1978, renewed annually. The Grey Zone 
is 6,000 square kilometers larger than the disputed area of 61,000 square 
kilometers of which 23,000 and 3,000 square kilometers are clearly Norwegian 
and Soviet respectively. In a 1988 proposal the Soviets suggested no line be 
drawn. Instead the two countries should establish a joint management area. 
Norway has proposed cooperation in management, but consistently has 
opposed joint management. Any resolution is likely to become complicated by 
the fact that oil exploration is moving towards the area.
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commission does not undertake its own research, so cooperates with 
the ICES to establish scientifically-based recommendations.
The USSR also has participated in conventions concerning the 
Northwest Atlantic. The USSR adheres to the ICNAF which was 
revised in 1977 and came into force in January of 1979.
Concerning the Southeast Atlantic, the USSR participates in the 
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(ICCAT) which was concluded on May 14, 1966 with 22 parties 
including the USSR, US, Brazil, Japan. The Commission is located in 
Rio de Janiero. The USSR also became a member of the International 
Convention on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
Southeast Atlantic (ICCLRSEA) concluded in Rome on October 23,
1969. Membership is comprised of 17 states including the USSR, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cuba, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Italy, 
Japan, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, and Spain.
In the Pacific, the USSR participated in the Northwest Pacific 
High Seas Fisheries Convention in 1956 with Japan. In addition, on 
February 9, 1957, Canada, Japan, the US and the USSR concluded in 
Washington an Interim Convention on the Conservation of North 
Pacific Fur Seals (ICCNPFS) for a period of 6 years. The convention is 
extended every four years. The purpose of the convention is to 
establish maximum acceptable limits for exploitation of fur seals in 
North Atlantic. The convention prohibits marine harvesting of seals. 
In compensation for Japan's and Canada's renunciation of marine 
harvesting of seals, the USSR and the US each transfer to them 15% of 
the fur annually harvested in Soviet and US seal rookeries.332
More recently, in December 1987, Soviet scientists joined 
others from the United States, Canada, and Japan in Ottawa for the 
Pacific International Commission for the Exploration of the Sea 
(PICES) to discuss the formation of a regional scientific organization 
for the North Pacific. All but Japan agreed to the formation and 
scheduled to meet again at a later date.
332The Arctic seals are traditionally harvested by the countries 
bordering the Arctic Circle. On April 12, 1983, the USSR and Norway reached
an agreement on the conservation of seals in this area.
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The Soviet Union has participated in cooperation agreements 
concerning the Antarctic, the first being the International Convention 
for the Regulation of Whaling concluded in Washington D.C. in 
December 1946 which set up the International Whaling Commission 
(IWC). The IWC appeared to be more concerned with stabilizing the 
falling price of whale oil than it was with the diminishing population 
of Antarctic whales. Thus the TAC suggested by the Commission was 
based on the oil yield per species, rather than population dynamics. 
Not all the members agreed on the Commission’s recommended TAC 
and so the fishery was basically unregulated. The IWC did not have 
the enforcement capability to restrict entry into the fishery, so, by 
1965, the Antarctic whale fishery was close to depletion. At this 
point, the members realized the seriousness of the whaling problem 
and were finally able to agree on whaling limits acceptable to all the 
m em bers.
The Soviet krill harvesting operations are guided by the 
principles established in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and the more 
recent 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources (CCAMLR). This has taken an ecosystem approach 
to fishery management instead of examining one fishery and coming 
up with a MSY. The group’s objective is to conserve the resources 
rather than maximize the fish yield. CCAMLR is limited in its power 
to protect stocks because of differences in interpretations of 
members and the scientific uncertainty of the area.
The USSR has also participated in international conventions on 
the Baltic and Black Seas. On September 13, 1973, Denmark, the FRG, 
Finland, GDR, Poland, Sweden, and the USSR concluded in Gdansk, 
Poland a Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources in the Baltic Sea and the Belts. This set up the 
International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission (IBSFC) in Warsaw. Its 
aim was to maintain and increase the living resources of the Baltic 
Sea and to ensure the optimum catches as well as to expand and 
coordinate research efforts among the signatories. Denmark and the 
FRG ceased to be parties to the convention upon entry to the EC 
which became a party to the convention. Measures were adopted by 
a two thirds majority, but enforcement was left up to the individual
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states. The Convention was revised in Gdansk on September 13,
1977 to take into account the increased claims of the Baltic states 
over the coastal waters.
The Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the Baltic Sea was held at Helsinki on March 23, 1976. Participating 
states include the USSR, Denmark, Finland, GDR, FRG, Poland, and 
Sweden.
The USSR is the only Baltic state to claim a 200 mile EEZ and 
has recently concluded new delimitation agreements with Finland 
and Poland. This establishes a single maritime boundary to delimit 
territorial waters, EEZ, fishery zones and continental shelves in the 
area.333
The Soviet Union also has been active in the Commission for 
Black Sea Fisheries along with Romania and Bulgaria. In addition, the 
USSR has concluded relevant agreements with Sweden, Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, Japan, Bulgaria, and Romania for cooperation in 
rescue and assistance to ships and aircraft in distress in the Black 
Sea. Bilateral agreements have been concluded to ensure prompt 
cooperation and assistance, no matter the nationality, for distressed
ships in the Baltic, Black, Barents, Bering Seas and the Seas of Japan
and Okhotsk. Salvage and rescue operations in these territorial seas 
are performed under relevant national legislation with a major 
exception being agreements with Denmark and Finland. The Soviet 
agreements with these two countries allows for the distressed ship to 
decide which nationality of ship she will call for assistance. In 
addition, the 1971 "Agreement on Cooperation in Merchant Shipping" 
concluded by the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania, states that a ship in distress off the shores of
any contracting party is to be given assistance.334
333"'New' Soviet Delimination Agreements with its Neighbors in the 
Baltic Sea," Ocean Development and International Law. V.19, N. 2, 1988, pp. 143- 
158.
334Blishchenko, The International Law of the Sea, pp. 157-159. In the 
USSR organization and assistance to vessels is done by the National Maritime 
and Salvage and Rescue Association of the Merchant Marine Ministry. The 
Ministry of Fisheries has its own rescue and salvage services.
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The trend in the Soviet Union is towards increased 
international cooperation which is then codified into domestic 
legislation. The Soviet Union has moved away from the isolationism 
under Stalin to become an active participant in the world arena of 
international politics.
Sum m ary
The Soviet position on law of the sea has been strongly
influenced by politics and economics. The Soviet position on 
coastal jurisdiction shifted from the support of Czarist law under 
Lenin and Stalin, to accepting a 200 miie EEZ with guarantees of 
freedom of passage for its fleets.
After signing the 1982 LOS Convention, the Soviet Union
codified this information into its domestic legislation. As a result
of the EEZ, the Soviet Union has been motivated to participate in
bilateral treaties, joint ventures, and international conventions 
to gain access to its traditional fishing grounds.
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Future Options and Conclusion
A study of future options open to the fishing industry in the 
1990's focusing on krill and tuna from the high seas and on 
aquaculture in the coastal and inland waterways of the USSR. 
Despite these options, the future of this industry is less optimistic 
than in the 1970's or even the 1980's.
Despite the stock depletions and the enclosure of its traditional 
grounds, the Soviet Union is still the number two fishing nation after 
Japan, with 12% of the world catch, including 28% of the world 
output of frozen, refrigerated, and fresh fish and 37% of world's 
canned fish.335 The Soviet Union is planning to intensify its fishing 
efforts including a 15% increase over the 1985 total catch by 1990, 
and an 11% increase in its commercial production. Edible fish 
products including canned goods is expected to increase from 5.3 
million tons in 1986 to almost 5.7 million tons by 1990. Fish meal 
production is planned to increase from 712,000 tons to 800,000 tons 
during the same period.336
In order to fulfill these plans, the USSR has implemented a 
multi-faceted strategy to increase the quantity and quality of fish 
and fish products. The first goal is to "intensify fishing operations in 
the littoral waters of the USSR" by increasing the domestic harvest at 
the expense of the Japanese and South Koreans. Currently, the catch 
in the Soviet EEZ is over five million tons of primarily Alaskan 
pollack. In conjunction with this program, the government is focusing 
on its mariculture program to expand the Soviet harvest in its inland 
and coastal waterways. In connection with this expansion, the 
government plans to set up a modernized network of fish processing 
enterprises conveniently located to the harvesting operations 
throughout the country.337
In keeping with its multi-faceted strategy, the USSR is seeking 
even greater access to fishing grounds within the coastal waters of 
Africa and the South Pacific through bilateral agreements as well as 
participating in future joint ventures. Although, joint ventures were 
the "answer" to the EEZ during the 1980's, their future seems less 
bright in the new decade as domestic fishing industries, including
335Press Release May 1989.
336/&id. A resolution passed on April 5, 1989 calls for "the 
intensification of commercial fishing in external waters and to develop the 
fishing industry on the high seas."
W l b i d .
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processing enterprises, ease foreign partners like the Soviet Union 
out of their fisheries. This is because the Soviet Union has given the 
coastal state the necessary technology and knowledge to run the 
domestic fishing industry, thus eliminating the need for Soviet 
services. The joint venture operations have also increased coastal 
states' awareness of their own resources and by increasing domestic 
demand for fish and fish processing have attracted new players into 
the market. As the domestic industry becomes more successful and 
thus more powerful, the local companies are then able to lobby for 
legislation to keep the Soviet vessels out of the coastal waters.
As joint venture options decrease, the Soviet Union is focusing 
on finding and developing new fishing grounds outside coastal 
jurisdiction. Since the USSR is very interested in furthering its 
development of high seas fisheries, the industry will continue to 
modernize and redesign fishing vessels, auxiliary fleets, and its 
research vessels so as to increase the total harvest, so that up to 35% 
of the total catch will be from outside coastal EEZs. The USSR is 
actively exploring the potential of underutilized stocks in the world's 
ocean. Despite Western skepticism, Soviet scientists estimate that 
fishing in the neritic, epipelagic, and bathypelagic zones could be ten 
times greater then the current harvest now is in these waters, given 
the right equipment and expertise.338
One area of particular interest is the underwater mounts in the 
Northern Pacific and Bering Sea fishing grounds which are not within 
the American or Soviet EEZs. The USSR also has been sending its fleet 
to the open sea outside the Peruvian and Chilean EEZs. At the same 
time, the USSR is becoming increasingly interested in the Southwest 
Pacific fisheries as a long-term resource, particularly tuna.
According to Soviet scientists, only one third to one fifth of the 
potential catch of tuna is harvested currently in the world's oceans. 
Despite Western belief that the tuna fishery is overcapitalized, the 
USSR has heavily invested in specialized vessels for this industry to
338Vladimir Kaczynski, "Distant Water Fisheries and the 200 Mile 
Economic Zone," Occasional Paper N. 34, Law of the Sea Institute, Honolulu, HI, 
1983, pp. 33-34.
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try to increase its share of the world catch to 18%.339 Tuna products 
are expected to produce food for the Soviet population as well as 
hard currency, though one Soviet official denies that tuna is sought 
for foreign exchange.340
Soviet interest in the tuna industry started in the 1960’s when 
Soviet surveys showed ample supply of the fish in the Indian,
Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans. The Soviets began harvesting the tuna 
experimentally with one tuna clipper purchased from Japan followed 
later by two Japanese tuna seiners. The first Soviet tuna ship, a long 
liner called the Nereida, was constructed in 1972, followed by four 
motherships of the Leninskii Luch type bought from Japan in 1974. 
The Soviet assessment of the potential tuna harvest from the West 
Indian Ocean and the East Central Atlantic prompted the Soviets to 
order US$ 100 million worth of tuna vessels from Poland in 1976.341
Krill is another species of great interest to Soviet scientists for 
further future development. Like tuna, krill operations need 
specially designed vessels. Although krill has a great harvesting 
potential, the industry will not show an immediate profit because of 
the necessary large upfront investment.
Krill is an important link in the food chain for all Antarctic 
living resources. Originally, krill was thought to only exist in surface 
waters where it is consumed by whales, seals, and seabirds.
Recently, it was discovered that adult krill can live at considerable 
depths where it is consumed by bottom fish, making this an even 
more important part of the food chain. The potential harvest of krill 
from surface and deep waters is estimated to be 100 to 200 million 
metric tons annually, making krill the largest known species in 
existence. However, until an edible consumer product is acceptable to 
the population, krill harvesting is a very expensive method to 
produce fishmeal.
The next decade will be challenging for the fishing industry, for 
the cream of ocean fishery possibilities has been skimmed off. Now
339Conversation with Dr. Kaczynski in November 1988.
340Correspondence with Dr. V.A. Teplitsky dated August 23, 1989.
34 * Kaczynski, "Soviet Bloc Tuna Fisheries: Perspectives for 
Development," pp. 2-6.
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the fishing industry faces increasing competition from the 
agricultural sector for budgetary consideration. Fish will remain a 
source of much sought after hard currency and food, but the 
prospects for the optimistic growth forecasted by the Soviet 
government are not realistic. Despite the current profitability of the 
fishing industry, several factors limit future growth of this industry. 
Restricted access to coastal fisheries, depleted stocks worldwide, as 
well as the high cost of open ocean fishing operations dim the future 
of the Soviet fishing industry in the 1990’s.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A
Background Information on the Agricultural Sector
The agricultural sector has a long history of crisis management 
and mismanagement. Stalin's introduction of Collectivization in 1929 
has been a disaster both politically and economically. It changed the 
traditions of rural development more profoundly than the Revolution 
did. Stalin's radical approach destroyed any future development of 
family-based agriculture which has been successful and highly 
profitable in other parts of the world.
Khrushchev promoted three main agricultural programs: the 
Virgin Lands Program, the Corn Program and the "Plow Up"
Campaign. The first of these was an effort to cultivate a large tract of 
land in Siberia and Kazakhstan in order to increase grain output. 
Beginning in 1954, 13 million hectares342 were cultivated followed 
by 42 million hectares being seeded by 1960. The results were poor 
despite the massive investment in the program because of the 
marginal soil, variable climate, short growing season, and scarcity of 
irrigation.
The Corn program increased the area dedicated to corn 
production from 4.3 million hectares in 1953 to over 37 million 
hectares by 1962. The program was based on the success of the 
American Corn Belt, and did not take into consideration the different 
climatic conditions or the American use of fertilizers and hybrid 
varieties specially adapted to the local environment.
The final program, "Plow Up," was introduced in 1961 to 
eliminate the grassland system of crop rotation which was prominent 
under Stalin. This campaign drastically cut the area of land devoted 
to fallow. These three programs had "successful" short-term crops, 
and "bought time" for Khrushchev politically, but were disastrous in 
the long run.343
During the Brezhnev era, the equivalent of a US$ 1 trillion was 
invested in agriculture. Most of the money was squandered on 
improperly used fertilizers, grandiose irrigation projects, and the 
concrete livestock sheds that were estimated to cost more per cow 
than a small apartment. Much of the money ended up in the pockets
3420ne hectare is 2.47 acres.
343Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart, Soviet Economic Structure and 
Perform ance. Harper & Row, Publishers, NY, 1974, pp. 243-245.
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of corrupt politicians. In response, Andropov set up a campaign for 
strict discipline, followed by Chernenko's unsuccessful program of 
irrigation and land reclamation.344
Now Gorbachev has introduced plans for the intensification and 
administrative reorganization of the agricultural sector. Currently, 
35% of the total Soviet budget is dedicated to agriculture. This large 
percentage hurts development in other branches of the economy. In 
addition, the increased investment has not helped the annual 
harvest, which in 1988 was the lowest in three years, falling below 
the target level of 235 million tons.345 The USSR produces enough 
grain for bread, but not enough for livestock feed, so that in a poor 
harvest year, the consumer suffers by a reduction in the supply of 
meat.
Gorbachev has responded to the crisis situation in this sector 
by introducing reforms to increase productivity on the farms. 
Currently, there are 6,500 loss-generating collective and state farms 
which control 21% of the farming lands and 18% of the plough land. 
One method of reform has been the introduction of a lease 
arrangement. The reintroduction of what Gorbachev delicately refers 
to as "individual property" could cause the most sweeping overhaul 
in Soviet agriculture since Stalin collectivized farms in 1929.
Currently, one Soviet collective farmer feeds seven to nine people, 
whereas a Dutch farmer can feed 112. Peasants have their own plots 
on 3% of the arable land in the USSR, but produce about 60% of the 
potatoes and honey, 40% of the fruits, berries, and eggs, and 30% of 
the milk, meat, and vegetables. It is estimated that private plots 
produced 25% of the USSR's total crop output and 30% of the total 
milk and meat output in 1986.346
A new lease arrangement was introduced at the White Dacha 
State Farm on the outskirts of Moscow. Instead of paying farmers a 
flat fee no matter how much they produce, the farm's 100 pig 
farmers started to operate under a lease contract, a business 
arrangement in which the farm leases the equipment to the farmers 
for a fee. In return, they agree to sell the farm enough meat to cover
344Zhores Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture. W.W. Norton & Company, NY, 
1987, pp. 317-318.
345The preliminary figure was 195 million tons, down from 211 million 
tons in 1987. The USSR will import at least 9 million tons of grain from the US 
in each of the next two years.
34^Mikhail Gorbachev, "Boosting Agricultural Production Through 
Encouraging Contract-Farming and Restructuring Economic Relations in the 
Countryside" Pravda  October 14, 1988 in Reprints from the Soviet Press. V. 47, 
N. 11-12 December 15-30, 1988, p. 36.
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its state quota as production quotas are still handed down by the 
state. Any extra meat can be sold privately for profit. The idea is to 
encourage increased production and reduce costs. However, the 
uncertainty concerns many of the farmers whose contract only lasts 
two years. Currently, Gorbachev is trying to increase the length of 
leases to 50 years to make farmers feel like masters of the land, the 
principle stops just short of renouncing the socialist principle of state 
ownership of land.
Even if these reforms increase output, the pricing system 
remains a detriment to economic recovery. Prices have been 
reviewed in isolation on a yearly basis, never as part of the whole 
economy. Wholesale or retail prices for products as important as 
agricultural produce were often determined in a non-industry 
standard method. Currently, 80 to 90% of prices are set centrally. 
Prices of raw materials are expected to double after a price review 
and reform scheduled in 1990.
In 1985, the state provided 54.7 billion rubles in subsidies for 
agriculture; 35.1 billion for meat and milk alone. Subsidies are 
intended to stimulate agricultural production while allowing the state 
to hold down retail food prices. The price of bread has remained the 
same since 1955. Meat, milk, and butter have been unchanged since 
1962. This has resulted in an interesting situation where peasants 
sell grain to the state procurement agencies at a high price and feed 
their livestock with heavily subsidized bread from bread shops. In 
fact, it has been estimated that one of every four families in Estonia 
and Belorussia buys food to be used as livestock feed. As a result, on 
July 1, 1986 the reselling of bread became a crime with a fine of 50 
to 100 rubles.347 It is estimated that the state subsidizes over 100 
billion dollars of agricultural goods every year. Subsidies on bread 
and other important stables will probably be reduced but not 
revoked entirely because of fears of huge inflation and political 
upheaval.
The USSR has introduced an additional reform to try to reduce 
the agricultural imports,348 while stimulating domestic production. 
Now some farmers who grow wheat and other commodities will be 
paid in foreign currency, presumably US dollars, for anything they 
produce above average levels from 1981-1985. The move implicitly 
acknowledges the relative worthlessness of the ruble—now officially 
US$ 1.60, but traded on the black market for 10 cents or less.
347Goldman, Gorbachev’s Challenge, p. 35.
348The USSR is world’s largest importer of grains. By 1985, the annual 
import of agricultural products exceeded US$ 16 billion.
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The Gorbachev’s reforms do not deal with one of the sector’s 
the major problems. Currently, up to 30% of some crops spoil on the 
way to market. This is partially due to the fact that only 40% of 
Soviet farms have a storehouse, and often the building is used to 
store farming equipment, not food. Soviet planners have a tendency 
to build fewer but more grandiose storage and processing facilities, 
so that farms are located an average of 200-300 miles away from 
grain storing buildings. In addition, over one quarter of the state 
and collective farms are not serviced by roads.349
A lack of decent roads, adequate transport and processing is 
compounded by the idiocies of the State Agro-Industrial Committee, 
Gosagroprom , which oversees the agricultural sector.350 Gosagroprom  
sets production quotas, provides supplies and manages an archaic 
distribution system. The system takes so much of the produce to 
urban centers like Moscow that the rural areas are deprived of food 
they grow, and the locals must travel to the cities to buy food.
Pravda  recently disclosed that one region delivers 38,000 tons of 
meat annually to Moscow, only to have its residents travel to the city 
via heavily subsidized Aeroflot flights to purchase about half that 
amount. A Soviet joke is that the Gosagroprom  should be renamed 
Gosagropromkj, roughly translated as Gosagro-Blundcr.351 
Gorbachev announced the abolition of Gosagroprom  at the March 15, 
1989 meeting of the Central Committee.
349Goldman, Gorbachev's Challenge, p. 35.
35®Gosaprogram, USSR State Agro-Industrial Committee, is the central 
organ of state management of the USSR’s agro-industrial complex formed in 
1985 to streamline the bureaucracy of the previous system in which seven All- 
Union Ministries and departments managed the agriculture and food 
processing sectors.
351 Conversation with Captain Tkachenko.
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Appendix B
The New Soviet Government
General Secretary Gorbachev wants to radically restructure the 
Soviet government, replacing it with a system more Western in style.
Old System
President o f the Presidium 
Nominally head of state, presides 
over Supreme Soviet and 
performs mostly ceremonial 
duties
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
39 members oversee ministries 
and issue laws, but like the 
President, they are answerable 
to the Party
Supreme Soviet
Technically the highest organ of 
state authority, but actually a 
rubber stamp for the President's 
decisions
Local Soviets
Councils supervise departments 
but are bound by local Party 
directives
Time Magazine. July 11, 1988, p. 29.
Replaced By
President o f the Supreme Soviet 
US-style executive who conducts 
foreign and defense policy and is 
elected by secret ballot by the 
new Congress
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
17 Vice Presidents assist the 
President and oversee 
committees of the new Supreme 
Soviet
Supreme Soviet 
Smaller 2 Chamber Parliament 
with year-round real legislative 
duties and is answerable to the 
new Congress
Congress of the People's Deputies 
2,250 member forum which 
meets annually to decide major 
policy issues and elect the 
President and Supreme Soviet
Local Soviets 
Councils have enhanced 
authority to manage economic 
enterprises in their area and are 
presided over by the Party's 
regional secretaries
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Appendix C
O rganizational
Most
Dept, of Economics
Dept, of Technology
Dept, for Science & 
T echnology
Foreign Relations Dept.
C harts for the M inistry of Fisheries 
T hree V ersions
M inistry  of F isheries 
Recent Version September 1989
M in is te r-----------Council for Science &
Techniques
First Deputy 
5 Deputies
i
Dept, of Fleet Operations Dept, of Productions
Dept, of Fish Stocks 
R eproduction , 
E n v iro n m en ta l, 
E n fo rcem en t
Dept of Marketing
Dept, for Safety Dept, for Industrial
Navigation, Safety & Supply 
Labor, Standards Control
Dept, for Personnel, 
Education, Social 
D evelopm ent
Dept, of Industrial & 
Social Construction
This is the most recent organizational chart which I received from Captain 
Tkachenko in September 1989 after his visit to Moscow and conversation with 
Deputy Minister Zilanov.
Ministry of Fisheries
Version 2 1989
1. Minister
a. Collegium
2. Deputy Ministers
a. Kamentsev "First Deputy Minister" (Atlantic)
b. Eliseev, replaced by Orlov, replaced by Kudriavtsev
c. Sukhorochenko (died 12/15/70) replaced by Rytov, replaced by 
G ulchenko
d. Studenetskii (research)
e. Zhigalov
3. Regional Administrations
1. Far Eastern Fisheries
2. Northern Fisheries
3. Western Fisheries
4. Azov and Black Sea Fisheries
5. Caspian fisheries
4. Moscow apparatus
Central Administrations
6. Glavnoe upravlenie po rybovodstvu i rybolovstvu vo 
vnutrennikh vodoimakh
7. Glavnoe upravlenie tarnoi promyshlennosti
8. Glavnoe upravlenie po remontu flota
9. Glavnoe upravlenie material 'no-technicheskogo snabzheniya- 
GLAVRYBSNAB SBYT
10. Glavnoe upravlenie po okhrane i vosproizvodstvu rybnykh 
zapasov i regulirovaniyu rybolovstva-GLAVRYBVOD
11. Glavnoe gosudarstvennaya inspektsiya bezopasnosti 
moreplavaniya i portovogo nadzora flo ta  rybnoi promyshlennosti
W orking Administrations
12. Planova-ekonomicheskoi upravlenie
13. Finansovoe upravlenie
14. Upravlenie promyshlennogo rybolovstva
15. Upravlenie proizvodstva rybnoi produktskii i novoi 
te kh n o lo g ii
16. Upravlenie sudostoeniya
17. Upravlenieekspluatatsii flota i portov
18. Upravlenie nauchno-issledovatel'skikh institutov i novoi 
te k h n ik i
19. Upravlenie gslavnogo mekhanika i glavnogo energetika
20. Upravlenie kadrov i uchebnykh zavedenii
21. Upravlenie proektirovaniya i kapitainogo stroitelstva
22. Upravlenie organizatsii truda, zarabotnoi platy i rabochikh
kadrov
23. a. Upravlenie eksportnikh postavok
b. Proizvodstvennoe upravlenie po proizvdodstvu i realizatsii 
ryby i rybnoi produktsii
24. Upravlenie po delam rybolovetskikh kolkozov
25. Otdel svyazi i poiskovoi tekniki
26. Transportnyi otdel
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27. Glavnaya inspektsiya po kachestvu rybnoi produktsii
28. Nauchnii-tekhnicheskii sovet
29. TsentraVnaya bukhgalteriya
30. Pervyi otdel
31. Vtoroi otdel
32. Yuridicheskii otdel s arbitrazhem
33. Kantselyariya ministerstva, s vklyucheniem v ee sostav 
sekretariata i inspektskii pri Ministre
34. Khozyaistvennole upravlenie
35. Glavnji informatsionii post upravenija po koordinatsii 
vychisletel'nkyk rabot, issledovaniiu i rukovodtsvu operatsiiami
36. Otdel Po Tekhniki Bezopasnosti i Promyshlennoi Sanitarii
37. Automatisirovanaia systerna upravlenii proizvodstva
38. GLAVPROMRYBSBYT
39. GLAVSPETSSTROI
Correspondence with Milan Kravanja. This information is from the working 
papers of the Department of International Affairs under the Department of 
Commerce.
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Correspondence with Bruce Connuck, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, 
Department of State, Washington D.C., dated June 15, 1988.
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Appendix D
World Fishing Fleets by Tonnage 1980-1987 
Vessels over 100 GRT
N ation 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7
USSR 6,509 6,470 6,500 6,607 6,328 6,483 6,847 6,830
Jap an 1,107 1,102 1,092 1,096 1,090 1,080 1,080 1,052
USA 525 551 594 643 627 638 643 640
Spain 558 532 518 507 492 488 482 503
ROK 360 378 384 397 400 410 418 448
Poland 354 344 330 320 308 302 304 304
N orway 240 230 232 224 225 211 223 244
Rom an. 183 190 197 210 224 220 220 226
Canada 151 154 159 161 158 153 153 155
O thers 2,682 2,767 2,814 2,866 2,954 3,000 3,004 3,095
Total 12,669 12,718 12,820 13,031 12,806 12,985 13,374 13,497
ROK stand for the Republic of Korea.
Lloyd's Registry of Shipping Statistical Tables. London, 1965-1989.
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Appendix E
Background Information on the Soviet Merchant Marine and
Na v y
As part of its ocean strategy, the Merchant Marine has been 
designed in conjunction with the fishing fleet to aid the Navy. The 
Merchant Marine fleet can be used to service naval vessels or even 
be transformed into military ships during a time of war. Merchant 
tankers fuel naval ships underway at sea and in anchorages. In 
addition, many merchant ships have military sea-lift capability 
which enable them to transfer material ashore, even in areas of 
limited port facilities, and transfer cargo offshore. Some merchant 
fleet vessels have the speed, endurance, deck space, hatch size, and 
crane capability to be used as naval auxiliaries. Also, a number of 
merchant vessels are used to carry arms and military equipment to 
Third World countries under their sphere of influence.
The Merchant Marine has grown rapidly over the past 30 years 
from a variety of coastal shipping vessels to a worldwide fleet of 
ocean-going vessels. Unlike the Western shipping industry, which is 
made up of hundreds of individually-owned companies, the Soviet 
Merchant Marine is a state organized industry. Centralized control of 
the merchant fleet, fishing fleet, military and research vessels means 
that the USSR knows every ship position on a daily basis and can 
divert vessels quickly as needed.
Much of the Soviet shipbuilding industry was destroyed during 
World War 11. As a result, the USSR was dependent on the West to 
transport their manufactured products. In the 1950's less than 30% 
of the Soviet foreign trade was carried by its own vessels. The Soviet 
merchant fleet had less than two million DWT which was a very 
small percentage of the world's total of 115 million DWT. This lack of 
ability to carry its own cargo was a severe drain on the Soviet 
foreign currency reserves. As a result, the USSR began a fleet 
expansion program in the 1960’s which emphasized quantity rather 
than quality. The majority of these ships were built in COMECON 
countries like Poland and East Germany, and to a lesser extent 
Yugoslavia. During the next 25 years, the merchant fleet grew at an 
average of 600,000 DWT tons per year, increasing to 750,000 in the
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early 1980's, 352 making the Soviet fleet one of the largest in the 
world.
Traditionally, the Soviet fleet was not as well balanced as 
Western shipping enterprises.353 The Soviet Union did not have oil 
supertankers, bulk vessels, container ships and specialty ships in the 
mid-1970's as so much money had been spent on the Navy that the 
civilian infrastructure suffered. In addition, its Third World 
customers did not have the port facilities to handle modern vessels, 
so a more modern fleet was not needed. Finally, with a centrally 
controlled economy, there was no motivation to develop a 
competitive fleet.
In 1979, the Soviet Merchant Marine had over 13% of general 
cargo ships worldwide, but only 4.5% of dry bulk vessels and 3.5% of 
oil tankers. More recently, the USSR built Ro/Ro ships with partial 
container capacity. These vessels can transport supplies to 
developing countries and with a stern ramp feature, can even offload 
in less modem ports, as well as support naval amphibious forces.
The objective of the Merchant Marine has been to earn hard 
currency and to displace Western shipping. The sector has been 
subsidized by the government, and can, therefore, successfully 
undercut other shipping ventures. The USSR is trying to push 
Western countries out of the freight market with its below market 
rates. The USSR has increased its percentage of trade by 
undercutting prices. Recently, the Soviet Merchant Marine has 
dominated most of the major third world shipping routes.354
352The USSR was motivated to increase its shipping capabilities by two 
major events in the 1960's. The first was when the Soviet Union broke off 
relations with the PRC. Those goods which had been transported via rail to 
the PRC, now were shipped to developing countries. Also, after the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, the USSR became responsible for all trade in and out of Cuba.
353i)CSpitc the Western trend towards containerization, the USSR still 
maintains a large number of conventional bulk vessels equipped with their 
own cargo-handling equipment. In addition, the USSR maintains more than 50 
liners which can earn foreign currency as cruise ships especially now that 
the West has cut back on its liner fleets.
354After the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, The US ordered a grain 
embargo and stopped 17 million tons from leaving the US for the USSR. The 
1981 declaration of martial law in Poland resulted in an even sharper cut back 
on US-USSR trade. The US suspended talks on a new agreement which would 
have allowed Soviet access to US ports. The USSR was forced to shift its ships in 
liner cross-trading to routes other than the US. Though this meant more 
container ships were available to go to the Third World, the USSR had a 
difficult time employing all its vessels and ended up selling three bulk 
carriers to the West. As a result, in the early 1980's Soviet shipping was 
underutilized, its major role being political. The FYP from 1981-1985 did not 
plan to expand the Merchant Marine. Instead the FYP called for a renewal and
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Peter the Great built the first Navy to defeat the Swedes in 
1714. By the early 1900’s, the Russian Navy was number four in the 
world, until its total defeat at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905. The 
Navy played no significant role in World War 1, although the 
disaffected sailors moored off St. Petersburg in 1917 helped set off 
the October Revolution.
The Navy had a very large surface fleet by the time of the 
German invasion in 1941, but these ships played no significant role 
in the war. Such maritime activities that did take place were 
primarily in the estuaries and coastal inlets of the Black Sea under 
the command of Rear Admiral Gorshkov who fortunately for him 
happened to be working with the political adviser to the area, Leonid 
Brezhnev.355
Due to fears of an American and British invasion after the end 
of World War 11, Stalin ordered the construction of a massive naval 
fleet of cruisers, destroyers and submarines in July 1945. This 
buildup came to a halt under Khrushchev who decided that Stalin’s 
concept of a "balanced fleet" was useless and consequently cut back 
the amount of tonnage built by 60% in order to use the shipyards to 
construct cargo and fishing vessels.356
After a series of international debacles for the Soviets, starting 
with the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Navy, under Admiral 
Gorshkov, became very powerful. By the 1970's, Gorshkov published 
a series of 11 articles on the necessity of increasing the size and 
power of the Navy in order for the USSR to become a world power.
In 1989, the USSR spent over 15% of its total budget or 77,300 
million rubles on defense. According to Soviet sources, the US spends 
27% of its budget on defense.357 The USSR spent 6.9 billion rubles on
replacement of obsolete vessels, and included new orders for dry bulk carriers 
and unit load ships, and the construction of its first nuclear powered LASH to 
be employed in the Arctic.
355Andrew Cockbum, The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine. 
Vintage Books, NY, pp. 389-399.
356/£ id ., Ironically, Admiral Gorshkov maneuvered around the cutbacks 
so that within six years, Khrushchev attended the launch of a 6,000 ton 
cruiser although Khrushchev still maintained this was "a floating coffin."
357Admiral V. Chemavin, Commander of the Navy, "The Pacific in 
Focus: Restraint Must Be Mutual," Krasnava Zvezda. December 7, 1988, in 
Reprints from the Soviet Press. V. 48, N. 2, January 30, 1989, pp. 34-35. The 
Soviets say that the cost of weapons in the US is several times greater than the 
cost of similar weapons in the USSR. The American Ticonderoga  class nuclear 
powered guided missile cruiser is approximately nine times the cost of a 
similar Soviet ship. Like-wise the cost of the SH-60 helicopter is 11 times the 
Soviet equivalent.
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its space program. According to the Soviets, the US spent US$ 29.6 
billion, including US$ 22.8 billion for defense related space 
development which is six times the Soviet budget figure.358
As part of its current defense budget, the USSR is testing or 
producing nine different classes of submarines. Since 1983, the USSR 
has deployed four new classes which the US calls the Mike, the 
Sierra, the Yankee, and the Akula. The newest of these subs is only 
1% as noisy as those built by the Soviets 10 years ago. According to 
Pentagon estimates, the United States has 12 diesel attack subs and 
the Soviets have 130; 36 American ballistic subs to 77 Soviet subs, 
and 85 nuclear attack subs to 70 Soviet subs of a similar class.359 
The USSR has the world's largest sub, the strategic missile carrying 
Typhoon. The USSR continues to build super-quiet diesel subs which 
run on batteries while submerged which increases the Western 
defense budgets as they must develop techniques to track the more 
sophisticated submarines.360
As part of his overall economic strategy, Gorbachev plans to cut 
defense in the new decade. From 1989 to 1991, expenditures on 
arms and hardware are being reduced almost 20%, along with a
500.000 troop reduction. The combined cuts in the military will save
30.000 million rubles. By 1995, the USSR wants to reduce 
armaments further to cut down the defense portion of the national 
budget to 2%.361
358/b/d.
359Conversation with a US naval officer in Charleston, SC who 
preferred anonymity. In reference to the very quiet A ku la  sub, he said it 
should have been called "the Walker" referring to the espionage ring led by 
retired submariner John Walker.
360/b /d . The officer said that they used to laugh about the Soviet A lpha  
class submarine which was so noisy that a sonar station in Bermuda heard it 
when the sub went full speed in the Arctic. He also told me a joke. "How do you 
tell a Soviet submariner?—He glows in the dark."
361 Mikhail Moiseyev, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed 
Forces, "Soviet Defense Budget," Pravda. June 11, 1989, in Reprints from the 
Soviet Press. V. 49, N. 4, August 31, 1989, pp. 57-61.
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Appendix F
Soviet Fishing Fleet Comparison Before and After the 
Introduction of the EEZ 
In GRT
Type of 
Ship
Small coastal 
sh ip/catcher 
boats
100-499 GRT
1 9 7 7  
N o .o f  
V e s s e l s
1 9 7 7
GRT
2,153 453.200
1 9 8 4  
No. of 
V e s s e l s
1 9 8 4
GRT
1,142 203.234
? Change 
in GRT
-55%
Freezer tr. 
500-999 GRT
908 579.240 798 521.752 - 10%
Factory tr.
1,000-1,999
GRT
140 229.707 189 289.719 +26%
Factory tr.
2,000-3,999
GRT
734 2.537.35 889 2.372.298 7%
Super 
factory tr. 
over 4,000 
GRT
29 143.891 40 184.392 +29%
'T r.” stands for trawler.
Lloyd's Registry of Shipping Statistical Tables. London, 1965-1989.
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Appendix G
Soviet Fishing Catch by Region 1965-1987 
(1,000 m etric tons)
Y ear L.A. N.A, A frica A ntar. Ocean. In la n d Coastal Xatal
1965 17 1,363 479 _ 826 2,414 5,099
1966 111 1,386 516 - - 789 2,547 5,349
1967 702 1,192 443 - - 816 2,625 5,778
1968 249 1,228 813 - - 781 3,011 6,082
1969 123 1,626 998 - - 747 3,006 6,500
1970 441 1,559 1,082 - - 853 3,317 7,252
1971 39 1,678 1,468 - 13 935 3,203 7,336
1972 126 2019 1,698 - 54 870 2,990 7,757
1973 192 1,737 1,635 - 75 850 4,130 8,619
1974 61 1,855 1,728 - 90 773 4,738 9,245
1975 108 1,740 1,564 - 45 944 5,475 9,876
1976 34 1,349 2,179 58 78 770 5,665 10,133
1977 28 618 2,254 363 129 771 5,188 9,351
1978 54 457 2,291 298 73 730 5,011 8,914
1979 549 336 1,389 439 72 806 5,517 9,108
1980 580 168 1,804 527 74 747 5,577 9,477
1981 624 117 1,714 516 67 807 5,702 9,546
1982 627 113 1,869 602 77 804 5,866 9,958
1983 683 88 1,598 376 100 856 6,116 9,817
1984 663 152 1,402 197 73 882 7,226 10,595
1985 697 144 1,438 216 76 906 7,046 10,523
1986 791 157 1,576 431 165 927 7,214 11,261
1987 1,013 164 1,780 384 167 988 6,664 11,160
"Ocean.” stands for Oceania.
These figures have been rounded.
Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations, Yearbook of Fisheries 
Statistics. FAO, Rome, 1965-1989.
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Appendix H
Soviet Fishing Catch by Region in Percentage 1965-1987
Year L.A, N.A. Africa Antar. Ocean. In land Coastal
1965 0.3 26.7 9.4 _ 16.2 47.3
1966 2.0 25.9 9.7 - - 14.6 47.6
1967 12.1 20.6 7.7 - - 14.1 45.4
1968 4.1 20.2 13.4 - - 12.8 49.5
1969 1.9 25.0 15.4 - - 11.5 46.2
1970 6.1 21.5 14.9 - - 11.8 45.7
1971 0.5 22.9 20.0 - 0.2 12.7 43.7
1972 1.6 26.0 21.9 - 0.7 11.2 38.5
1973 2.2 20.2 19.0 - 0.9 9.9 47.9
1974 0.7 20.1 18.7 - 1.0 8.5 51.3
1975 1.1 17.6 15.8 - 0.5 9.6 55.4
1976 0.3 13.3 21.5 0.6 0.8 7.6 55.9
1977 0.3 6.6 24.1 3.9 1.4 8.2 55.9
1978 0.6 5.1 25.7 3.3 0.8 8.2 56.2
1979 6.0 3.7 15.2 4.8 0.8 8.8 60.5
1980 6.1 1.8 19.0 5.6 0.8 7.9 58.8
1981 6.5 1.2 18.0 5.4 0.7 8.5 59.7
1982 6.3 1.1 18.8 6.0 0.8 8.1 58.9
1983 7.0 0.9 16.3 3.8 1.0 8.7 62.3
1984 6.3 1.4 13.2 1.9 0.7 8.3 68.2
1985 6.6 1.4 13.7 0.2 0.7 8.6 67.0
1986 7.0 1.4 14.0 3.8 1.5 8.2 64.0
1987 9.1 1.5 15.9 3.4 1.5 8.9 59.7
Totals may not add up to 100% because of rounding.
Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations, Yearbook of Fisheries 
Statistics. FAO, Rome, 1965-1989
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Appendix I
Joint Venture Draft Law Dated March 5, 1990
Law of the USSR on Joint Ventures Created on the Territory of the USSR with 
the Participation of Soviet and Legal Entities and Citizens
GENERAL PROVISIONS
This Law establishes special applications of Soviet law regarding the creation 
and activity on Soviet territory of enterprises with the participation of Soviet 
legal entities and foreign legal entities and citizens (hereinafter referred to as 
"joint ventures").
Joint ventures are created for the purpose of more complete satisfaction of the
country's demand for products (work, services), raw material and 
manufactured goods, the introduction into the Soviet economy of advanced 
foreign technology, management experience, additional material and 
financial resources, the development of the country's export base and 
production of imported goods.
A rticle 2
Joint ventures may perform any type of activity which fulfills the goals 
foreseen in the foundation documents, with the exception of activity that is 
against the laws of the Soviet Union and Soviet republics.
Certain types of activity of the joint venture can be undertaken only on the 
basis of permission (licenses) issued according to procedure established by
Soviet law. The permission may stipulate the conditions for engaging in such
types of activity.
A rticle 3
Joint ventures are legal entities according to Soviet law.
Joint ventures organize their activity on the basis of cost-accounting, self-
financing, and hard currency self-sufficiency.
A rticle 4
Joint ventures may create on a voluntary basis sectoral, intersectoral, regional 
and interregional associations of joint ventures.
Joint ventures may participate in concerns, consortia, intersectoral state 
associations, various associations and other large scale organizational 
structures created on a voluntary basis by Soviet enterprises, associations and
o rg an iza tio n s.
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The provisions of this law apply to the activity of associations of joint 
ventures, assigned the rights of legal entities, and also associations and other 
forms of organizations engaged in commercial activity voluntarily created by 
Soviet enterprises and organizations with the participation of joint ventures.
A rticle 5
Joint ventures are governed in their activity by the Law of the USSR "On stock 
organizations, other economic associations and companies," and other legal 
acts of the USSR and Soviet republics, regulating the activity of Soviet state 
enterprises with the exceptions stipulated in this Law.
Specifics of the creation and activity of joint ventures, involved in banking 
activities are set forth in the USSR Law "On Banks and Banking Activities," the 
USSR Law "On the USSR G osbank ," and also other acts of union republics 
concerning banking activities.
A rticle 6
If after ratification of the present Law, laws are adopted which worsen the 
conditions for joint venture activities, the joint ventures which were 
established prior to the existence of such laws will be subject to the laws in
effect at the moment of registration of the joint venture.
The provisions of this article do not apply to legislative acts of the USSR, which 
set taxation.
A rticle 7
The present Law applies to the establishment of international economic joint 
ventures with participation of Soviet and foreign organizations, companies 
and administrative bodies on the territory of the USSR.
A rticle 8
If international agreements of the USSR set new rules, which are different 
from those of the Legislature of the USSR, joint ventures will follow the rules
of the international agreements.
11. REGISTRATION OF JOINT VENTURES 
A rticle 9
Joint ventures are established on the basis of agreement between 
participating parties with permission of the local authorities of the joint 
venture location. The procedure for obtaining permission for such joint 
ventures is set by the Soviet republic. Such permission will be given to one of 
the Soviet participants in the joint venture.
Joint ventures are created as joint stock companies, companies with limited 
liability, and as other types of economic companies and organizations.
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In cases stipulated by the law of the USSR and Soviet republics, joint ventures 
are established with the permission of the indicated state organs.
A rticle 10
Participants of joint ventures with the USSR can be legal entities:
-state enterprises, associations and organizations;
-public organizations, unions, and their enterprises and organizations; 
-manufacturing cooperatives, their unions, their enterprises and 
o rg an iza tions;
-leasing enterprises
-concerns, consortia, interbranch state associations, associations, and 
also other organizations, which are not part of the system of state organs, 
public organizations;
-other organizations in cases specified by laws of the USSR and Soviet 
rep u b lics;
Joint ventures can establish a new joint venture with participation of a Soviet 
enterprise, organization or association on condition of making a contribution 
of not less than US$ 100,000 into the charter fund. This rule is applied when a 
joint venture becomes a member of a Soviet association of enterprises, 
associations, unions and organizations, concerns, consortiums of intrabranch 
state associations.
Foreign participants of joint ventures can be state authorities, also companies 
and other enterprises, which are legal entities in the country of their origin 
and also physical persons, having in accordance with the law of the country 
of which they are citizens, or in which they maintain permanent residence, 
the right to undertake such activity.
A rticle 11
The decisions on the creation of joint ventures are made by state organs, state 
enterprises, associations and organizations with the agreement of the superior 
o rg an .
Public organizations themselves make decisions on the creation of joint 
ventures, and enterprises of public organizations make decisions according to 
procedure established by the central organs of these organizations.
Production cooperatives make decisions on the creation of joint ventures with 
the agreement of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet republic without 
regional division, the Council of Ministers of the autonomous republics, the 
Kray Ispolkom, oblispolkom, Mosgorispolkom, Lengorispolkom depending on 
the location of the cooperative, or with the agreement of the ministry or 
department to whose enterprise the cooperative is attached.
Joint ventures and other organizations, not included in the system of state 
organs or public organizations, make decisions on the creation of joint 
ventures on their own.
Article 12
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It is established, that the state organs and central organs of public 
organization during the decision of the question on the creation of joint 
ventures, consider the following obligatory requirements:
-attainment of the joint venture of economic self sufficiency, including 
hard currency, in accordance with the presented feasibility study;
-conformance of the feasibility study of the joint venture to 
environmental protection standards.
A response to a proposal by the Soviet participant for the creation of a joint 
venture will be given by the corresponding organ or central organ of the
public organization no less than 30 days from the moment of the receipt of the
proposal in written form.
The agreement and charter of the joint venture must also contain the 
follow ing:
1. purpose of activity
2. participants
3. name, location of headquarters and affiliates
4. time frame for establishment
5. size of the charter fund, respective shares of the partners, size of 
contributions by participants, schedule for contributions to the fund,
procedure for distributing the joint venture profit and losses
6. the rights of participants
7. management and oversight organs, subjects of their conduct and 
procedures for their activity
8. appointment of the organ to which the joint venture accounts are
sent and which will be required to facilitate access by the business community
9. procedures for accounting
10. basic procedures for the liquidation of the enterprise 
A rticle  14
Joint ventures are considered created and acquire the rights of a legal entity 
from the day of their registration.
Registration of the remainder of joint ventures is effected by financial organs
according to procedure determined by the law of union republics.
In the course of registration, the documents presented are the agreement on
the creation of the joint venture and its charter, the technical feasibility
study, verification that the foreign participants are legal entities, verification 
from the foreign participant's bank that the foreign participant is solvent, 
(conscientiousness as a bank client) The receipt from a Soviet bank, 
confirming the transfer by the participants of a sum of money required for 
the formation of the charter fund (not less than 25% of the amount established 
in the Charter), other necessary documents depending on the type of activity 
of the created joint venture, including the production feasibility study, design
documentation for construction, and so forth.
The registration of joint ventures and their affiliates requires a payment in 
the amount established by the law of the USSR and the union republics.
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The creation of joint ventures is announced in the press.
111. PROPERTY AND FUNDS OF THE JOINT VENTURE 
A rticle  15
The ownership of foreign participants of a joint venture is not limited by 
percentage (the relative proportion will depend on the size of the joint 
venture, on the branch of the national economy, and other factors), but by the 
absolute size in the sum equivalent to US$ 100,000. In the case of the creation 
of an affiliate, the minimum investment of the joint venture must be US$
50,000.
A rticle  16
The joint venture has its own property, necessary for conduct of the activity 
as stipulated in the foundation documents.
The property rights of the joint venture are defended in accordance with
Soviet law. Penalties on the property of the joint venture may be imposed only
by the decision of organs, which in accordance with the law of the USSR may 
examine disputes involving joint ventures.
The provisions of part two of this article are applied also to the property of the 
foreign partners of the joint venture, received by them as a result of joint 
venture profit distribution and also tied to the reduction by them of the share 
of the joint venture, or through withdrawal from the joint venture or its 
liquidation, and also assets imported into the Soviet Union as a partial
contribution to the charter fund.
A rticle  17
The property of the joint venture can be used to answer for all of its 
obligations, including loans. In this capacity, rights contributed by the 
participants into the charter fund, including the use of land, water, and other 
natural resources, buildings, structures, equipment and also other property
rights can also be used.
Special permission must be received from Soviet or republic organs in order to
transfer rights to minerals or continental shelf resources.
The property set forth may be sold by creditors according to agreed upon 
prices, including at auctions by Soviet organizations, and in cases covered by 
law of the USSR and its republics, also by foreign legal entities and citizens.
A rticle  18
The property of the joint ventures must be insured by insurance organizations 
of the USSR. Risk insurance for the joint ventures is obtained from insurance 
organizations according to the agreement of the partners.
Article 19
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The joint venture creates a reserve fund and other funds necessary for its 
operation and the social development of its work force.
The reserve fund is created in an amount established in the foundation 
documents, but not less than 25% of the charter fund. The formation of the 
reserve fund is effected by means of an annual contribution in Soviet or 
foreign currency until the size of the fund established in the foundation 
documents is reached. The amount of the annual contribution to the reserve 
fund is covered in the foundation documents, but cannot be less than 5% of the 
balance sheet profit.
The list of other funds, the procedures for their formation and expenditure are 
determined by the joint ventures themselves.
A rticle 20
The formula for amortization deductions is stipulated in paragraph 33 of the 
Council of Ministers of the USSR decree of January 13, 1987, namely, 
"amortization deductions are conducted in accordance with current 
instructions for Soviet state organizations if another method is not stipulated 
in the foundation documents."
IV. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF JOINT VENTURES 
A rticle 21
The joint ventures develop and confirm programs for their economic activity 
them selves.
Joint ventures have the right to undertake state orders on a voluntary basis 
through concluding contracts with the corresponding state organ, including 
on a competitive basis.
The state organ in this case, is responsible for supplying to the joint venture 
limited centrally allocated m aterial-technical resources, construction and 
contract work, necessary for the fulfillment of the contract and to guarantee 
to the joint venture a market for the products, work and services, covered in 
the state order. The joint venture is obliged to fulfill the contract for delivery 
of the products, completion of work or services covered in the state order.
A rticle 22
Delivery to the joint venture of centrally allocated products of Soviet 
production is effected through the Soviet participant and its superior organ in 
full accordance with the demands of the joint venture. For other products, 
their delivery to the joint venture is effected on the basis of agreement with 
the producers, trade organizations and material-technical supply, and also 
through the retail network of state and cooperative trade.
The type of currency in the accounts and pricing is determined by the joint 
venture in agreement with suppliers of the products.
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The purchase of material resources essential to the joint venture is effected on 
the foreign market by the joint venture itself, or through the foreign 
participants, or through Soviet foreign trade organizations using hard
currency resources of the joint venture.
The sale of products (works, services) of the joint venture is effected by the 
joint venture itself, not including cases covered by Article 21 of this Law.
A rticle 23
Joint ventures can only export products (works, services) they produce
themselves and import products (works, services) only for their own needs.
They may also effect operations with raw material received in accordance with
regulations established for Soviet enterprises.
Export and import operations of the joint venture are effected on its won or 
through foreign economic organizations or through the marketing network 
of the foreign participants in the joint venture.
A rticle 24
All hard currency expenditures of the joint venture, including payment of
profit and other sums, accruing to the foreign participants and specialists
must be made in hard currency from the joint venture's account.
A rticle 25
Property, imported into the USSR during the period covering the charter 
documents as a contribution to the charter fund is not subject to customs 
paym ents.
A rticle 26
The foreign participants in the joint venture are guaranteed transfer abroad 
of sums in hard currency which accrue to them as a result of the distribution 
of profits of the joint venture and also in connection with reduction of their 
share in the joint venture, either by withdrawal from it or liquidation of the 
joint venture.
The profit of the foreign participant in rubles cannot be transferred and can 
be expended only on the territory of the USSR through its ruble account or 
through reinvestm ent.
V. PROTECTION OF INVENTIONS AND INDUSTRIAL MODELS 
A rticle 27
Exclusive rights to inventions and industrial models, created by the workers of 
the joint venture in connection with the fulfillment of the work assignments, 
belong to the joint venture on the basis of a contract concluded with the 
worker at the time of hiring.
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According to the agreement, the worker relinquishes to the joint venture 
rights to receive patents for inventions and industrial models, created by the 
worker in connection with his work assignments, and the joint venture is
obliged to pay the worker a reward.
Patents are issued in the name of the joint venture with an indication in the 
patent of the last name, first name, and middle name of the inventor.
Joint ventures themselves make decisions on the patenting in foreign
countries of their inventions and industrial models according to procedure 
established in the foundation documents.
VI. CREDIT AND ACCOUNTS 
A rticle 28
Joint ventures may keep their money in any bank on the territory of the 
USSR, and foreign currency in those banks on the territory of the USSR 
empowered by the law of the USSR and the republics, and in foreign banks 
with the permission of V neshekonom bank.
The procedure for conducting accounts, percentage deductions and effect of 
payments is established in agreement with the bank which conducts the 
corresponding account.
The exchange rate difference in hard currency of the joint venture and also 
for its operations in hard currency are transferred to the account of its profits 
and losses.
A rticle 29
Joint ventures may use credit on commercial terms set forth:
-in rubles by any bank on the territory of the USSR
-in hard currency by any bank on the territory of the USSR thus
empowered by the USSR and republic law, or foreign banks and firms.
A rticle 30
The writing off of monetary assets from the accounts of the joint ventures is
conducted only through their instructions or by decision of organs which in
accordance with the law of the USSR may examine disputes involving joint 
v e n tu re s .
A rticle 31
Banks granting credits (including foreign banks) have the right to verify the 
use of the credit issued to the joint venture and its collateral.
VI. TAX OBLIGATIONS OF THE JOINT VENTURE, TAX REDUCTIONS, 
VERIFICATION of PENALTY TAXES
Article 32
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Tax obligations of the joint venture, its participants, tax reductions, and also 
verification of the correctness of tax penalties and penalties on arrears are 
regulated by legal acts of the USSR on taxation issues.
V l l l .  JOINT VENTURE PERSONNEL 
A rticle 33
The personnel of joint ventures are primarily Soviet citizens. The 
administration of the joint venture is obliged to conclude agreements with the 
trade union associations created at the enterprise. The content of these 
agreements, including provisions for development of the work force, are 
determined by Soviet law and the foundation documents.
A rticle 34
The labor relations of persons working at the joint venture are regulated by
laws of the USSR and the union republics on labor, in accordance with this
Law.
Joint ventures themselves determine procedure for hiring and firing workers,
forms, systems and amounts of wage payments, the schedule for the work day,
shifts, make decisions on conduct of calculating working time, set the 
procedure for holidays and vacation time.
Joint ventures themselves determine the length of the yearly paid vacation,
but its length cannot be less than that established for similar categories of
workers at state organizations.
A rticle 35
Social security (with the exception of the pension funds for foreign workers
of the joint venture) and social insurance for workers at the joint venture are
regulated by norms established in Soviet law.
The State Committee of the USSR for Labor and Social Issues of the VTsSIS has
the right to determine special applications of Soviet law on social insurance
for foreign workers of the joint venture.
The joint venture contributes to the state budget of the USSR an amount for 
state social insurance of Soviet and foreign citizens and contributions to the
pension funds of Soviet citizens according to the norms established for Soviet 
organizations. Payments into pension funds for the foreign workers are made
in the corresponding funds of the country of which they are permanent 
residents in the hard currency of that country.
A rticle 36
Wages for the foreign workers of the joint venture are taxed at the rate 
according to procedures established in Soviet laws on taxation of the 
popu la tion .
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The non-expended portion of these wages in hard currency may be 
transferred abroad.
IX. OVERSIGHT OF JOINT VENTURE ACTIVITIES 
A rticle 37
Financial and other state organs within the limits of their competence verify
the adherence of the joint venture to laws, including payment of taxes and 
other contributions to the budget, conduct of accounting procedure, foreign 
economic activity, protection of labor, technical safety, environmental
protection, and protection of historical monuments and culture.
Joint ventures annually present to local financial organizations the joint 
venture's annual accounting balance in the form of the balance sheet, 
account of profit and losses, addendum to the balance, and explanatory notes. 
The procedure for presentation of these documents is determined by the USSR 
Ministry of Finance.
A rticle 38
Joint ventures can hire auditing organizations to verify their financial and
commercial activity.
A rticle 39
Joint ventures are not obliged to present any sort of accounts or information 
to foreign state organs. If necessary, foreign participants inform their 
country's organs about the result of their participation in the activity of the
joint venture.
X. LIQUIDATION OF THE JOINT VENTURE 
A rticle 40
Joint ventures may be liquidated in cases:
-of divergence of the joint venture from the goals outlined in the 
foundation documents
-of inability to maintain hard currency self sufficiency
-of inability to form the charter fund within the time frame and in the
amount, permitting the beginning of operation of the joint venture within a
year of the date of its registration by the Ministry of Finance of the USSR 
-of other reasons covered by legislation of the USSR and the union 
rep u b lics .
A rticle 41
The foreign participant in the case of withdrawal from the joint venture or its 
liquidation receives the right to receive its contribution back in the form of
money or goods for the remainder cost at the moment of withdrawal or 
liquidation after all obligations have been met to Soviet participants and third 
p arties.
205
A rtic le  42
Liquidation of joint ventures is regulated by the financial organs with which 
the joint venture was registered. For liquidation of the joint venture a 
liquidation commission is appointed by the USSR Ministry of Finance. Notice
of liquidation is published in the press.
XI. DISPUTE ARBITRATION 
A rtic le  43
Disputes between joint ventures and organizations with the Soviet state, 
cooperative, and other public organizations, internal disputes, and also 
disputes between participants of the joint venture on issues connected with its 
activity are taken to the Soviet courts, or by agreement of all sides, taken to a 
court of arbitration, or in cases stipulated in Soviet law, taken to organs of 
state arbitrage.
The copy of this draft law was given to me by Emily Silliman, Consultant on 
Soviet Trade and Law, Mountain View, CA, in June 1990.
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Appendix J
1985 Fisheries Agreement Between the USSR and the 
Republic of Kiribati
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KIRIBATI 
(HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS "THE GOVERNMENT") AND SOVRYBFLOT OF THE 
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS "THE 
COMPANY") CONCERNING PURSE SEINE AND LONGLINE FISHING WITHIN THE 
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE OF KIRIBATI
WHEREAS the Republic of Kiribati has sovereign rights for the purpose 
of exploring and exploiting, conserving, and managing the natural resources 
of the exclusive economic zone,
AND WHEREAS, the company has requested the Government to permit 
fishing vessels to fish within the fishery limits of the Republic of Kiribati 
established in accordance with the Ordinance,
NOW THEREFORE, it is agreed by and between the Government and the 
company as follows:
ARTICLE 1.-DEFINITIONS
1.1 "Fishery limits" means the fishery limits established in accordance 
with the Ordinance
1.2 "Fishing" shall have the same meaning as defined in the Ordinance.
1.3 A "Fishing trip" means a period which shall extend for the duration 
of a permit granted pursuant to this agreement.
1.4 "Licensed vessel" means a fishing vessel in respect of which a 
permit has been issued pursuant to the Ordinance.
1.5 "Ordinance" means the Fisheries Ordinance Cap. 33 1979, as amended 
from time to time, and any regulations made thereunder, of the 
Republic of Kiribati.
1.6 "Permit" means a permit issued pursuant to the Ordinance and 
includes a license.
1.7 "This Agreement" means this Agreement and its schedules.
ARTICLE 2.-TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT AND PERMITS
2.1 This Agreement shall commence on the 15th day of October 1985 and 
shall continue in force for one year up to and inclusive of the 14th 
of October 1986.
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2.2 A permit issued pursuant to this Agreement shall permit a licensed 
vessel to fish in the fishery limits for one year or until the expiry 
of this Agreement whichever is the shorter period PROVIDED 
HOWEVER that a permit issued within 21 days of the date of 
commencement of this Agreement shall continue in force for one 
y ea r.
2.3 Notwithstanding the terms of this Agreement, as defined in Section
2.1 above, this Agreement may be extended for a period as may be 
mutually agreed.
ARTICLE 3.-TYPE AND METHOD OF FISHING
Vessels licensed pursuant to this Agreement may be used for fishing 
only by the purse seine and longline methods for tuna and tuna­
like fishes, billfishes, and species caught incidental thereto.
ARTICLE 4. - APPLICATIONS FOR REGISTRATION AND PERMITS
4.1 Only vessels registered on the Regional Register of Foreign Fishing 
Vessels maintained by the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency in 
Honiara, Solomon Islands, and being in good standing on the 
Regional Register, shall be eligible to apply for a permit.
4.2 Application for registration on the Regional Register shall be made 
to the Government in the form set out in Schedule 1.
4.3 The Government shall issue permits to the Company for the vessels 
as listed in Schedule 2.
4.4 An application for a permit pursuant to this Agreement shall be 
made to the Government in accordance with the requirements of 
the Ordinance..in writing, by cable or telex, and shall indicate:
i. the registration number of the vessel on the Regional Register,
ii. the name of the vessel,
iii. the date on which it is proposed that the permit shall commence
iv. the estimated duration of the vessel’s operation within the 
fishery limits
4.5 Any permit issued to a vessel pursuant to this Agreement shall be 
subject to the terms and conditions as set out in Schedule 3.
4.6 The Government shall upon receipt of an application for permits 
and the appropriate fee, process the application, and provided that:
a. the application is in accordance with the terms of this Agreement
b. the vessel for which permits are sought have not previously 
breached this Agreement or the terms and conditions of any permit,
The Government will issue permits and will advise the company of 
the permit numbers of the vessels by cable or telex.
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4.7 Where the Company wishes to withdraw a licensed vessel which has 
been permitted to fish within the fishery limits it may apply to the 
Government for a permit to be issued to another fishing vessel of a 
similar type and size to the vessel proposed to be withdrawn, and the 
Government shall give consideration to the application PROVIDED 
HOWEVER that the total number and composition of licensed vessels 
fishing within the fishery limits is not increased or changed from 
that set out in Schedule 2 hereof.
4.8.1 The Government understands that the Company will use 
supply vessels to re-provision licensed fishing vessels and that such 
vessels will not actively engage in catching, harvesting, or taking 
fish within the fishery limits.
4.8.2 The Company will apply for permits to be issued to such 
support vessels pursuant to the terms of this Agreement and the 
Ordinance, such permits to be in addition to those required for the 
vessels referred to in Schedule 2, and no fee shall be charged by the 
Government for the issuing of such permits.
ARTICLE 5.-FEES
5.1 The fee to be paid to the Government upon application for the issue 
of permits pursuant to this Agreement shall be Australian $
2,400,000.
5.2 The fee referred to in paragraph 5.1 shall be paid in Australian
dollars to the No. 1 Account of the Government with the National
Bank of Kiribati, Bairiki, Tarawa, and shall be paid free and clear of 
any deduction or withholding of any kind whatsoever by deposit 
with or telegraphic transfer to Westpac Banking Corporation's
Sydney, Australia Branch to the credit of the National Bank of 
Kiribati's Account and shall advise the National Bank of Kiribati by 
telex or cable of the said payment.
5.3 The fee shall be paid in three advance installments according to the
following schedule:
-upon application for permits the sum of A$ 672,000 shall be paid
into the account as set out in paragraph 5.2
-upon the expiration of four (4) months after the signing of the
Agreement, the sum of A$ 816,000 shall be paid into the account as 
set out in paragraph 5.2
-upon the expiration of eight (8) months after the signing of the 
Agreement, the sum of A$ 912,000 shall be paid into the account as 
set out in paragraph 5.2.
ARTICLE 6.-NOTIFICATION
The Government shall notify the Company of any action initiated by 
it pursuant to this Agreement or pursuant to the laws of Kiribati, 
against any vessel to which a permit has been issued pursuant to 
this Agreement.
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ARTICLE ^-MISCELLANEOUS
7.1 The Company shall ensure that all vessels to which permits are 
issued pursuant to this Agreement, shall comply with the provisions 
of this Agreement, the permit and the Ordinance.
7.2 Any differences or dispute which may arise as to the interpretation 
or implementation of this Agreement (other than a breach referred 
to in paragraph 7.3 hereof) shall be resolved by consultation and 
discussion between the parties.
7.3 Subject to the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea any breach of the terms of this Agreement, a permit 
or the Ordinance by the vessel to which a permit has been granted, 
or by the Master or any other officer of any such vessel shall be 
dealt with in accordance with the laws of Kiribati.
7.4 Notwithstanding the provisions of this Agreement the Government 
may license further vessels pursuant to this Agreement at such a 
fee as may be agreed between the parties.
Signed this 18th day o f August, 1985, Manila
Minister of Natural Resource Development, on behalf of the
G overnm en t
Acting Trade Representative of the Republic of the Philippines,
on behalf of the Company
Copy of this agreement was sent to me by Anote Tong in August 1988.
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Appendix K
Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
on February 28, 1984 
Excerpts Pertaining to Fisheries
"Edict of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 28 February 1984,” On the 
USSR Economic Zone (1984) 9 Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR 137, 
confirmed by law of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11 April 1984, On the 
Confirmation o f the Edict o f the Presidium o f the USSR Supreme Soviet "On the 
USSR Economic Zone'\ (1984) 16 Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR 234.
3. The USSR exercises rights resulting from its primary interest in stocks of 
anadromous species which originate in its rivers, and for the primary 
responsibility for them.
Soviet competent organs ensure the conservation of stocks of such 
anadromous species by means of the adoption of appropriate measures and the
establishment of rules regulating their commercial catch, including the 
establishment of total allowable catches, both within its economic zone as well
as outside its boundaries.
The USSR ensures the enforcement of its measures and rules, with 
respect to stocks of anadromous species, beyond its economic zone on the basis 
of treaties between the USSR and other interested states.
The commercial catch by other states of anadromous species which 
originate in rivers of the USSR, beyond the outer limit of the economic zone of 
the USSR, is conducted on the basis of treaties between the USSR and other 
interested states concerning the terms and conditions of such commercial 
catch giving due regard to the conservation requirements of such species and 
the needs of the USSR with respect to them.
The terms and conditions of the utilization and safeguarding of stocks of 
anadromous species which originate in rivers of the USSR, are determined by 
the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
4. In the economic zone of the USSR all states-whether coastal or land-locked- 
enjoy, subject to the observance of the provisions of the present Edict, other 
relevant legislative acts of the USSR, as well as generally accepted principles 
of international law, the freedom of navigation and overflight, the laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines and other internationally lawful uses of the 
sea related to these freedoms.
5. The USSR ensures the optimum utilization of the fishery and other living 
resources in its economic zone by the realization of appropriate measures for 
their conservation and management, taking into account the most reliable 
scientific evidence and in appropriate cases in co-operation with competent 
international organizations.
For that purpose, in particular, Soviet competent organs determine 
yearly a maximum allowable catch of every species of fish and other living 
resources, the part of the catch, the access to which may be given to foreign 
states, and they also take measures to ensure the rational conduct of
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commercial fishing, conservation and reproduction of living resources and 
their protection, including the inspection, detention and arrest of ships.
The terms and conditions of utilization and protection of fishery and 
other living resources of the economic zone of the USSR are determined by the 
Council of Ministers of the USSR.
6. The commercial catching of fish and other living resources, as well as 
research, exploratory and other operations connected with such commercial 
fishing (hereinafter cited as commercial fishing) can be conducted by foreign 
juridical and natural persons in the economic zone of the USSR only on the 
basis of international treaties or other agreements between the USSR and 
respective foreign states.
Foreign juridical and natural persons, conducting commercial fishing 
in the economic zone of the USSR in accordance with part one of the present 
Article, must observe the measures concerning the conservation of living 
resources and other provisions and conditions established by the present Edict, 
other relevant legislative acts of the USSR and rules, adopted on their basis.
"Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 17 February 1986," On  
the Introduction o f Modifications and Completions to the Decree o f the 
Presidium o f the USSR Supreme Soviet On the Manner o f Implementation o f 
Articles 19 and 21 o f the Edict o f the Presidium o f the Supreme Soviet o f the 
USSR On the Economic Zone o f the USSRX1986) 9 Vedomosti Verkhovnogo 
Soveta SSSR 152.
In order to conserve the stocks of anadromous species of fish which 
originate in rivers of the USSR, beyond the outer limit of the economic zone of 
the USSR, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet decrees:
To introduce in the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR of 12 November 1984 On the Manner o f Implementation o f Articles 19 and 
21 o f the Edict o f the Presidium o f the Supreme Soviet o f the USSR On the 
Economic Zone o f the USSR'" the following modifications and completions:
1. Redraft Part one of Article 1, in the following wording:
"(1) The measures of responsibility, established by Articles 19 and 21 of 
the Edict of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 28 February 1984, "On 
the USSR Economic Zone o f the USSR,",are applied to juridical and natural 
persons who have committed violations provided for by Article 19 of that Edict, 
within the limits of the economic zone of the USSR, and for the illegal 
commercial catch of anadromous species of fish which originate in rivers of 
the USSR, beyond the economic zone of the USSR."
2. In Part one of Article 2:
redraft paragraph two, in the following wording:
"illegal extraction in large quantities of natural resources in the 
economic zone of the USSR and anadromous species of fish which originate in 
rivers of the USSR, beyond the economic zone of the USSR";
paragraph seven, insert after the words "economic zone of the USSR" 
the words "and the safeguarding of stocks of anadromous species of fish which 
originate in rivers of the USSR, beyond the economic zone of the USSR."
3. In Article 3:
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part one, after the words "Ministry of Amelioration and Hydrology of
the USSR" insert the words "and for illegal catch of anadromous species of fish
which originate in rivers of the USSR, beyond the economic zone of the USSR- 
by the fishery conservation agencies of the Ministry of Fisheries of the USSR";
part three, after the words "economic zone of the USSR" insert the words
"as well as stocks of anadromous species of fish which originate in rivers of
the USSR, beyond the economic zone of the USSR".
4. Articles 5 and 8, after the words "economic zone of the USSR" insert the 
words "and the safeguarding of stocks of anadromous species of fish which 
originate in rivers of the USSR, beyond the economic zone of the USSR".
5. Part one of Article 7, after the words "economic zone of the USSR" insert the 
words "as well as stocks of anadromous species of fish which originate in 
rivers of the USSR, beyond the economic zone of the USSR".
"Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR 17 February 1986," On the 
Confirmation o f the Statute on the Utilization o f Living Resources o f the 
Economic Zone o f the USSR, as well as on the Safeguarding and Utilization o f 
Stocks o f Anadromous Species Which Originate in the Rivers o f the USSR, 
Beyond the Economic Zone o f the USSR, (1986) 10 Sobranie Postanovlenii 
PraviteVstva SSSR 66.
With reference to the Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of 
the USSR of 28 February 1984, "On the Economic Zone of the USSR" the Council 
of Ministers of the USSR decrees;
To confirm the annexed "Statute on the Utilization of Living Resources 
of the Economic Zone of the USSR," as well as "On the Safeguarding and 
Utilization of Stocks of Anadromous Species Which Originate in the Rivers of 
the USSR, Beyond the Economic Zone of the USSR,"
Statute on the Utilization o f Living Resources o f the Economic Zone o f the
USSR, as well as on the Safeguarding and Utilization o f Stocks o f Anadromous
Species Which Originate in the Rivers o f the USSR, Beyond the Economic Zone
o f the USSR,
1. The utilization of living resources of the economic zone of the USSR, as well 
as on the safeguarding and utilization of stocks of anadromous species which 
originate in the rivers of the USSR, beyond the outer limit of the economic 
zone of the USSR, is conducted in accordance with the Edict of the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 28 February 1984, "On the Economic Zone of
the USSR" the present Statute, other legislative acts of the USSR and
international treaties of the USSR.
2. The USSR ensures the optimum utilization of the fishery and other living
resources of its economic zone by the realization of the following measures for
the conservation of those resources and their management:
(a) the establishment of rules and norms concerning the conservation
of those resources and their management;
(b) the establishment of prohibitions and restrictions in the utilization
of living resources;
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(c) the safeguarding of living resources from violations of utilizations
p a tte rn s ;
(d) the protection of the living environment, the conditions of 
reproduction and migratory routes of the living resources;
(e) the prevention of the destruction of the living resources through 
the realization of productive processes and shipping;
(f) the safeguarding of rare species and species of living resources
threatened with disappearance;
(g) the creation in the established manner of reserves, protected zones
and the allocation of other specially protected territories;
(h) the assistance to sea animals and other living resources in case of a 
threat of their destruction by catastrophe or by other reasons;
(i) the organization of scientific research, aimed at the motivation of
measures concerning the conservation of living resources;
(j) propaganda by means of mass information on the conservation of 
living resources.
In order to guarantee the optimum utilization of fishery and other 
living resources of the economic zone of the USSR, still other measures can be 
taken concerning the conservation of those resources and their management.
Measures concerning the conservation of the living resources and 
their management are carried out, taking into account the best scientific
evidence and, in appropriate cases, in cooperation with competent 
international organizations.
3. The elaboration and realization in accordance with the prevailing
legislation of measures concerning the conservation of living resources in 
the economic zone of the USSR and their management, as well as measures
concerning the exploration of these resources is entrusted to the Ministry of
Fisheries of the USSR, which for that purpose:
(a) secures the realization of measures concerning the reproduction of
the living resources in the economic zone of the USSR;
(b) determines yearly a maximum allowable catch of every species of 
fish and other living resources of the economic zone of the USSR, as well as 
the part of that catch, the access to which may, on the basis of international 
treaties or other agreements between the USSR and respective foreign states, 
be given to foreign states; determines in the established manner, quotas of 
catch of every species of fish and other living resources for a foreign state, as 
well as establishes, if necessary, by agreement with the interested ministries 
and departments of the USSR areas in which foreign juridical and natural 
persons may conduct commercial fishing;
(c) elaborates and confirms rules of conduct of commercial fishing in 
the economic zone of the USSR. Under commercial fishing in the present 
Statute is meant the commercial catching of fish and other living resources, as 
well as research, exploratory and other operations connected with such 
commercial fishing;
(d) establishes the terms and conditions of the granting of permission to 
Soviet fishery exploitation organizations and also on the basis of the 
respective international treaties or other agreements between the USSR and 
the respective foreign states, to foreign juridical and natural persons, to 
conduct commercial fishing in the economic zone of the USSR including the 
terms of introducing demands to obtain permissions and necessary
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information in connection with it, the terms recalling the permission or 
suspension of their effect;
(e) grants permission to Soviet fishery exploitation organizations, as 
well as foreign juridical and natural persons for the conduct of commercial
fishing in the economic zone of the USSR in accordance with the established 
quotas;
(f) makes proposals in the established manner and conducts 
negotiations concerning the conclusion of international treaties of the USSR 
on matters of conservation and utilization of the living resources of the 
economic zone of the USSR.
4. Commercial fishing in the economic zone of the USSR can only be carried 
out by foreign juridical and natural persons on the basis of international
treaties or other agreements between the USSR and respective foreign states.
Foreign juridical and natural persons, conducting commercial fishing 
in the economic zone of the USSR, must comply with the requirements 
concerning the conservation of the living resources and other requirements,
provided for by the "Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
of 28 February 1984","On the Economic Zone of the USSR," the present Statute, 
other legislative acts of the USSR and rules, adopted on their basis.
The terms and conditions of the conduct of commercial fishing in the 
economic zone of the USSR by foreign juridical and natural persons are 
determined, giving due regard to the significance of the living resources of 
the given area to the economic and other state interests of the USSR, as well as 
other circumstances related to that commercial catch, provided for by
international treaties of the USSR.
5. The USSR exercises rights, resulting from its primary interest in stocks of 
anadromous species which originate in its rivers and from the primary 
responsibility for them.
The conservation of stocks of such anadromous species is ensured by 
creating appropriate conditions for their reproduction and living, while 
taking other corresponding measures and establishing rules concerning the 
regulation of their commercial catch, including the establishment of total 
allowable catches, both within the economic zone of the USSR as well as outside 
its boundaries.
The USSR ensures the enforcement of the measures and rules with
respect to stocks of anadromous species which originate in its rivers, beyond
its economic zone on the basis of treaties between the USSR and other 
interested states.
6. The elaboration and realization of measures concerning the conservation 
and rational use of stocks of anadromous species which originate in rivers of 
the USSR, beyond the economic zone of the USSR is entrusted to the Ministry of 
Fisheries of the USSR, which for that purpose:
(a) secures the realization of measures concerning the reproduction of
stocks of anadromous species which originate in rivers of the USSR;
(b) establishes rules for the regulation of the commercial catch of such
anadromous species beyond the economic zone of the USSR;
(c) makes proposals in the established manner and conducts
negotiations concerning the conclusion of international treaties of the USSR 
on matters of conservation and utilization of the stocks of anadromous species 
which originate in rivers of the USSR, beyond the economic zone of the USSR.
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In order to guarantee the optimum utilization of the stocks of 
anadromous species which originate in rivers of the USSR, beyond the 
economic zone of the USSR still other measures can be taken concerning the 
conservation of those resources and their management.
7. The commercial catch by interested states of anadromous species which 
originate in rivers of the USSR, beyond the economic zone of the USSR is 
carried out on the basis of treaties between the USSR and those states.
The terms and conditions of the conduct of such commercial catch, 
including the requirements concerning the guarantee of strict 
implementation by foreign vessels of the measures and rules concerning 
stocks of anadromous species which originate in rivers of the USSR, are 
determined in an international treaty between the USSR and respective 
foreign state, giving due regard, in particular, to the conservation 
requirements of those stocks, the needs of the USSR in them, as well as the
degree of participation of a foreign state in measures related to their
reproduction and conservation, particularly by expenditures for that purpose.
8. The safeguarding of stocks of anadromous species which originate in rivers 
of the USSR, beyond the economic zone of the USSR is entrusted to fishery 
conservation agencies of the Ministry of Fisheries of the USSR and carried out 
by them by means of :
(a) the patrol of areas in which run the migratory routes and which 
contain the feeding grounds of those species of fish;
(b) the observance of foreign ships which conduct commercial catch of 
such species of fish, the inscription in a special diary of the executed 
operations by them, the location, name, number on board, nationality of the 
mentioned ships and the establishment of the nature of commercial catch they
are carrying out;
(c) the control of the enforcement of measures and rules concerning 
the regulation of the commercial catch of those species of fish by foreign 
ships, which carry out the mentioned commercial catch, on the basis of an 
international treaty of the USSR;
(d) the institution of legal procedures against foreign ships which
conduct illegal commercial catch of such species of fish, to terminate the 
commercial catch, as well as the taking of other measures concerning its 
prevention in the established manner.
Ships of fishery conservation agencies, when carrying out the 
safeguarding of stocks of anadromous species which originate in rivers of the 
USSR, beyond the economic zone of the USSR have to bear a special pennant 
and the officials of fishery conservation agencies are obliged to carry the 
revised official credentials.
9. For violations related to the commercial catch of anadromous species which 
originate in rivers of the USSR, occurring outside the economic zone of the 
USSR, the guilty foreign juridical and natural persons bear responsibility in 
accordance with Articles 19 and 21 of the Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR of 28 February 1984 "On the Economic Zone of the USSR," 
and the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 12 
November 1984 "On the Manner of Implementation of Articles 19 and 21 of the 
Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 'On the Economic Zone of the
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USSR,"’ unless a treaty between the USSR and the respective foreign country 
provides otherwise.
10. State inspectors of fishery conservation agencies of the Ministry of 
Fisheries of the USSR, which carry out the protection of stocks of anadromous 
species which originate in rivers of the USSR, beyond the economic zone of 
the USSR, impose fines on the violators, provided for by the first part of 
Article 19 of the "Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 28 
February 1984,""On the Economic Zone of the USSR."
If necessary, fishery conservation agencies transmit materials about 
the committed violations for the prosecution of the guilty persons in 
accordance with prevailing legislation.
The seizure from the offenders of equipment, gear instruments and 
other objects and documents, as well as everything extracted illegally, is 
carried out in a manner determined by the "Statute on the Safeguarding of the 
Economic Zone of the USSR."
11. In case of the continuation of the conduct of illegal commercial catch by 
foreign ships of anadromous species which originate in rivers of the USSR, 
beyond the economic zone of the USSR, notwithstanding the requirement of 
the termination of the commercial catch, the fishery conservation agencies of 
the Ministry of Fisheries of the USSR take measures to arrest the offenders and 
convey them to one of the open ports of the USSR fro prosecution.
Soviet competent organs can also in case of illegal commercial catch of 
anadromous species by foreign juridical or natural persons take other 
necessary measures concerning the conservation of stocks of anadromous 
species.
"Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of 10 March 1986," On the 
Manner o f Calculation o f Fines Imposed for Damage Caused to Living Resources 
o f the Economic Zone o f the USSR as well as to Stocks o f Anadromous Species o f 
Fish Which Originate in Rivers o f the USSR, Beyond the Economic Zone o f the 
USSR,  (1986) 12 Sobranie Postanovlenii PraviteVstva SSSR 75.
The Council of Ministers of the USSR decrees:
1. To confirm the annexed Schedule for the calculation of fines imposed for the 
damage caused to living resources of the economic zone of the USSR, as well as 
to stocks of anadromous species which originate in rivers of the USSR, beyond 
the economic zone of the USSR as a result of their illegal harvesting by 
citizens of the USSR and by foreign juridical and natural persons.
In remaining cases (except in cases of causing damage to living 
resources in the economic zone of the USSR by pollution of the marine 
environment in that zone) the fines imposed for damage are calculated 
according to the method determined by the Ministry of Fisheries of the USSR 
and the Ministry of Amelioration and Hydrology of the USSR in collaboration 
with the Ministry of Finances of the USSR.
2. Fines imposed for damage to living resources of the economic zone of the 
USSR are calculated by officials of fishery conservation agencies of the 
Ministry of Fisheries of the USSR and agencies for regulating water use and 
conservation of the Ministry of Amelioration and Hydrology of the USSR.
Fines imposed for damage to stocks of anadromous species which 
originate in rivers of the USSR, beyond the economic zone of the USSR are
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calculated by officials of fishery conservation agencies of the Ministry of 
Fisheries of the USSR.
3. To repeal the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of 8 August 1977 
No. 723 "On the Manner of Calculation of Fines Imposed for Damage Caused to 
Fish and Other Living Resources in the Marine Areas Adjacent to the Coast of 
the USSR” (SP USSR, 1977, No. 23, 143).
A copy of this translation by Erik Franckx, Free University of Brussels, 
Belgium was sent to me by Professor Donald Cameron Watt in June 1987.
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Appendix L
Common Pool Problem
Fisheries management is a "common pool" problem. The 
optimum reproduction of stocks depends on hydrological and 
biological conditions as well as the intensity of fishing. An important 
feature of the fishing industry is that fish reproduce continuously. 
Biologically, hundreds of thousands and even millions of eggs are 
emitted. Of these only a small number reach maturity. Another 
problem is that fish are highly mobil and often do not remain within 
man-made territorial boundaries.
The two traditional approaches to establish controls on the total 
fishing effort are licensing the number of vessels in a fishery and 
introducing a tax or user fee both of which will discourage others 
from participating in the fishery. The disadvantage of licensing is 
the difficulty of controlling the catching power and establishing a 
standard unit of effort. This method also discourages the 
introduction of new technology. Taxes are the most economically 
advantageous though they usually are not politically feasible.
Under a quota system, each fishing vessel is allocated a percent 
of the management organization's MSY. The fisherman is allowed to 
lease part or all of the allocation. A governing body establishes 
limits on the catch size and acceptable gear use, and should be the 
only agency allowed to sell licenses. In this way, the government can
withhold use of the quotas as necessary to manage the fishery levels
through the purchase of quotas at market value from willing 
fishermen rather than enforcing a reduction in catch from all 
fishermen. If a quota is exceeded, a fine is imposed based on the 
overproduction. If a fishermen is unable to fulfill his quota because 
of the excesses of others, he receives payments equal to the amount 
between his catch and quota. Foreign fishermen are allowed to 
harvest the amount of the quota not caught by the domestic vessels. 
Quotas are a more efficient method to obtain the MSY than licenses
or taxes, but quotas do not optimize the economic yield as taxes
would since the same amount of fish would in theory be taken at a 
lower cost.
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